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I 
 
Abstract 
There has been a global consensus that GHG emissions including carbon dioxide 
(CO2) are the main cause of climate change and global warming, which can have a 
significant impact on business activity and behaviour (Saka and Oshika, 2014). Thus, 
carbon information has become more and more important for stakeholders to make 
an informed decision about a company’s GHG emissions performance (Luo & Tang, 
2014a&b; Rankin et al. 2011; Tang & Luo, 2014; Luo et al. 2013; Luo & Tang, 
2015). However, there is criticism that companies tend to disclose some unreliable 
climate change related information (Kolk et al. 2008). It can be argued that corporate 
governance plays a critical role in determining how companies are responding to 
climate change. This is because companies that have a high quality of corporate 
governance are more likely to integrate climate change into their business strategy 
and are more likely to maintain the long term commitment to effectively address 
climate change risks and opportunities across their entire operating system. But there 
is limited empirical evidence about this (Liao et al. 2014). 
The purpose of this thesis is, therefore, to investigate two empirical issues. First, it 
investigates the effect of corporate governance mechanisms (board size, board 
independence, board diversity, board meetings, audit committee independence, 
environmental committee presence, CEO stock option, CEO long term bonus, 
ownership concentration and managerial ownership), on carbon performance. 
Second, this study examines the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and the extensiveness of carbon disclosure.  
The sample of this study consisted of an unbalanced panel set of 205 firm-year 
observations from the largest Australian companies that participated in the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP) questionnaire survey over a period of four years (2009-
2012). Twenty hypotheses are developed and tested using Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) multiple regression analysis to identify the correlation between corporate 
governance structures and carbon performance and disclosure together with the 
possible impact of the institutional environment in determining this relationship. 
Regarding carbon performance, the empirical results show: first, generally speaking, 
the overall corporate government strength is not significantly related to carbon 
performance. Second, superior carbon performance is only found in firms that take 
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an environmental orientation and proactive carbon strategy. Third, carbon 
performance is higher in carbon intensity sectors than carbon non- intensity sectors. 
Finally, the results also indicate carbon performance is sensitive to some financial 
indicators such as leverage, Tobin’s Q, and capital intensity. The findings from the 
empirical study on carbon disclosure indicate that some dimensions of corporate 
governance, (board size, board independence, board diversity and managerial 
ownership), are significantly correlated with the degree of carbon transparency. 
Whereas, other corporate governance mechanisms are not significantly associated 
with the extensiveness of carbon disclosure.  The results also showed that firm size, 
(as control variable), is significantly associated with the degree of carbon 
transparency. 
The results of this study contributes to a growing literature on corporate governance 
and climate change association and presents new evidence of how carbon 
performance/disclosure is impacted by corporate governance. My findings suggest 
the current version of corporate governance mechanism in Australia appears to be 
structured to focus primarily on maximisation of financial performance.  As a 
consequence, the board of directors of my sample firms seem to focus less on other 
aspects of performance such as carbon reduction. The study also contributes to the 
increasing literature about how corporate governance motivates the proactivity of 
corporate sustainability strategy in general and in carbon disclosure in particular.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
OF THE RESEARCH 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Among the major problems of the 21st century is the emission of GHG and the 
overdependence on carbon-based energy sources. Scientific researchers continue to 
present mounting evidence of the effects of GHG on climate change. Companies 
have always been central to the efforts to face these two problems owing to the large 
quantity of material that they process leading to the release of GHGs as a by-product 
and their capabilities for technological innovation (Hoffmann & Busch, 2008). This 
importance is reflected in the emerging literature in the fields of corporate and public 
policy which requires companies and organizations to respond and adapt to climate 
change (Griffiths et al. 2007). 
The control of GHG emissions is a fundamental aspect of sustainable development. 
All managers and corporate personnel are obliged to develop organizational 
structures for the control of emissions, assessment of the risks associated with GHG 
and the evaluation of carbon control mechanisms developed to address the issue.  
According to a report issued by the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP, 2011) and 
Pinkse & Kolk, (2009) corporate carbon reporting has increased around the world 
and particularly in Australia over the last few years. This is mainly due to the fact 
that climate change issues have become increasingly fundamental to a wide range of 
stakeholders in the corporate sector, which has shifted attention to the effects of 
GHG, mainly carbon, on corporate activities (Luo & Tang, 2011). This is a trend 
evidenced by the increase in the number of socially responsible investments by firms 
all over the world (Clarkson, Richardson & Vasvari, 2011). 
This current research examines the carbon information that is disclosed voluntarily in 
the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) by Australian firms and the underlying carbon 
performance and its correlation with corporate governance structure. The CDP 
reports encourage the firms to develop web-based forms of corporate accountability 
with regard to carbon activities (Luo & Tang, 2011).  
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The disclosure of environmental information by Australian companies started in the 
early 1990s but it was not until after a change in the Australian Corporations Law 
was enacted some years later in July 1998 (Section 299 (1)(f)) that it was taken 
seriously. In early years, environmental disclosure was largely voluntary and very 
few disclosures were recorded in July 1998. This change in Australian Corporations 
Law required all corporate executives, specifically for companies whose operations 
were subject to any particular environmental regulation, to include details of their 
company’s performance in annual director’s report (Gibson, & O’Donovan, 2007). 
According to Frost & English, (2002), there has been a significant increase in the 
number of companies disclosing the information on their performance in relation to 
the environmental regulations since the enactment of that law in Australia. This study 
analyses data in CDP reports to determine whether Australian companies actually 
disclose carbon performance information. It also provides an insight into the role 
played by institutional governance systems in their carbon performance and carbon 
disclosure. 
1.2 Objectives of this study 
 
This study examines the relations between corporate governance mechanisms and 
carbon performance and the extensiveness of carbon disclosure. It aims to investigate 
the impact of structure and quality of corporate governance on carbon performance 
and disclosure using the largest Australian Companies that participated in the CDP 
questionnaire survey over four years (2009-2012). 
The objectives of the study are: 
1- To examine the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on carbon 
performance. 
2- To investigate whether the corporate governance indicators are linked with 
the extensiveness of carbon disclosure. 
3- To explore whether existing conceptual framework can explains the 
association between corporate governance, and carbon performance and 
carbon disclosure. 
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1.3 Motivation of this study  
 
The Australian Government has been advised by scientists that the climate is 
changing around the world and that there will be adverse effects on Australia if the 
global temperatures continue to rise (The Australian Government’s Climate Change 
Plan, 2011). Australia -as a hot and dry continent - has more to lose from climate 
change than any other developed country (Garnaut, 2011). Given the significant risks 
to the environment and economy of Australia, it is important for researchers to 
contribute and find ways to improve carbon performance. 
Generally, environmental and carbon performance are not compulsory by regulation; 
therefore it would be of interest to find out why companies voluntarily report this 
information, and what theories can explain social and environmental reporting 
practices. The most recent version of the KPMG International Survey of Corporate 
Responsibility Reporting from 2011 shows nearly 80% of the Global Fortune 250 
now produce corporate responsibility reports including environmental and carbon 
performance reports. Since a significant number of companies (both globally and in 
Australia & New Zealand) are embracing public social and environmental 
performance information, this is a worthwhile question for investigation. If we 
understand the reasons behind the reporting, we are in a position to judge the quality 
of the information that is being reported. Having the ability to judge the quality of 
the disclosures empowers users to make more informed decisions about how to 
invest, what products to buy, and which companies to work for, and could also 
inform regulators to improve the regulations and standards in this area. 
 This research work was inspired by the significance of the carbon performance of 
Australian organisations and their role in GHG emissions. It is also expected that this 
study will enrich both academic and empirical literature on several accounts: 
• First, the majority of previous literature focuses on partial aspects of the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and social and 
environmental performance (e.g. Walls et al. 2012; De Villiers et al.  2011; Hafsi & 
Targut, 2013 & Deckop et al. 2006). In contrast, this study will examine the 
association between a number of individual and specific dimensions of corporate 
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governance mechanisms and carbon performance and carbon disclosures in 
Australia.  
• Second, there is no previous study that used a comprehensive set of corporate 
governance indicators or thoroughly examined the relationship with carbon 
performance and disclosure.  
• Third, compared to prior studies, this study focuses on Carbon Disclosure 
Project (CDP) reports, whereas the majority of studies evaluated GHG disclosures in 
annual, sustainability and web site reports (Peng, Sun & Luo, 2015; Chithambo & 
Tauringana, 2014; Rankin et al. 2011). 
1.4 Research Questions 
 
Based on the above objectives, the main research question is:  
 
To what extent is good corporate governance related to better carbon 
performance and higher level of carbon disclosures? 
The study discusses the following questions:  
1- What is corporate governance?  
2- How to measure carbon performance? 
3- How to measure the extensiveness of carbon disclosure? 
4- What indicators of corporate governance are associated with carbon 
performance and the extensiveness of carbon disclosure? 
1.5 Expected Contribution of the study 
 
There are limited studies that have investigated the relationship between corporate 
governance and environmental disclosure, especially for carbon 
performance/disclosure in Australia. The current study will fill the gap and, to my 
knowledge, this is the first study to examine the issue in Australia by using a wide 
array of corporate governance mechanisms. The study chooses Australian firms 
because Australia is one of the highest per capita carbon emitters in the world and 
Australia will be most significantly and negatively affected by global warming (Lue 
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& Tang, 2014). Additionally, Australian government has introduced a series of GHG 
legislations which signal a new era of transition toward a carbon constrained 
economy. Currently the environmental accounting literature is limited to the issues 
related to water and toxic chemical pollution rather than carbon pollution. For the 
majority of Australian firms, the exposure to carbon liability has much more 
financial implication than general environmental exposure. This is due to the fact that 
these firms do not have water or toxic chemical air pollution problems, but any 
carbon emission is subject to carbon tax (although this tax was repealed in 2014, 
there are other provisions to restrict carbon emissions). Consequently, the results of 
my study contributes to a growing literature on corporate governance and climate 
change association and presents new evidence of how carbon performance and 
transparency is impacted by the strength and structure of corporate governance. 
1.6 Research Methodology 
 
The sample selection process of this study starts from the largest Australian 
companies that participated in the CDP survey over the 2009 - 2012 periods. The 
final sample that met all of the selection criteria includes 205 firm- year 
observations. While the data relating to corporate governance were hand collected 
from firms’ annual reports, carbon emissions and activities data have been obtained 
from firms’ response to a CDP standardised questionnaire. The financial data are 
gathered from the FinAnalysis database. In order to test the hypotheses, descriptive 
statistics was used first that includes sample values such as the mean, median, 
standard deviation, minimum, maximum values, 25th and 75th percentile of the 
variables and Skewness-Kurtosis statistics, etc. And then, the Pearson correlation 
matrix is constructed to identify the correlation between the dependent and 
independent variables. In addition, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) multiple 
regression analysis was the primary statistical technique adopted to test the predicted 
association between two dimensions of the carbon activity. First, the association 
between a number of corporate governance characteristics and carbon performance 
was tested. Second, the impact of various corporate governance mechanisms on 
carbon disclosure was examined. Finally, additional analysis was performed to check 
the robustness of the main regression analysis.  
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1.7 Outline of the Thesis 
 
As seen in Figure 1.3 below, this thesis has six chapters which are structured as 
follows; Chapter 1 provides an overview of this thesis, which begins with the 
objectives of this thesis, followed by the motivations of the study. It then continues 
to identify research questions as well as expected contribution of the research. A 
brief summary of the research methodology is also presented in the end of this 
chapter. 
Chapter 2 provides a review of relevant literature to this study. The first section of 
the chapter provides a comprehensive definition of corporate governance. The 
chapter then focuses on the background of GHG emission in Australia. The chapter 
also explores previous studies on carbon performance and their relationship with 
corporate governance mechanisms. Following this, we provide the previous literature 
investigating the association between corporate governance mechanisms and 
environmental and carbon disclosure. Finally, this chapter presents the three main 
theories that would be suitable within the scope of the empirical work. The 
theoretical perspectives reviewed are: legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory, and 
signalling theory. 
Chapter 3 discusses the research method that was employed to test my hypotheses in 
the current study.  The first section commences with explaining the procedures of 
sample selection and data sources.  The criteria for selection of my sample are also 
explained. After the data description, the chapter also discusses the development of 
the main hypotheses to be tested in this study. My hypotheses are drawn heavily 
from literature reviews that are provided in chapter three. The chapter also describes 
the measurements of the dependent variable (carbon performance and carbon 
disclosure). Following this, the chapter describes the measurements of corporate 
governance mechanisms and control variables. Finally, the chapter further concludes 
with an explanation of the statistical techniques used in this study and the regression 
models employed to test my hypotheses and the outcome of this research. 
Chapter 4 presents the first phase of the current study which uses quantitative 
methods for the investigation of the impact of corporate governance on carbon 
performance. It starts by explaining five statistical assumptions that determines the 
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validity of the regression model, namely: linearity, independence of errors, 
normality, homoscedasticity and multicollinearity. The chapter then includes a 
comprehensive descriptive analysis of the variables used in the first model. After that 
the correlation coefficients analysis and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) are 
conducted to identify the collinearity and multicollinearity problems among 
variables.  OLS regression analysis was employed in this study to examine this 
relationship. The results of the regressions of corporate governance and carbon 
performance are evaluated. Finally, additional analysis and the robustness checks are 
discussed in the end of this chapter. 
Chapter 5 investigates the link between a number of individual corporate governance 
mechanisms and the extensiveness of carbon disclosure in the largest Australian 
companies. The assumptions, namely; linearity, independence of errors, normality, 
homoscedasticity and multicollinearity are examined to detect violations in the 
regression model. The chapter then presents the descriptive analysis of the variables 
used in this model. Additionally, the correlation coefficients analysis and Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) are reviewed. Following this, OLS regressions have been 
employed to test the association between corporate governance mechanisms and the 
extensiveness of carbon disclosure. The chapter also provides a detailed discussion 
of the results and testing of the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3. 
Finally, the summary of the whole thesis is provided in chapter 6. In this chapter, an 
overview of the main results are presented and commented upon. It then discusses 
the main contributions, potential implications and limitations of this study. In 
addition, this chapter ends by providing several avenues for future research that arise 
from the empirical; results and limitations of the study. 
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Figure 1.3: Thesis Structure 
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The primary goals of this chapter are to provide a review of the extensive research on 
the structure of corporate governance and to review its relationship with 
environmental/social performance and disclosure, as well as to review the different 
theories that have been used to explain these associations. However, since the 
context of carbon emissions is relatively new, this chapter sheds light on previous 
environmental studies in order to link this study with the prior literature. 
Furthermore, previous studies are to be reviewed in order to build the relevant 
theoretical framework and research hypotheses and the methodology of this study. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 provides a 
comprehensive picture of corporate governance definitions. Section 2.3 presents a 
background to carbon emissions. Section 2.4 highlights the three main theories that 
would be suitable within this study: legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory and 
signalling theory. Section 2.5 presents prior studies that have investigated the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and social/environmental 
performance, while Section 2.6 reviews studies that have demonstrated an 
association between corporate governance mechanisms and social/environmental 
performance. Finally, Section 2.7 concludes the whole chapter. 
2.2 Corporate Governance Definitions 
 
The increasing amount of corporate governance research over the last decades leads 
to greater variation of the corporate governance definitions. However, there is as yet 
no single, universally accepted definition of corporate governance because the 
circumstances vary country-by-country (Solomon, 2007). Furthermore, countries 
across the globe are dissimilar from each other in terms of culture, legal systems and 
historical developments (Ramon, 2001). This explains why there has been a 
multitude of corporate governance definitions around the world. Therefore, Table 2.1 
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below provides various definitions of corporate governance from different sources to 
give a better understanding of the concept of corporate governance (CG). 
Table 2.1: summary of CG Definitions adopted from previous studies 
Year Author/s Definitions 
1992 Cadbury Report CG is “the system by which companies are directed 
and controlled”. 
1993 Keasey & Wright CG is “the structures and processes associated with 
production, decision making, control and so on 
within an organisation to ensure that the agent acts 
for the benefit of shareholders and stakeholders”. 
1997 Shleifer & Vishny CG is defined as “the ways in which suppliers of 
finance to corporations assure themselves of getting 
a return on their investment”. 
1998 Gillan & Starks CG is “the system of laws, rules, and factors that 
control operations at a company”. 
1998a Zingales CG is “the complex set of constraints that shape the 
ex post bargaining over the quasi-rents generated 
by the firm”. 
2001 Tirole CG is “the design of institutions that induce or 
force management to internalize the welfare of 
stakeholders.” 
2003 Daily, Dalton & 
Cannella 
CG is “‘the determination of the broad uses to 
which organizational resources will be deployed 
and the resolution of conflicts among the myriad of 
participants in organizations”. 
2003 Denis & 
McConnell 
CG is “the set of mechanisms – both institutional 
and market-based – that induce the self-interested 
controllers of a company (those that make decisions 
regarding how the company will be operated) to 
make decisions that maximize the value of the 
company to its owners (the suppliers of capital).” 
2004 The Organization CG is “a set of relationships between a company’s 
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for Economic 
Cooperation and 
Development 
(OECD) 
management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders.” 
2005a Luo CG is “the relationship between the corporation and 
the stakeholders that determines and controls the 
strategic direction and performance of the 
corporation”. 
2005 
 
Du Plessis, 
McConvill & 
Bagaric 
CG as “the process of controlling management and 
of balancing the interests of all internal 
stakeholders and other parties (external 
stakeholders, governments and local communities) 
who can be affected by the corporation’s conduct in 
order to ensure responsible behaviour by 
corporations and to achieve the maximum level of 
efficiency and profitability for a corporation”. 
2005 Hennessey CG is “the set of actions and procedures that ensure 
a company is soundly managed so all investors 
receive a return on their investment that is 
reasonable given the risks involved”. 
2007 Larcker, 
Richardson & 
Tuna 
CG is “the set of mechanisms that influence the 
decisions made by managers when there is a 
separation of ownership and control”. 
2008 Donnelly & 
Mulcahy 
CG is “a set of control mechanisms that is specially 
designed to monitor and ratify managerial 
decisions, and to ensure the efficient operation of a 
corporation on behalf of its stakeholders.” 
2009 Rezaee CG is “The process affected by a set of legislative, 
regulatory, legal, market mechanisms, listing 
standards, best practices, and efforts of all 
corporate participants including the company’s 
directors, officers, auditors, legal counsel, and 
financial advisor’s which creates a system of 
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checks and balances with the goal of creating and 
enhancing enduring and sustainable shareholder 
value, while protecting the interests of other 
stakeholders”. 
2010,2007 ASX Corporate 
Governance 
Council 
CG is “the framework of rules, relationships, 
systems and processes within and by which 
authority is exercised and controlled in 
corporations.” 
2011 Larcker and 
Tayan 
CG is “the collection of control mechanisms that an 
organization adopts to prevent or dissuade 
potentially self-interested managers from engaging 
in activities detrimental to the welfare of 
shareholders and stakeholders.” 
2013 Solomon CG is “the system of checks and balances, both 
internal and external to companies, which ensures 
that companies discharge their accountability to all 
their stakeholders and act in a socially responsible 
way in all areas of their business activity.” 
 
In sum, whatever definition above is preferred, it is clear that the narrowest definition 
of corporate governance was proposed by Cadbury Report, (1992) which described 
the basic role of corporate governance. OECD’s (2004) definition focused only on 
shareholders and company management from the finance perspective. Solomon, 
(2013) extended this concept to a broader definition that encompassed corporate 
accountability to all their stakeholders and the wider society. Therefore, the key 
purpose of corporate governance is to manage the corporation in such a way that will 
ensure better performance for its key stakeholders. 
2.3 Theoretical Background  
2.3.1 Introduction 
 
Chambers (1996) reported that a theory will not tell us what we ought to do, but it 
will tell us what it is possible to do and what it is not possible to do. In that way it 
13 
 
removes countless considerations when confronted with the necessity of choosing or 
acting. In this sense, a review of the relevant literature reveals that a variety of 
theoretical frameworks have been used in order to describe and explain 
environmental disclosure practices and mechanisms of corporate governance. A 
number of theories, e.g. legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory and signalling theory, 
have been found to be particularly relevant to explain the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and carbon performance and disclosure. 
The rest of this section provides a theoretical framework to support the 
aforementioned argument. In doing so, the study explores multiple theories that 
explain different perspectives related to carbon performance and disclosure and 
governance practices.  
2.3.2 Legitimacy theory 
 
Legitimacy theory has become one of the most popular theories that have been 
widely used to explain the social and environmental disclosure literature (Patten 
1992; Deegan & Gordon, 1996; O'Donovan, 2002; Deegan, Rankin & Tobin 2002). 
Legitimacy was defined by Lindblom (1994, p.2) as: “a condition or a status which 
exists when an entity's value system is congruent with the value system of the larger 
social system of which the entity is a part. When a disparity, actual or potential, 
exists between the two value systems, there is a threat to the entity's legitimacy”.  
Fundamentally, legitimacy theory relies upon the idea of a social contract between a 
company and the members of the society in which it operates (Patten, 1991; 
Mathews, 1993; Deegan, 2002). Normative argument that is fundamental to 
legitimacy theory is that organisations will only survive and prosper if they operate 
within the boundaries and norms of their respective societies (Gray, Owen & Adams, 
1996). In order to maintain their legitimacy within society, the theory of legitimacy 
assumes that companies may voluntarily disclose social and environmental 
information regarding their performance in order to legitimise their activities so as to 
give the impression of being socially responsible to the society (Deegan, 2002; 
O’Donovan, 1999; Patten, 1991). Therefore, legitimacy theory has been adopted by 
numerous previous studies in the context of the social and environmental disclosure 
literature (e.g. Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Deegan et al. 2000; Deegan, 2002; Gray et 
al. 1996). 
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The legitimacy of an organisation can be thought of as a process or simply as a state 
of being (Deephouse, 1996). No problems exist when there are no differences 
between organisational and societal values. However, legitimacy is threatened when 
such differences arise. Therefore, whenever there is such a gap, organisations take 
sufficient steps or perform certain activities to close this ‘legitimacy gap’ that exists 
between their values and those of the wider society. This is done in order to re-
establish a state of organisational legitimacy. Ultimately, this state of legitimacy is 
bestowed upon organisations by the wider society or relevant public, as it is within 
their power to determine the organisation’s state of legitimacy, thereby reflecting 
their views of the organisation. Ultimately, it is in the best interests of the 
organisation to ensure that the wider society has a positive perception of them, since 
they exist within the sphere of the wider society and are dependent upon it. As such, 
when there is a shift in society’s perception of them, the organisation focuses on 
gaining or repairing legitimacy. Therefore, it is crucial that corporate entities are 
aware of shifts in societal perceptions in order to ensure that no threats to their 
legitimacy exist (Deegan, 2007). 
Lindblom (1994) argues that there are four distinct strategies that organisations 
employ whenever there is a perceived threat to their legitimacy. First, they try to 
educate and inform their stakeholders regarding relevant changes in the 
organisation’s performance. Second, they seek to change stakeholders’ perceptions 
regarding the organisation’s performance without changing the performance itself. 
Third, they manipulate perceptions by deflecting attention from the issues of concern 
to other related but appealing issues. Fourth, they seek to change external 
expectations regarding their performance. Disclosure plays an important role in each 
of these four legitimacy threat mitigation strategies. This leads us to believe that 
legitimacy theory does explain some components of voluntary disclosure practices. 
Legitimacy is akin to the firm’s reputation in certain ways, as it exists in people’s 
minds (Breton & Cote, 2006). Since people’s perceptions have a significant 
influence, it is crucial that these perceptions be positive in order to maximise the 
firm’s utility. In order to gain such legitimacy, a certain degree of disclosure is 
desirable, even if it is not mandatory (Magness, 2006). Without such disclosure, 
people rely on preconceived notions in order to form their perceptions, and this may 
carry an element of risk. Legitimacy is not always threatened when an organisation 
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deviates from societal expectations; sometimes, it may be threatened even if the 
organisation has failed to provide evidence that it is indeed conforming to the 
expectations that society has of it. Lack of disclosure could be perceived as evidence 
of insufficient socially responsible behaviour. This means that the entity would 
become vulnerable to claims of negligence (Meyer & Rowan, 1991, cited in 
Suchman, 1995). However, disclosure in itself might also result in a variety of 
responses. This is because the firm might have compromised their responsibilities in 
order to achieve short-term financial targets. Therefore, voluntary disclosures, 
whenever they are made, are done using a strategic consideration of defiance, 
acquiescence and compromise (O’Dwayer, 2002). Furthermore, it is important to 
consider how ‘legitimacy’ as a driver can often result in what can only be termed as 
‘minimal appeasement’ (O’Dwayer, 2002). For example, if there is a hypothetical 
clash between environmentalists and the financial stakeholders of a company, there 
is a possibility that any disclosures made to appease the demands of the former will 
not be a true reflection of the organisation’s performance in the area. Instead, it may 
remain a symbolic gesture aimed at minimally appeasing this group as opposed to 
defying them completely. 
In support of the legitimacy theory, Patten (1992) concluded that the increasing 
concerns of society increased the level of social responsibility information in annual 
reports, which is believed to be evidence of legitimacy in support of corporate 
reactions to society in order to gain its approval for the company’s existence. These 
conclusions are grounded in the legitimacy theory arguments of Preston & Post 
(1975). This is consistent with Deegan & Rankin (1996), who conducted a study 
indicating a positive association between an increase in the level of environmental 
disclosures and companies that have been prosecuted by Australian state 
Environmental Protection Authorities (EPAs).  On the other hand, Guthrie & Parker 
(1989) conducted an analysis of social disclosures for Australian 
mining/manufacturing company, Broken Hill Proprietary Company Ltd (BHP) 
through its annual reports over a 100-year period. They argued that the testing of 
legitimacy theory as an explanation for BHP’s social disclosures relied upon the 
matching of peak social disclosure periods with periods of significant social and 
environmental events affecting the company. However, the analysis failed to confirm 
legitimacy theory as an explanation for CSR, particularly for BHP’s social 
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disclosures. Furthermore, according to Campbell, Craven & Shrives (2003), 
legitimacy theory has not provided a suitable measure of the effect of disclosures 
being able to change the perceptions of the relevant public in isolation from other 
influences and events in the society.  
Drawing on the literature regarding legitimacy theory, it can be inferred that 
legitimacy theory could be used in order to predict and understand the quality of 
voluntary disclosures in cases of carbon performance. For example, if the legitimacy 
of a firm is threatened by negative media coverage, it is likely that the firm will make 
soft claims that are hard to verify. This is a form of tactical disclosure that aims to 
strategically restore legitimacy without sufficiently changing the activity of the 
organisation whose legitimacy is being threatened.  
2.3.3 Stakeholder theory 
 
Initially, the purposes of stakeholder theory were to defend the social responsibilities 
of businesses and to declare that managers have a moral responsibility towards 
stakeholders other than financial stakeholders (Hendry, 2001). These stakeholders 
are usually critical factors in determining and ensuring the success of the 
organisation, and therefore deserve to be eligible for some return on their 
involvement (Crowther & Jatana, 2005). Under stakeholder theory, the shared values 
between society and business organisations are a necessary part of doing business 
and reject the separation of ethics and economics (Freeman, 1994). In particular, the 
theory also allows businesses to articulate how they want to go about conducting 
their transactions and whether they care about giving something back to the people 
who are involved in or affected by their activities. Therefore, the following section 
tries to achieve two major objectives: 
• Clarifying the stakeholder concept; 
• Categorising stakeholders such that their individual relationships with 
businesses can be better understood. 
The term of ‘stakeholder’ first appeared in the management literature in an internal 
memorandum at the Stanford Research Institute in 1963 in order to generalise the 
concept of stockholder as the only group to whom management need be responsive 
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(Freeman et al. 2010). Therefore, the concept of the stakeholder was originally 
defined by Freeman (1984: p.25) as “any group or individual who can affect or is 
affected by the achievement of the firm’s objectives”.  The symmetrical phrase is 
“any human agency that can be influenced by, or can itself influence the activities of 
the organization in question” (Gray et al. 1996: p.33).  Evan & Freeman (1988: p.79) 
further clarified the definition by stating that stakeholders are “those groups who 
have a stake in or a claim on the firm”. Thus, the major stakeholders of the company 
originally included shareholders, suppliers, customers, competitors, banks, 
employees, creditors, public interest groups, governmental bodies, local 
communities, stock markets, industry bodies and society (Tilt, 2007).   
The classifications of stakeholders can take various forms, such as differentiating 
between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995; Savage et al. 
1991). A primary stakeholder is defined as “one without whose continuing 
participation the corporation cannot survive as a going concern” (Metcalfe 1998 & 
Clarkson, 1995).  Consequently, primary stakeholders involve those who are directly 
engaged in transactions with the company and have the ability to impact its bottom 
line directly, such as shareholders, creditors, managers and employees, suppliers, 
customers and regulatory stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995). Secondary stakeholders are 
defined as those who affect or influence – or are affected or influenced by – the 
company, but are not involved in transactions with the company and are not 
necessary for its survival (Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997). Consequently, the media, 
special interest groups and the general public are identified as secondary stakeholders 
under this definition. Moreover, Mitchell et al. (1997) categorised stakeholders based 
upon stakeholders possessing one or more of the attributes of power, legitimacy and 
urgency. In terms of stakeholders’ power, this relates to the ability of one actor 
within a social relationship to have another actor do something that they would not 
otherwise have done (Mitchell et al. 1997; Weber, 1947). From this notion, power is 
described as a relationship among social actors in which one social actor (A) can get 
another social actor (B) to do something that (B) would not otherwise have done 
(Weber, 1947; Pfeffer, 1981). Legitimacy is the perception or belief that 
stakeholders’ claims are proper, desirable or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions (Thorne, Ferrell & 
Ferrell, 2003; Suchman, 1995). Urgency is based on two characteristics: time 
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sensitivity and the importance of the claim to the stakeholder (Thorne et al. 2003). 
These three attributes of a specific stakeholder can change over time or with 
variation of the issues (Mitchell et al. 1997).  
In addition, stakeholder theory can also be identified as having two different 
branches (Gray et al. 1996; Deegan, 2000). The first branch is ethical (or normative). 
Deegan (2002) argued that all stakeholders have the right to be treated fairly by a 
company. This idea is reflected in the accountability model that was developed by 
Gray et al. (1996), who argued that the company is accountable to all stakeholders to 
disclose social responsibility information. Under the ethical branch, the company is a 
way of coordinating the interests of stakeholders and management practices that have 
a fiduciary relationship with all stakeholders; where conflicts of interest arise, the 
business should be managed so as to attain the optimal balance between them 
(Hasnas, 1998). The other branch is known as the managerial (or positive) branch. 
Ullmann (1985) stated that the more powerful stakeholders (those who have 
substantial control over corporate resources) are more likely to receive attention from 
the company. Under managerial stakeholder theory, social performance and 
disclosure are seen as part of the dialogue with stakeholders (Deegan & Blomquist, 
2006; Gray et al. 1995). Ullman (1985: p.553) confirmed that an organisation “will 
use either social performance or social disclosure or both techniques simultaneously 
to manage its relationship with its stakeholders”. 
Ullmann (1985) developed a three-dimensional framework in order to explain 
corporate social activity based on a stakeholder theory that includes a stakeholder’s 
power, the company’s strategic posture toward Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) and the company’s economic performance. A stakeholder’s power to 
influence corporate management is viewed as a function of the stakeholder’s degree 
of control over the resources required by the organisation (Ullmann, 1985). Under 
stakeholder power, the more significant the resources controlled by the stakeholder 
to the survival of the corporation, the greater the expectation that the stakeholder’s 
demands will be met within the organisation’s operations (Gregoric and Debeljak, 
2006). Based on this perspective, Deegan & Blomquist (2006) suggested that 
companies would change their operating and reporting behaviour in line with 
stakeholder expectations and power. For instance, if a powerful group is concerned 
about the social or environmental performance of the company, then that company 
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might perceive a need to publicly disclose information about the social or 
environmental initiatives that it has or plans to implement in order to alleviate any 
concerns held by the powerful stakeholders. As part of this response, a firm may use 
disclosures in order to manage stakeholder demands. Dierkers & Antal (1985) 
indicated that social disclosures and corporate responsibility information can provide 
a basis for dialogue with various business constituencies. The second dimension is 
the company’s strategic posture toward CSR activities. More social responsibility 
activities can be 'active firm' and if a company does not develop specific social 
programs to meet stakeholder demands, can be 'passive firm'. Therefore, the more 
active the strategic posture, the more socially responsible activity disclosures are to 
be expected. The third dimension of Ullmann’s model concerns the company’s past 
and current economic results. The importance placed on meeting the social 
responsibility goals is very much dependent on the economic demands of the 
company, which impact directly on a company’s continued viability. Therefore, 
given certain levels of stakeholder power and strategic posture, an increase in 
economic success will yield increased socially responsible activities and disclosures. 
Donaldson & Preston (1995) argued that the stakeholder theory can be used in three 
different forms: descriptive, instrumental and normative. The descriptive approach of 
stakeholder theory is used to explain specific corporate characteristics/behaviours 
(Clarkson, 1995), as it has been used to describe the past, present and future activities 
of companies and their stakeholders in order to generate predictive propositions 
related to stakeholder management (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). The instrumental 
approach seeks to explain the specific links between stakeholder approaches and the 
achievement of traditional corporate objectives (e.g. profitability and growth) (Kotter 
& Heskett, 1992). This approach has been applied in environmental studies, 
indicating that adherence to stakeholder principles and practices achieve 
conventional corporate performance objectives. The normative approach is used to 
analyse the basis of the underlying moral and philosophical principles of the 
management of corporations (Marcus, 1993).  
A number of studies have used stakeholder theory to explain the rationale behind 
environmental disclosure, including GHG (e.g. Clarkson, 1995; Roberts, 1992; 
Deegan, 2002; Freedman & Jaggi, 2005; Liao, Luo & Tang, 2014). It has been 
suggested that environmental disclosures are made in response to the demands of 
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stakeholders for social and environmental information. In particular, Liao et al. 
(2014) argued that the intensity of conflicting stakeholder demands and preferences 
provides a potential explanation for GHG disclosures in terms of a firm’s 
responsiveness to climate change, its strategic orientation towards social and 
environmental responsibility and the trade-off between economic and ecological 
objectives. 
Stakeholder theory is significantly related to the legitimacy theory discussed above. 
Similarly to legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory places the organisation within the 
society in which it operates. However, legitimacy theory is concerned with society as 
a whole, whereas stakeholder theory narrows its focus to specific stakeholders who 
have a link (however tenuous) with the activities of the organisation. Legitimacy 
theory states that organisations should always operate within societal norms and 
ensure that their actions are perceived as legitimate by society, therefore suggesting a 
two-way interaction. Stakeholder theory, however, emphasises a one-way delivery of 
information to stakeholders regarding organisational accountability. From this, we 
can infer that these two theories are not in competition, as one could be led to 
believe. In fact, they can be seen as being complementary in terms of explaining the 
different frameworks that have been established in order to analyse different 
approaches to voluntary disclosure. 
2.3.4 Signalling theory 
 
Signalling theory deals with the issue of information asymmetry in an imperfect 
market (Akerlof, 1970). It argues that when there is such information asymmetry, the 
party with more information must convey or ‘signal’ this information to the other. It 
can therefore be inferred that, through such signalling, firms aim to distinguish 
themselves from others in terms of achievements. The concept of signalling theory 
was introduced by Spence, who first put forth the theory of signalling in 1973, 
primarily based on the seminal work of Akerlof (1970). Spence’s (1973) seminal 
work on labour markets revealed how a job applicant might engage in behaviours to 
reduce information asymmetry, which hampers the selection ability of potential 
employers. Signalling theory is essentially concerned with reducing information 
asymmetry between two parties (Spence, 2002). Therefore, signalling theory is 
useful for describing behaviours when two parties have access to different 
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information, in which the sender must choose whether and how to communicate the 
information and the receiver must choose how to interpret the signal (Connelly, 
Certo, Ireland & Reutzel, 2011). Several previous studies have confirmed the 
predictions of signalling theory suggesting that a high-quality firm will not shy away 
from informing the market of its quality (e.g. Kanagaretnam, Lobo & Whalen, 2007; 
Mitchell, 2006). Furthermore, managers voluntarily disclose both good and bad 
news, as the good news signals quality and the bad news is signalled in order to 
avoid reputational costs and litigation (Skinner, 1994). Dye (1985) indicated that 
even a company with good news may choose to withhold information from investors. 
By contrast, a firm with bad news may choose not to disclose such news if the firm is 
worried about its competitors’ potential reactions to this information. This is because 
the managers may not have any information to disclose (Kwon, 1988) or because the 
absence of disclosure may affect the managers’ performance (Nagar, 1999). In 
addition, Dye (1985) & Verrecchia (1983) posited that companies with ‘good news’ 
in terms of performance have the incentive to signal their ‘type’ to the market in 
order to avoid the adverse selection problem by making the credible environmental 
disclosures that poor performers find difficult to mimic.  
Based on the above arguments, firms are seen to have the incentive to disclose 
regardless of the ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ of their performed activities. If the 
activities are of sufficiently high quality, then the firm has the incentive to signal this 
to the market. This signalling enables stakeholders and investors to reassess the value 
of the firm, and they are therefore more likely to make decisions that are more 
favourable for the company. On the other hand, the signalling of so-called ‘bad’ 
information can help the company reduce legal costs and restore legitimacy, as most 
legitimacy-restoring strategies (discussed above) rely on the disclosure of 
information. In a changing corporate environment in which environmentally 
responsible behaviour is being rewarded, the signalling of positive environmental 
performance can also be helpful for attracting investors and reducing the costs of 
raising capital. There are a number of means by which companies can signal their 
positive behaviour, and amongst these, voluntary disclosure (especially in annual 
reports) is considered to be very effective (Ross, 1979). Therefore, the signalling of 
positive performance is also likely to bring about a variety of other benefits, such as 
improving the corporate image, attracting potential investors, lowering capital costs, 
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decreasing the volatility of their stocks, creating an understanding of the company’s 
products or services and, more importantly, improving relationships with various 
stakeholders (Rodgers, 2007). Other studies in this area have suggested that 
excellence in signalling can act as a motivation for companies to engage in voluntary 
disclosure (Oliviera, Rodrigues & Craig, 2006). Finally, it is also important to 
consider how the quality of signals is important in ensuring utility for the company. 
Morris (1987) reported that, for firms with superior performance, their signalling 
should be such that it is very difficult for low-quality firms to imitate them. 
Several studies have provided empirical support for signalling theory in an 
environmental setting (e.g. Li, Richardson & Thornton, 1997; Bewley & Li, 2000; 
Clarkson, Richardson & Vasvari, 2007; Clarkson, Overell & Chapple 2011; Luo, 
Tang & Lan, 2013), suggesting that companies with a superior environmental 
performance have the incentive to signal their ‘type’ to the market by making 
credible environmental disclosures that are very difficult for poor performers to 
mimic. In particular, Luo et al. (2013) suggested that firms with a good carbon 
performance prefer to signal their ‘good’ news to their investors, and they tend to use 
the types of credible disclosure that poor performers would find costly to imitate. 
2.4 literature review on carbon performance and disclosure studies 
 
Since the field of carbon emissions is relatively new, the literature review of current 
study begins with studies on environmental accounting and disclosure to link this 
study with prior literature. The main goal of this section is to provide a summary of 
the key results of each of previous study and its methodology to identify gaps in the 
existing literature. Therefore, prior studies are classified into the following two 
groups of studies that are relevant to this study: first, previous studies that have 
investigated the association between the characteristics of corporate governance and 
social/ environmental performance; and second, prior studies that have examined the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and social/environmental 
disclosures. 
 
 
23 
 
2.4.1 Corporate governance and social/environmental performance  
 
Only a few studies have explicitly investigated the association between corporate 
governance and carbon performance, and even fewer specifically in Australia. 
Therefore, this study starts with the previous environmental studies to link this study 
with prior literature. 
 Boulota (2013) empirically investigated whether and how female board directors 
may affect corporate social performance (CSP).  Her study used both of these 
alternative treatments of CSP. First, the impact of board gender diversity (BGD) is 
tested on overall CSP and then on CSP ‘strengths’ and CSP ‘concerns’. A sample of 
126 U.S. firms was gathered from the S&P 500 group of companies over a 5-year 
period (1999–2003). Her study used a generalised method of moments (GMMs) 
estimator to examine the link between board gender diversity and corporate social 
performance.  The empirical analysis indicated that board gender diversity has a 
positive and significant impact on overall CSP. However, this impact depends on the 
social performance metric used, In particular, the findings showed that board gender 
diversity has a stronger impact on the negative social practices of CSP (‘concerns’) 
than on the positive ones (‘strengths’).    
Hafsi & Targut, (2013) investigated the relationship between boardroom diversity 
and corporate social performance in a sample of S&P500 firms. The independent 
variables employed in their study include two indices; diversity of boards (DOB), 
which include board size, board independence, outside directors, and leadership 
duality; and diversity in boards (DIB) which include director gender, age, 
experience, tenure, and ethnicity. The results of OLS regression, based on a sample 
of 95 companies was composed of 49 companies in service (52%) and 46 companies 
in manufacturing (48%) industries, showed that a positive and significant association 
between gender and corporate social performance, negative and significant 
relationship between age and corporate social performance, while there is no 
significant relationship between other board structures (e.g. board size, board 
independence, outside directors, leadership duality, experience, tenure, and ethnicity) 
and corporate social performance. 
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Bai (2012) investigated how board size and occupational background of directors 
differentially influence social performance in both for-profit and non-profit 
organizations. Using data from California hospitals, they employed community 
benefits as a proxy for social performance, which was measured by the sum of 
uncompensated care cost, net education expense, and net research expense, divided 
by hospital gross patient revenues. The independent variables were board size, 
government officials on the board and physicians on the board. For- profit sample 
included 703 hospital-year observations from 137 hospitals, while the non-profit 
sample consisted of 1,236 hospital-year observations from 226 hospitals over the 
period of 2000 to 2005. The regression results showed that board size is positively 
related to social performance in for-profit hospitals and negatively associated with 
social performance in non-profit hospitals. In addition, the presence of government 
officials on the board is positively associated with social performance in non-profit 
hospitals and negatively related to social performance in for-profit hospitals. The 
results also indicated that representation of physicians on the board is positively 
associated with social performance in for-profit hospitals, whereas their presence is 
not significantly related to social performance in non-profit hospitals. 
Walls, Berrone & Phan, (2012) investigated how the relationships between and 
among the firms’ owners, managers, and boards of directors influence environmental 
performance of US companies. Their sample consisted of 313 US firms drawn from 
different polluting industries over nine years from 1997 to 2005 inclusive. Different 
techniques and statistical analyses were used. The regression results showed that 
shareholder activism and concentration have a direct influence on environmental 
performance. In addition, they found that the existence of environmental board 
committees was positive associated with KLD strengths and environmental concerns. 
However, environmental performance was seen to be poor in companies having 
large, less diverse boards. In contrast reverse results have been noted for smaller and 
more diverse boards. Further, in the case of environmental strengths, board size and 
CEO salary show that better environmental performance is due to a small board-low 
salary or a large board-high salary combination, whereas for environmental concerns, 
a high salary is much more detrimental to environmental performance than a low 
salary. 
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De Villers, Naiker & van Staden (2011) investigated the relationship between board 
characteristics and environmental performance of a firm. Board characteristics 
encompassed the boards’ monitoring role (director independence, CEO-chair duality, 
directors appointed after CEO, CEO-director ownership, insider-director ownership 
and outsider-director ownership) and boards’ resource provision role (board size, 
multiple directorships, active CEOs, law experts, and board tenure). The study 
sample consisted of an unbalanced panel of 2,151 observations from 1,216 firms, 
with 981 of the total observations pertaining to the year 2003 and 1,170 for the year 
2004. All the data was collected after careful consideration from the KLD database. 
By using logistic regression model, they concluded that the environmental 
performance is better in firms with higher board independence and lower 
concentration of directors appointed after the CEO on the board of directors. In 
addition, environmental performance is much better in firms that have larger boards, 
larger representation of active CEOs on the board and more legal experts on the 
board. Their findings were consistent with agency theory and resource-dependence 
theory.  
Cong & Freedman (2011) examined the relationship between good corporate 
governance practices and environmental performance and its disclosure among a 
restricted sample of major toxin-emmitting U.S. firms. The dependent variables used 
were pollution performance (measured using a methodology that includes both the 
toxicology of the emissions and the population density of the community). For their 
review they selected the firms that were the top 50 volume metric releasers of toxics 
from the period of 2003 to 2005, from 1897 firms. An OLS regression was run for all 
the model specifications. The results indicated that good corporate governance is not 
associated with good pollution performance, where these results were consistent with 
legitimacy theory. 
In a separate study, Manner (2010) examined the relationship between CEO 
characteristics and corporate social performance in a sample of 650 public US firms 
during 2006. The independent variables used were CEO characteristics which 
include; educational fields of study and functional career experience, gender and 
CEO compensation. The dependent variable employed in his study was corporate 
social performance (CSP) measured by KLD Index rating .The results, based on OLS 
regression analysis, revealed that that strong CSP  is positively associated with the 
26 
 
CEO having a bachelor’s degree in humanities, having a breadth of career experience 
and being female. However, the results show that the CEO having a bachelor’s 
degree in economics and their level of short term compensation are negatively 
related to strong/proactive social performance. Whereas, long-term compensation is 
not associated with strong/proactive social performance.  
Deckop, Merriman & Gupta (2006) examined the relationship between CEO pay 
structure and corporate social performance in a sample of 313 firms. They measured 
corporate social performance using six dimensions from the KLD which are 
categorized into employee relations, product quality and safety, community relations, 
natural environment, human rights, and diversity. While two of the independent 
variables were used in this study which are short term pay focus and long term pay 
focus, their sample was drawn from the 2001 Standard & Poor’s 500 list. Regression 
analysis was employed to examine empirically the relationship between CEO pay 
and particular dimensions of CSP. The findings showed that   a short-term CEO pay 
focus was negatively associated with CSP, whereas the long-term focus was 
positively related to the corporate social performance. 
Mahoney & Thorne (2005) examined the association between long-term 
compensation and different aspects of corporate social responsibility for 90 publicly 
traded Canadian firms from 1992 to 1996. The dependent variables used were CSR 
(measured as Total CSR, Total CSR product and total CSR people). The independent 
variable used was long-term compensation (measured as the percentage of stock 
option grants to total executive compensation).The results of the regression analysis 
indicated the total CSR is marginally positively associated with higher levels of 
longer term compensation.  In addition, the results documented that the total CSR 
product dimension is related to higher levels of long-term compensation, whereas the 
total CSR people dimension is not associated with long-term compensation. 
McGuire, Dow & Argheyd, (2003) examined the relationship between CEO 
incentives (CEO ownership, Bonus, Salary and another long term incentives) and 
strong and weak corporate social performance. Social and environmental 
performance was measured by ratings by KLD and Company, while bonus measured 
as the proportion of bonus payments in the CEO’s compensation and long-term 
incentives measured as the percentage of long-term incentive payments (stock 
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options and other long-term incentives) in the CEO’s compensation. Their study was 
based on 374 US firms, with data being collected from three different databases and 
analysed using the OLS regression model. The empirical results showed that the 
CEO incentives (either short-term or long-term compensation) and strong social 
performance are not significant, whereas salary and long-term incentives are 
positively associated with poor social performance. 
Kassinis & Vafeas (2002) empirically examined the determinants of environmental 
litigation in  the U.S. Their study was drawn on the issues of corporate governance in 
general and board structure in particular to empirically investigate environmental 
lawsuits. The potential explanatory factors that included characteristics of board 
structure were board size, director affiliation, director reputation and inside 
ownership. The sample is composed of 209 firms that were convicted and penalized 
for breaking an environmental law in the U.S for the period of 1994 to 1998. 
Multivariate logistic regression results indicated that board size and the fraction of 
directors in peer firms are positively related to the environmental violations. In 
addition, the results showed that the fraction of common stock owned by officers and 
directors is positively associated with environmental violations. In contrast, the 
number of directorships held by outside directors is negatively related to 
environmental violations. 
McKendall, Sánchez & Sicilian (1999) conducted a study to determine the effect of 
several different dimensions of board structure on the incidence of illegal 
environmental activity by corporations from 1985 to 1987, using the number of 
illegal violation of environmental regulations as essential tools for investigation. 
Based on a sample of 150 U.S firms, the results of the Tobit regression analyses 
showed that value of stock owned by corporate officers and directors was positively 
associated with environmental violations. On the other hand, outsider dominance, 
joint CEO-chairperson, presence of social responsibility officers in committee and 
lawyers on the board did not have any significant correlation with incidences of 
environmental violations.  
Coffey & Wang (1998) empirically evaluated both board diversity and managerial 
control of the board as predictors of corporate social performance in the U.S firms. 
They used two measures of board diversity: the percentage of inside board members 
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and the percentage of women board members, and two measures of managerial 
control: percentage of total stock owned by inside board members and ratio of stock 
owned by outside to inside board members. The sample used in this study was 
comprised of 98 Fortune 500 U.S companies. Multiple regressions were employed to 
examine the competing hypotheses regarding this relationship. The empirical results 
revealed that the ratio of insiders to outsiders on the board and the percentage of 
stock owned by insiders are positively significantly associated with charitable 
contributions. Whereas, percentage of women and ratio of stock owned by outside to 
inside board members are not. 
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Table 2.2: Summary of previous studies investigating the association between Corporate Governance and Social/Environmental 
Performance 
 
Author/Year 
 
Variables Methods  
Main results Dependent Independent Sample Analysis 
Technique 
Boulota 
(2013) 
 
Corporate Social 
Performance 
 
Board Gender Diversity 
 
A  sample of 126 firms 
drawn from the S&P500 
group of companies over 
a 5-year period 
 
Generalised 
method of 
moments 
(GMMs) 
estimator. 
The findings suggested that board gender 
diversity (BGD) has a positive and 
significant impact on overall CSP. 
However, this impact depends on the 
social performance metric under 
investigation. 
Hafsi & 
Targut (2013) 
 
Corporate Social 
Performance 
Diversity of boards: 
outside directors, board 
size, ownership, 
leadership duality. 
Diversity in boards: 
gender, age, ethnicity, 
experience, and tenure. 
 
A sample of 95 
companies was composed 
of 49 companies in 
service (52 %) and 46 
companies in 
manufacturing (48 %) 
industries. 
 
OLS regression 
Model 
They found that gender has a positive 
and significant effect on social 
performance and age has negative effect 
on corporate social performance. 
However, other board structures (outside 
directors, board size, ownership, 
leadership duality, ethnicity, experience, 
and tenure) have no significant effect on 
social performance. 
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Bai (2012)  
Corporate Social 
Performance 
 
Board size, government 
officials on the board and 
physicians on the board. 
 
A profit sample included 
703 hospital-year 
observations from 137 
hospitals, while the non-
profit sample consisted of 
1,236 hospital-year 
observations from 226 
hospitals over the period 
of 2000 to 2005 
 
OLS regression 
Models 
They found that board size is positively 
associated with social performance in 
for-profit hospitals and negatively 
associated with social performance in 
non-profit hospitals. In addition, the 
presence of government officials on the 
board is positively related to social 
performance in non-profit hospitals and 
negatively associated with social 
performance in for-profit hospitals. The 
results also indicated that representation 
of physicians on the board is positively 
associated with social performance in 
for-profit hospitals, whereas their 
presence is not significantly related to 
social performance in non-profit 
hospitals. 
Walls et al. 
(2012) 
 
Environmental 
performance: 
-KLD 
environmental 
strengths 
-KLD 
Institutional Ownership: 
Instl owner, Invt turnover, 
SH activisim, SH 
concentr. 
Board of Directors: 
independence, Envt 
A sample of 313 US firms 
drawn from different 
polluting industries over 
nine years from 1997 to 
2005 inclusive 
 
Poisson 
regression,  
Random effects 
model 
 
They found that shareholder activism 
and concentration have a direct impact 
on environmental performance. When 
boards were more independent, large, 
and less diverse, environmental 
performance suffered. And smaller and 
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environmental 
concerns 
 
com’tee, Diversity, Size. 
Managerial Incentives: 
CEO duality, Mgr control, 
CEO bonus, CEO salary, 
CEO options 
more diverse boards can mitigate 
detrimental environmental performance 
more effectively. Environmental board 
committees were positively associated 
with both environmental strengths and 
concerns. In the case of environmental 
strengths, board size and CEO salary 
show that better environmental 
performance is due to a small board-low 
salary or a large board-high salary 
combination, whereas for environmental 
concerns, a high salary is much more 
detrimental to environmental 
performance than a low salary. 
De Villiers et 
al.  (2011) 
 
Environmental 
performance 
 
Director independence, 
CEO-chair duality, 
directors appointed after 
CEO, CEO-director 
ownership, insider-
director ownership, 
outside-director 
ownership, board size, 
 
A sample consists of an 
unbalanced panel of 2,151 
observations from 1,216 
firms, with 981 of the 
total observations 
pertaining to the year 
2003 and 1,170 for the 
year 2004 in the U.S. 
 
Logistic 
regression 
They found the higher environmental 
performance in firms is correlated with 
(1) higher concentration of independent 
directors and (2) lower concentration of 
directors appointed after the CEO.  As 
well, they show that environmental 
performance is higher in firms that have 
(1) larger boards, (2) a large 
representation of active CEOs on the 
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multiple directorships, 
active CEOs, law experts 
and board tenure. 
board, and (3) more legal experts on the 
board. 
 Cong & 
Freedman, 
(2011) 
 
Environmental 
performance, 
Environmental 
disclosure 
A corporate governance 
index developed by 
Brown & Caylor (2006). 
The top 50 volume metric 
releasers of toxics in 2003 
to 2005 from 1897 firms 
in the US. 
OLS regression 
Models 
No relationship between good 
governance and pollution performance. 
Manner 
(2010) 
Corporate Social 
Performance 
CEO characteristics: 
Educational field of study, 
functional career 
experience, Gender and 
CEO Compensation 
A sample of 650 public 
US firms 
OLS regression 
Model 
They found that there is a significant 
positive relationship between the CEO 
having a bachelor’s degree in 
humanities, having a breadth of career 
experience and being female and strong 
or exemplary CSP, as measured by the 
strengths categories of KLD’s ratings. 
However, they found that KLD strength 
ratings are negatively related to the CEO 
having a bachelor’s degree in economics 
and short-term compensation. 
Deckop et al. 
(2006) 
 
Corporate Social 
Performance 
CEO short -term and 
long-term pay focus 
 
A sample of 313 firms 
from the 2001 Standard & 
Poor’s (S&P) 500 list. 
OLS regression 
model 
They found a significant negative 
relationship between a short-term pay 
focus and CSP, and a significant positive 
relationship between a long-term focus 
and CSP. 
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Mahoney & 
Thorne.  
(2005) 
 
Strengths and 
weaknesses in 
corporate social 
responsibility 
Pay mix: stock option 
grants/total compensation 
A sample of 90 publicly 
traded Canadian firms 
from the TS market 
capitalization (1992-
1996). 
Regression 
analyses 
The results indicated a significant 
relationship between the long-term 
compensation and the total CSR 
weakness as well as the product/ 
environmental weakness dimensions of 
CSR. In addition, they found a 
marginally significant relationship 
between long-term compensation and 
total CSR performance. 
McGuire et al. 
(2003) 
 
Strengths and 
weaknesses in 
corporate social 
performance 
CEO salary, bonus and 
long-term compensation 
A sample of 374 firms 
from three sources: Salary 
and incentives are taken 
from S&P Execucomp 
database, financial and 
ownership is taken from 
Disclosure database, and 
CSP are drawn from KLD 
database. 
OLS regression 
Model 
They found that incentives have no 
significant relationship with strong social 
performance, and the positive 
association between salary and long-term 
incentives and weak social performance.  
 
 
Kassinis & 
Vafeas 
(2002) 
 
Environmental 
litigations 
 
Board size, director 
affiliation, director 
reputation, managerial 
control, and outside 
 
A sample consists of 362 
firms out of which 209 
were environmental 
lawsuit defendant in the 
 
Logistic 
regressions. 
They found that board size and the 
fraction of directors in peer firms are 
positively related to environmental 
litigation, and a positive relationship 
between environmental litigations and 
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stakeholder pressures U.S between 1994 and 
1998. 
stock ownership held by officer and 
directors. However, a negative 
association between the number of 
directorships held by outside directors 
and environmental litigations. 
McKendall et 
al. (1999) 
 
Environmental 
Violations 
 
Inside directors, joint 
CEO-chairperson, value 
of stock owned by 
directors, social 
responsibility committees, 
lawyer. 
 
A sample of 150 US firms 
for the periods of 1985 to 
1987. 
 
Tobit regression 
analyses 
The results demonstrated that the value 
of stock owned by corporate officers and 
directors was positively and significantly 
associated with serious environmental 
violations. Outsider dominance, joint 
CEO-Chairpersons, social responsibility 
committees and lawyers on boards were 
not significantly related to environmental 
violations. 
Coffey & 
Wang (1998) 
 
 
Corporate 
philanthropy 
 
Board composition, board 
diversity, managerial 
control 
 
 
A sample of  98 Fortune 
500 companies 
 
Multiple 
regressions 
The results indicated the ratio of insiders 
to outsiders on the board and the 
percentage of stock owned by insiders 
are positively related to charitable 
contributions, however, no relationship 
between corporate philanthropy and both  
ratio of stock owned by outside to inside 
board members  and women directors. 
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2.4.2 Corporate Governance and Social/Environmental Disclosure 
 
Previous studies have suggested there is a link between corporate governance and corporate 
disclosure. These studies examine different characteristics of corporate governance and their 
association with different types of disclosure. Some prior literature has investigated the 
relationship between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure in general and 
environmental disclosures in particular (e.g. Eng & Mak, 2003; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; 
Barako, Hancock & Izan, 2006; Lim Matolcsy & Chow, 2007; Donelly & Mulcahy, 2008; 
O’Sullivan, Percy & Stewart, 2008; Chau & Gray, 2010; Alegrini & Greco, 2011; Post, 
Rahman & Rubow, 2011; Kathyayini, Tilt & Lester, 2012; Rupley, Brown & Marshall, 
2012). However, few studies have explicitly examined the relationship between corporate 
governance and carbon disclosure, and even fewer specifically in Australia.  
Kathyayini, Tilt & Lester (2012) empirically investigated the relationship between 
environmental reporting and corporate governance characteristics of the largest 100 
Australian firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) in 2008. Environmental 
disclosure as dependent variable was measured by two different ways: total number of words 
dedicated to environmental issues in the annual report and total number of words dedicated to 
environmental issues in the annual report divided by total words in the annual report. Four 
corporate governance variables were included in this study; board independence, ownership 
concentration, board size and female directors, while the control variables used were firm 
size, profitability and industry. The regression results, based on OLS regression, indicated a 
strong positive relationship between the extent of environmental disclosures and the 
proportion of independent and female directors on the board. Besides, a positive correlation 
between environmental disclosures and institutional investors and board size was shown.  
Rupley, Brown & Marshall, (2012) examined the relationship between good governance 
characteristics and media coverage and the quality of voluntary environmental disclosure in a 
sample of 127 US firms during the period of 2000 to 2005 inclusive. They employed four 
measures of environmental disclosure quality, namely: compliance, pollution prevention, 
product stewardship and ecological sustainability. Five specific governance characteristics 
were examined which are: board independence, board diversity, multiple directorships, CEO 
duality and presence of a CSR committee. Control variables used were firm size, profitability, 
intensive sector, regulation sensitivity. The statistical analyses revealed the percentage of 
directors serving on multiple boards is positively associated with all levels of voluntary 
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environmental disclosure quality. Moreover, board independence and board diversity are 
significantly positively associated with at least one level of voluntary environmental 
disclosure quality. However, CSR committee is not significant association. 
Post, Rahman & Rubow, (2011) tested the association between boards of directors’ 
composition and environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR). The dependent 
variable was ECSR which was calculated by different ways. First, ECSR disclosures as 
reported in firms’ annual reports, corporate environmental reports, corporate websites, and 
government websites. Second, data from the proprietary KLD STATS database, issued by 
KLD, Inc, while the independent variables were board characteristics which included 
insider/outsider director, gender, age, and education. Moreover, control variables included 
industry, slack resources, CEO duality and board size. They used the data from KLD 
database for 78 US firms in the electronic and chemical industries over the period of 2006 to 
2007. Using univariate and multivariate analysis, their results provided some important 
insights which support agency theory that a higher proportion of outside board directors are 
associated with more positive ECSR disclosures and higher KLD strengths scores. 
Furthermore, the presence of three or more female directors on a board is associated with 
higher KLD strength scores. Also, boards with directors whose average age is closer to 56 
years and those with a higher percentage of Western European directors are more likely to 
disclose ECSR governance. 
Alegrini & Greco (2011) tested the interplay between corporate governance and voluntary 
disclosure practices for all non-financial companies listed on the Italian Stock Exchange in 
2007. Their study used a disclosure scoring index based on the information disclosed in 2007 
to measure the level of voluntary disclosure. Seven different corporate governance 
characteristics were identified in this study, namely: board independence, board size, CEO 
duality, lead independent director, board committees, board activity and audit committee 
activity, plus control variables such as firm size, leverage, profitability, listing status and 
ownership concentration. The results, based on an OLS regression model, demonstrated that 
board size and diligence and the frequency of audit committee meetings had a positive impact 
on amount of information disclosed voluntarily. CEO duality had a weak negative 
relationship with voluntary disclosure. However, presence of board committees, board 
composition and lead independent director had no association whatsoever with information 
disclosed.  
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Chau & Gray (2010) empirically examined the relationship between the extent of voluntary 
disclosure and levels of family ownership and board independence in Hong Kong. Different 
characteristics of corporate governance were used in this study: family ownership, 
independent chairman and independent non-executive directors.  The voluntary disclosure 
index was calculated as raw scores divided by the total possible voluntary disclosure scores. 
A sample of 273 listed companies in Hong Kong in the year 2002 was used.  A linear 
multiple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model was applied to examine the 
relationship between the dependent variable of voluntary disclosure and CEO duality, 
proportion of independent non-executive directors to total number of directors and family 
ownership of a firm. The empirical findings indicated that family ownership was negatively 
associated with the disclosure level not only for overall information but also for all of the 
information subgroups. In addition, the results showed that the proportion of non-executive 
directors on the board were not only positively associated with overall information disclosure 
but also with strategic and non-financial information disclosures. 
Michelon & Parbonetti (2010) examined the impact of different characteristics of the board 
on sustainability disclosure among US and European companies. The content analysis of the 
annual, social, environmental and sustainability reports of the companies was used to 
measure sustainability disclosure. Board characteristics were represented by five variables; 
independent directors, community influential members, CSR committee, CSR director and 
CEO duality.  The empirical analysis,  based on data of 114 European and American 
companies (57 companies listed in Dow Jones Sustainability Index and 57 companies belong 
to the Dow Jones Global Index for the year 2003, indicate that a positive association was 
found between community influential and sustainability disclosure. Empirical results also 
provide a weak evidence of the association between the existence of a CSR committee or 
CSR director and the level of sustainability disclosure. However, the proportion of 
independent and CEO duality were unrelated to sustainability disclosure.  
O’Sullivan, Percy & Stewart (2008) examined the association between corporate governance 
framework and voluntary disclosure of forward looking information of Australian companies 
in 2000 and 2002. The dependent variable was the voluntary disclosure of forward-looking 
information in corporate financial reports. The forward-looking information disclosed by 
sample firms exhibits certain common characteristics. The majority of disclosing firms 
publish qualitative forward-looking information within reports prepared by the chief 
executive officer, chairman and managing director. They used an index of governance 
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mechanisms that reflects various governance attributes to calculate an overall corporate 
governance score.  A number of control variables such as firm size, leverage, profitability and 
environment information were used. The logistic regression model was adopted to test their 
hypotheses. The results demonstrated that, in the year 2000, the presence and independence 
of the audit committee, its meeting frequency, the use of a Big 6 auditor and the auditor’s 
independence are positively related to voluntary disclosure of forward looking information. 
In addition, the findings showed that the independence and existence of compensation 
committee, nomination committee, and overall efficiency of governance system are all 
positively related to voluntary disclosure practices. However, none of these factors seem to 
be significantly associated with voluntary disclosure in the year 2002.  
Donelly & Mulcahy (2008) empirically analysed the relationship between board structure, 
ownership characteristics and voluntary disclosure in Ireland. Voluntary disclosure is 
measured by an index of disclosure. Board structure was categorized into nonexecutive 
directors and CEO duality, while ownership structure was classified into institutional 
ownership and managerial ownership.  Their sample consisted of 51 publicly listed Irish 
firms in the year 2002. The empirical results, based on a poisson regression model, indicated 
that the proportion of the board comprised of nonexecutive directors is significantly 
positively associated with the level of voluntary disclosure. The results also suggested that 
having a nonexecutive director as chairman is positively related to voluntary disclosure. In 
contrast, ownership structure is reported to be unrelated to the level of voluntary disclosure.  
Ghazali (2007) investigated the influence of ownership structure on corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) disclosure in Malaysian companies. His study employed the CSR 
disclosure checklist to measure the extent of CSR disclosure in annual reports. Ownership 
characteristics examined are ownership concentration, director ownership and government 
ownership. A multiple regression analysis was carried out to determine the association 
between ownership structure and CSR disclosure. Using a sample of 87 Malaysian companies 
listed on the Bursa Malaysia Stock Exchange, the results showed that companies in which 
directors hold a larger amount of equity shares (owner managed companies) disclosed 
significantly less information about their social activities. Companies in which the 
government is a large shareholder disclosed significantly more CSR information. However, 
ownership concentration is not statistically significant in explaining the level of CSR 
disclosure in annual reports.  
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Lim Matolcsy & Chow (2007) examined the association between board composition and 
level of voluntary disclosure of 181 Australian firms for the period of 1999 to 2001. They 
collected 67 items from annual reports to develop the total voluntary disclosure index. The 
independent variable used was board independence. A two-stage least squares regression 
(2SLS) model was employed to estimate the effects of board composition on voluntary 
disclosure. These items were classified into three major types of information: strategic, non-
financial and financial information. The regression results revealed that board composition is 
positively related to voluntary disclosure of information in annual reports. In addition, the 
results showed that boards composed largely of independent directors voluntarily disclose 
more forward looking quantitative and strategic information. However, board structure has no 
effect on financial and non-financial voluntary disclosure. 
Huafang & Jianguo (2007) empirically investigated the impact of corporate governance, as 
being represented by ownership structure and board composition, on voluntary disclosures of 
listed companies in China. They developed an index to measure the extent of voluntary 
disclosure by companies in the 2002 annual reports which consisted of 30 items covering 
background information, business information, financial information and non-financial 
information. They took a sample of 559 firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) 
for 2002 and applied the OLS regression model to analyse the data. The regression results 
reported that greater blockholder ownership and foreign shares/ listings are associated with 
increased voluntary disclosure. In addition, managerial ownership, state ownership and legal-
professional ownership are not particularly related to voluntary disclosure. The study also 
concluded that a greater percentage of independent researchers increases voluntary 
disclosure, whereas CEO duality is negatively associated with disclosure.  
Barako, Hancock & Izan (2006) tested the extent to which corporate governance attributes, 
ownership structure and company characteristics influence voluntary disclosure by Kenyan 
companies. The independent variables of corporate governance were board composition, 
board leadership structure, board size, board audit committee, ownership concentration, 
foreign ownership and institutional ownership. The study used a disclosure index to measure 
the level of reporting by companies. Their study also used a pooled Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs) to analyse the data obtained from 54 
Kenyan companies listed on the NSE was investigated from 1992 to 2001. The statistical 
analyses showed that the presence of an audit committee is positively related to the level of 
voluntary disclosure, and the proportion of non-executive directors on the board is found to 
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be significantly negatively related to the degree of voluntary disclosure. In contrast, board 
leadership structure did not appear to have a significant influence on the level of voluntary 
disclosure by firms. The study also found that the levels of institutional and foreign 
ownership are significantly positively associated with voluntary disclosure, whereas 
ownership concentration has negative association.  
Haniffa & Cooke (2005) investigated the impact of culture and corporate governance on 
social disclosures in Malaysian listed companies. Corporate governance structures were 
categorised into board composition, multiple directorships and type of shareholders. They 
used ethnic background of directors and shareholders as a proxy of culture. The dependent 
variable of disclosure in annual reports of Malaysian companies was calculated by an index 
score as well as in terms of number of words. The sample of this study was comprised of 139 
companies listed in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) from 1996 to 2002. Based on 
multiple regression models, the analyses results indicated that a significant positive 
relationship between Malay directors and chairs with multiple directorships are significantly 
positively associated with corporate social disclosure and a significant and negative 
relationship between composition of non-executive directors and corporate social disclosure 
was found. Moreover, the results showed that foreign share ownership was found to be 
positively and statistically significant related to CSD.   
Gul & Leung (2004) empirically tested the linkages between board leadership structure in 
terms of CEO duality, the proportion of expert outside directors on the board and voluntary 
corporate disclosures. They developed an index to measure the extent of voluntary 
disclosures by companies in the 1996 annual report which contained 44 discretionary items, 
which were classified into: background information (includes items such as corporate goals, 
competition, products and markets), financial performance information (includes items such 
as changes in sales, gross profits and R&D expenditures) and non-financial performance 
information ( includes items such as number of employees, staff training, products segment 
analysis, environmental measures and Y2K issues). Regression analysis of observations from 
385 Hong Kong companies indicated that CEO duality was negatively associated with the 
levels of voluntary corporate disclosures, supporting the view that the position of chairman 
and CEO should be separated. The results also revealed that firms with a higher proportion of 
expertise of non-executive directors are associated with lower voluntary disclosures. More 
interestingly, it was found that the negative association between CEO duality and corporate 
disclosures is weaker when the firm has a higher proportion of expert outside directors.  
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Eng & Mak (2003) investigated the association between ownership structure and board 
composition and voluntary disclosure of 158 Singapore firms listed on the Stock Exchange of 
Singapore (SES) in 1995. Voluntary disclosure was proxied by an aggregated disclosure 
score of non-mandatory strategic, financial and non-financial information, while ownership 
structure is characterized by managerial ownership, blockholder ownership and government 
ownership, and board composition is measured by the percentage of independent directors. 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model was employed. Their results found that 
government ownership is positively associated with voluntary disclosure and significant 
negative association between voluntary disclosure and managerial ownership. Furthermore, 
they reported that the percentage of independent directors is negatively associated with 
voluntary disclosure. However, blockholder ownership is not related to voluntary disclosure.  
Chau & Gray (2002) tested the relationship between ownership structure and the voluntary 
disclosures of listed companies in the settings of Hong Kong and Singapore. A checklist of 
voluntary disclosure items was constructed to capture corporate information disclosure 
practices in annual reports. This checklist had three classifications: general information, 
nonfinancial information and financial information multiple(s). The independent variable of 
ownership structure was measured by adding together the proportions of equity belonging to 
directors and to dominant shareholders to arrive at the proportion of a firm’s equity owned by 
insiders. A control variable of firm size, leverage, auditor’s size, multinationality and 
profitability were included. Based on a sample of 60 and 62 industrial companies listed in the 
Stock Exchange of Singapore and Hong Kong respectively and linear multiple regression 
analysis, the findings revealed that the extent of outside ownership is significantly positively 
related to voluntary disclosures, while the strong prevalence of “insider” and family-
controlled companies is likely to be associated with lower levels of disclosure. 
Haniffa & Cooke (2002) tested the relationship between a number of corporate governance, 
cultural and firm-specific characteristics and the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual 
reports of Malaysian companies. Voluntary disclosure was measured by an index of 
disclosure. The independent variables are categorized into three groups: corporate 
governance (represented by board composition, cross-directorships, role duality, family 
members on the board, finance director on the board and chairperson with cross-
directorships), cultural and firm-specific. The study was based on a stratified random sample 
of 167 companies gathered from the Annual Companies Handbook (1995), published by the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE). Using multiple regression models, the results 
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revealed that family members sitting on the board and a non-executive chairperson were 
significantly negatively associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure, whereas other 
variables of corporate governance are not related. The findings also showed that no 
significant association between the extent of voluntary disclosure and any of the cultural 
variables in the full model. 
Halme & Huse (1997) examined the relationship between environmental disclosure and 
corporate governance factors, industry factors, and country factors in Scandinavian countries.  
The independent variable was environmental disclosures which are examined with the help of 
a three-class categorization: annual report contains little or no environmental information, 
annual report has an environmental section and the company has an environmental policy and 
future action plans in the annual report. Two corporate governance variables were contained 
within this study: board size and ownership concentration. This study was conducted on the 
largest corporations from each of the Scandinavian countries: 40 firms from Finland 40 firms 
from Norway, 40 firms from Sweden and 20 firms from Spain (Based on each firms’ data 
from the year 1992 onwards). The analysis was performed using multiple logistic regression 
analyses. The regression results showed that there is not any significant relationship between 
environmental disclosure and ownership concentration and the number of board members. In 
addition, the results indicate that the extent of a corporation's environmental impact is 
significantly positively associated with environmental reporting.  
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Table 2.3: Summary of previous studies investigating the association between Corporate Governance and Social/Environmental 
Disclosure 
 
Author/Year 
 
Variables Methods  
Main results Dependent Independent Sample Analysis 
Technique 
Kathyayini et 
al. (2012) 
Environmental reporting: 
- Environmental 
disclosure. 
- Proportion of 
environmental 
disclosure. 
Board independence, 
Institutional ownership, 
Board size  and 
Proportion of Female 
directors 
A sample of 96 of the top 
100 Australian firms 
listed on the Australian 
Stock Exchange (ASX) 
in 2008 
 
OLS regression 
Model 
The results indicated a significant 
relationship between the extent of 
environmental disclosures and the 
proportions of independent and 
female directors on a board. As well 
as a positive association between 
the extent of environmental 
disclosures and institutional 
investors and board size. 
Rupley et al. 
(2012) 
 
 
Quality of voluntary 
environmental disclosure 
Environmental 
legitimacy:  
environmental media 
coverage, negative 
environmental media. 
Board of directors: 
board independence, 
directorship,   Gender 
A sample of 127 U.S. 
firms over a 6-year 
period (2000–2005). 
Standard linear 
regression model 
 
They found that the percentage of 
directors serving on multiple boards 
is positively associated with all 
levels of quality voluntary 
environmental disclosure. 
Furthermore, board independence 
and board diversity have a positive 
association with at least one level of 
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diversity, CEO duality 
and CSR committee.  
Institutional investors:  
long-horizon investors 
and  short-horizon 
investors 
 
voluntary environmental disclosure 
quality. However, CSR committee 
is not significant associated with 
VED quality. 
Post et al. 
(2011) 
 
 
 
 
Environmental 
corporate social 
responsibility (ECSR): 
(ECSR) disclosures: 
Disclosed ECSR 
Governance, Disclosed 
ECSR Credibility, 
Disclosed Environmental 
Performance Indicators. 
KLD STATA database: 
as measured by KLD 
environmental Strengths, 
KLD environmental 
concerns, Total KLD 
Insider/outsider status, 
gender, age, Western 
European education and 
educational attainment 
 
A sample of 78 U.S. 
Firms. 
 
- Electronics firms 
found in the 2006 
list of Fortune 
1000 companies. 
- Chemical firms 
found in the 2007 
list of Fortune 
1000 companies. 
OLS 
Regressions 
The study found that a higher 
proportion of outside board 
directors is associated with more 
favourable ECSR disclosures and 
higher KLD strengths scores. Firms 
with boards composed of three or 
more female directors received 
higher KLD strengths scores. In 
addition, boards whose directors 
average closer to 56 years in age 
and those with a higher proportion 
of directors with Western European 
education were more likely to 
implement environmental 
governance structures or processes. 
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Allegrini & 
Greco (2011) 
The level of voluntary 
disclosure 
 
 
 
 
Board composition, 
Board size, CEO 
duality, Lead 
independent director, 
Board committees, 
Board activity and  
Audit committee 
activity 
A  sample consists of 177  
companies listed on the 
Italian Stock 
Exchange in 2007 
OLS regression 
model 
They found that board size and 
diligence were positively related to 
voluntary disclosure. Frequency of 
audit committee meetings also had a 
positive impact on amount of 
information disclosed voluntarily. 
However, presence of board 
committees, board composition and 
LID had no association with 
voluntary disclosure.  Whilst, CEO 
duality had a negative relationship 
with voluntary disclosure. 
 
Chau & Gray 
(2010) 
The extent of voluntary 
disclosure 
Family ownership, and 
board independence 
A sample of 273 listed 
firms in Hong Kong for 
the year 2002. 
OLS regression 
Model 
The results showed that family 
ownership was negatively 
associated with the disclosure level 
not only for overall information but 
also for all of the information 
subgroups. In addition, the results 
showed that the proportion of non-
executive directors on the board 
were positively associated with 
overall information disclosure but 
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also with strategic and non-financial 
information disclosures. 
Michelon & 
Parbonetti 
(2010) 
 
The level of sustainability 
disclosure 
Board composition 
(independent directors 
and community 
influential members), 
Board structure (CSR 
responsible and CSR 
committee), and Board 
leadership (CEO 
duality). 
A sample of 114 
European and American 
companies of which 57 
companies are listed in 
Dow Jones Sustainability 
Index and 57 companies 
belong to the Dow Jones 
Global Index for the year 
2003. 
OLS regression 
model 
They found a positive association 
between community influential and 
the level of sustainability 
disclosure, a weak evidence of the 
association between the existence of 
a CSR committee or CSR director 
and the level of sustainability 
disclosure. However, the proportion 
of independent and CEO duality 
were unrelated to sustainability 
disclosure.  
O’Sullivan et 
al. (2008) 
Voluntary disclosure of 
forward- looking 
information   
Board autonomy, the 
presence of  Board 
committees,  
Independent ownership 
and  Audit quality 
A sample consists of the  
largest 300 publicly  
listed Australian firms in 
the years 2000 and 2002 
logistic 
regression model 
The results indicated that audit 
quality which consists of the 
presence and independence of the 
audit committee, its meeting 
frequency, the use of a big 6 auditor 
and the auditor’s independence, are 
positively associated with the 
disclosure of forward-looking 
information. In addition, board 
committees which consist of the 
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appointment and independence of a 
compensation committee and the 
creation of a nomination committee 
and the overall efficacy of the 
corporate governance system are 
also positively associated with the 
disclosure of forward-looking 
information. 
Donelly & 
Mulcahy 
(2008) 
 
The extent of voluntary 
disclosure 
Non-executive 
directors,  non-
executive directors as 
chairman ,  institutional 
ownership and 
managerial ownership 
 
A sample consists of 51 
publicly listed Irish firms 
in the year 2002. 
Poisson 
regression model 
They found a positive and 
significant association between 
nonexecutive directors and the level 
of voluntary disclosure. The results 
also suggested that having a 
nonexecutive director as chairman 
is positively related to voluntary 
disclosure. However, there is no 
relationship between voluntary 
disclosure and institutional 
ownership and managerial 
ownership. 
Ghazali 
(2007) 
Corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) 
disclosure 
Ownership 
concentration, director 
ownership, government 
A sample of 87 non- 
financial companies 
included in the Bursa 
Multiple 
regression 
analysis  
The results indicated that director 
ownership and the government as a 
substantial shareholder are 
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ownership. Malaysia Composite 
Index 
significant influences on CSR 
disclosure in annual reports. 
However, ownership by the ten 
largest shareholders is not 
statistically significant in explaining 
the level of CSR disclosure in 
annual reports. 
Lim et al. 
(2007) 
The level of voluntary 
disclosure including 
Environmental disclosure 
Board composition A sample consisting of 
181 Australian firms for 
the period of 1999 to 
2001 
A two-stage 
least squares 
regression 
(2SLS) model 
They found a positive association 
between board composition and 
total voluntary disclosure. 
Furthermore, the results indicated 
that (1) boards composed largely of 
independent directors would 
voluntarily disclose, were more 
forward looking, and had  
quantitative and strategic 
information and (2) board structure 
has no bearing on non-financial and 
financial voluntary disclosure. 
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Huafang & 
Jianguo 
(2007) 
 
 
The extent of voluntary 
disclosure 
Ownership structure: 
blockholder ownership, 
managerial ownership, 
state ownership; legal-
person ownership, and 
foreign listing/shares 
ownership. 
Board composition: 
The proportion of 
independent directors 
and CEO duality. 
A sample of 559 firms 
listed on Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SSE) for 
2002. 
OLS regression 
Model 
They found that higher blockholder 
ownership and significant foreign 
listing/shares ownership are 
associated with increased-voluntary 
disclosure, while managerial 
ownership, state ownership and 
legal-person ownership are not 
related to disclosure. Also, an 
increase in independent directors 
improves voluntary disclosure and 
CEO duality reduces disclosure. 
Barako et al. 
(2006) 
 
Voluntary disclosure Board composition, 
Board leadership 
structure,   Board audit 
committee, ownership 
concentration, foreign 
ownership and 
institutional ownership.   
A sample consists of 54 
companies listed on the   
Nairobi Stock Exchange 
during the period 1992-
2001 
Pooled Ordinary 
Least Square 
(OLS),   Panel-
Corrected 
Standard Errors 
(PCSEs). 
They found that the existence of 
audit committee is positively related 
to the extent of voluntary 
disclosure, and the percentage of 
non-executive directors on the 
board is negatively related to 
voluntary disclosure, whilst they 
found an insignificant association 
between board leadership structure 
and voluntary disclosure. The study 
also found that the levels of 
institutional and foreign ownership 
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are significantly positively 
associated with voluntary 
disclosure, whereas ownership 
concentration has negative 
association 
Haniffa & 
Cooke (2005) 
 
corporate social 
disclosure: 
- Corporate social 
disclosure index 
(CSDI). 
- corporate social 
disclosure length 
(CSDL) 
board composition, 
multiple directorships 
and type of shareholders 
A sample of 139 
Malaysian 
companies listed in the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange (KLSE) for 
1996 and 2002. 
 
OLS regression 
Model 
The study found a significant 
positive relationship between Malay 
directors and chairs with multiple 
directorships are significantly 
positively associated with corporate 
social disclosure and a significant 
and negative relationship between 
composition of non-executive 
directors and corporate social 
disclosure was found. Moreover, the 
results showed that foreign share 
ownership was found to be 
positively associated with CSD. 
Gul & Leung 
(2004) 
 
 
The extent of voluntary 
disclosure 
CEO duality. 
Expertise of non-
executive directors. 
A sample of 385 Hong 
Kong listed companies 
for 1996. 
Two-stage OLS 
model 
They found that CEO duality is 
associated with lower levels of 
voluntary corporate disclosures, 
while firms with a higher proportion 
of the expertise of non-executive 
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directors (ENEDs) are associated 
with lower voluntary disclosures. 
Eng & Mak 
(2003) 
 
 
 
Voluntary disclosure 
 
Ownership structure: 
Managerial ownership, 
blockholder ownership, 
and government 
ownership. 
Board composition: 
the proportion of 
outside directors 
A sample of 158 
Singapore firms listed on 
the Stock Exchange of 
Singapore. 
 
OLS regression 
Model 
Results indicated that lower 
managerial ownership and 
significant government ownership 
are associated with increased 
voluntary disclosure, while 
blockholder ownership is not related 
to disclosure. They also found that 
an increase in outside directors 
reduces voluntary disclosure. 
Chau & Gray 
(2002) 
The extent of voluntary 
disclosure 
Ownership structure 
 
A sample of 60 Industrial 
companies in Hong Kong 
and 62 Industrial 
companies in Singapore 
listed in the respective 
stock exchanges. 
Multiple 
regression 
Model 
They found a positive relationship 
between the extent of outside 
ownership and voluntary disclosure, 
while the strong prevalence of 
‘‘insider’’ and family-controlled 
companies is likely to be associated 
with lower levels of disclosure. 
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Haniffa & 
Cooke (2002) 
The extent of voluntary 
disclosure 
Corporate governance 
represented by board 
composition, cross-
directorships, role 
duality, family members 
on the board, finance 
directors on the board 
and chairperson with 
cross-directorships. 
A sample of 167 
Malaysian 
Companies listed in the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange (KLSE) for 
1995. 
Multiple 
regression 
Model 
They found that family members 
sitting on the board and the 
chairperson as non-executive 
chairperson were significantly 
negatively associated with the 
extent of voluntary disclosure, 
whereas other variables of corporate 
governance are not related. The 
findings also showed no significant 
association between the extent of 
voluntary disclosure and any of the 
cultural variables in the full model. 
 
Halme & 
Huse (1997) 
 
Environmental reporting: 
- Annual reports 
- Environmental 
disclosure. 
Ownership structure, 
Board size, Industry 
variations, and country 
differences. 
The largest corporations 
from each of the 
Scandinavian countries: 
40 firms from Finland  40 
firms from  Norway, 40 
firms from  Sweden  and 
20 firms from Spain. 
Logistic 
regression 
analyses. 
 
They found a positive association 
between the extent of a 
corporation's environmental impact 
and environmental reporting. Also, 
results indicated that there was no 
significant relationship with 
ownership concentration or the 
number of board members. 
 
 
53 
 
2.4.3 Carbon performance, carbon disclosure and other carbon related studies 
 
Many studies have examined the motivations toward voluntary carbon disclosure (Cotter & 
Najah, 2012; Freedman & Jaggi, 2005; Kolk et al. 2008; Prado- Lorenzo et al. 2009; Stanny, 
2010; Stanny & Ely, 2008). Another important stream of carbon studies involves 
investigations of the association between carbon performance and its valuation (e.g. Griffin et 
al. 2012; He et al. 2013; Krishnan, 2003; Luo & Tang, 2014b; Matsumura, Rachna & Vera-
Munoz, 2014). However, few attempts have been made to examine the association between 
corporate governance and carbon performance and disclosure (Liao et al. 2014; Tauringana & 
Chithambo, 2014). 
Liao, Luo & Tang (2014) empirically tested the impact of corporate boards’ characteristics on 
the voluntary disclosure of GHG emissions in the United Kingdom. The dependent variable 
was carbon disclosure, which measured as equal to 1 if the firm participated in the CDP in 
2011 and 0 otherwise. The independent variables include the key CG test variables (board 
diversity, board independence and environmental committee).Two sets of control variables 
were used; first, CG variables including board size, board meetings, the number of non-
executive directors, non-executive directors as chair, CEO duality, short-term bonus, long-
term bonus, share option, managerial ownership and ownership concentration. Second, 
financial variables include firm size, leverage and profitability.  A sample was composed of 
329 largest companies in the UK (out of the FTSE 350) that were included in the 2011 CDP 
reports. Univariate tests and probit regression models were employed. The regression results 
showed that the proportion of female directors in the board and the existence of an 
environmental committee are significantly and positively associated with GHG disclosure. In 
addition, board independence was positively related to GHG disclosure. 
Luo & Tang (2014b) examined whether voluntary carbon disclosure reflects firms’ carbon 
performance. Their study measured carbon disclosure based on content analysis of Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP) reports, while carbon performance index was focused on both 
carbon intensity and carbon mitigation. They used OLS regression model to analyse their 
data. Based on a sample of 474 observations for the United States, the United Kingdom and 
Australian firms, the results showed that there is a significant positive relationship between 
carbon disclosure and performance, suggesting that firms’ voluntary carbon disclosure in the 
CDP is indicative of their underlying actual carbon performance. 
54 
 
Tauringana and Chithambo (2014) examined the effect of the 2009 DEFRA guidance on the 
extent of GHG disclosure and whether GHG disclosure is determined by corporate 
governance mechanisms. A sample of 215 companies from a population of London Stock 
Exchange FTSE 350 companies was investigated from 2008 to 2011. They employed a fixed 
effects modelling technique to examine the determinants of GHG disclosure. The empirical 
results revealed that board size is positively related to GHG disclosure, whereas, director 
ownership, and ownership concentration have a significant and negative effect on GHG 
disclosure. However, the percentage of non-executive directors has no significant association 
with GHG disclosure. 
Saka & Oshika (2014) examine the impact of corporate carbon emissions and disclosure on 
corporate value of Japanese companies that reported carbon emissions in 2006, 2007 and 
2008. They used the company responses to the CDP questionnaire as a proxy for the 
disclosure of carbon management, while carbon emissions were measured by the volume of 
carbon emissions per unit of sales in that period. Based on a sample of 1,094 observations of 
firms that responded to the CDP questionnaire and OLS regression analysis, they found that 
the volume of carbon emissions is negatively associated with the market value of equity, 
while the disclosure of carbon management has a positive relation with the market value of 
equity, and the positive relation between carbon management disclosure and the market value 
of equity is stronger for the companies with a high volume of carbon emissions. 
Peters & Romi (2013) investigated whether environmental corporate governance 
characteristics are associated with GHG disclosure in the United States. A sample of 1,238 
firm year observations from firms that participated in the CDP from 2002 until 2006 was 
examined. Their study used a probit regression and Heckman two-stage regression models to 
test the relationships between GHG disclosure and the existence of an environmental 
committee and a sustainability officer. The findings documented that GHG disclosure and 
disclosure transparency were significantly positively related to the presence of environmental 
committees on the board and the existence of corporate sustainability officers. Further 
analyses of this study showed that the size of the environmental committee, number of 
environmental committee meetings, expertise of environmental committee members, 
expertise of the sustainability officer and overlap between the environmental committee and 
audit committee were also positively associated with the likelihood of GHG disclosure. 
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He, Tang & Wang (2013) used a sample of US S&P 500 corporations that presented their 
CDP reports on the CDP website in 2010, to investigate the interactions among carbon 
disclosure, carbon performance and the cost of capital. They used the carbon disclosure score 
index from the CDP, which is more comprehensive than others and covers many aspects of 
relevant information such as : carbon governance mechanisms, carbon risks and 
opportunities, carbon strategy and targets, carbon actions and processes, carbon emissions 
and reporting, carbon emission trading and offsetting, carbon communications and 
engagement, while carbon performance was measured as the inverse of total carbon emission 
per million dollars of sales turnover (net). They used a three-stage least squares regression 
(3SLS) model to analyse their data. The results showed that carbon disclosure was negatively 
associated with the cost of capital and that this negative relationship was largely found in 
firms with poor carbon performance. In addition, they documented a negative relationship 
between prior disclosure and contemporaneous emission reduction, suggesting that poor 
carbon performers tend to present (rather than withhold) carbon information in advance in 
attempts to mitigate any future negative impacts on the market. 
Ennis, Kottwitz, Lin & Markusson (2012) explored the relationships between carbon 
disclosure and performance in FTSE 350 companies. They used the Carbon Disclosure 
Leaders Index (CDLI) to calculate disclosure scores. Two carbon performance measures were 
used in this study. First was the absolute level of emission, which is the total of scope 1 and 
scope 2 emissions reported in CDP. Second was the emission intensity measure (or index 
measure) that is calculated as the reported emission (direct and indirect) per unit of company 
revenue. Carbon emissions data was obtained from the CDP, selecting FTSE 350 companies 
that have reported consistently over the period from 2006 to 2009 using the GHG protocol. 
The results showed that there is no significant relationship between voluntary carbon 
disclosure and emissions performance in FTSE 350 companies. The findings on the 
relationship between emissions performance and financial performance show that emissions 
levels are not presently drivers of stock prices. The financial market is not yet responsive to 
the carbon performance of companies, or perhaps the information available is not sufficient to 
provide clear signals to differentiate between companies’ performance. 
Busch & Hoffmann (2011) investigate the relationship between carbon emissions and 
corporate financial performance measured by ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q respectively. 
Focusing on climate change, they developed a set of questions that cover a firm’s carbon 
emissions and carbon management strategies. They use a firm’s carbon intensity, measured as 
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the ratio of the total GHG emissions (Scope 1 and Scope 2) to a firm’s sales, as the outcome 
based environmental performance measurement. Regarding the process-based environmental 
performance measurement, they use the aggregated score of 13 questions from the 
questionnaire. The results show that when using carbon management as a process-based 
measurement, carbon management is negatively related to Tobin’s Q and ROE as measures 
of corporate financial performance. However, when using carbon emissions as an outcome-
based measurement, environmental performance is positively associated with Tobin’s Q. 
Prado-Lorenzo & Garcia-Sanchez (2010) used multiple regressions to empirically examine 
the role of boards of directors in disseminating relevant GHG information in a sample of 
companies listed on the FTSE Global 500 companies that participated in the CDP 
questionnaire. They developed their disclosure index from the Carbon Disclosure Leadership 
Index (CDLI). Based on a sample of 283 companies that participated in the CDP 2008 
survey, the results found that the existence of a dual CEO / board chair person is significantly 
positively related to the level of GHG information disclosed. However, the percentage of 
female board members and board independence are not statistically significant in the 
analysis, while board size and board meetings are negatively associated with the level of 
GHG information disclosed.  
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Table 2.4: Summary of previous studies on carbon performance, carbon disclosure and other carbon related studies 
 
Author/Year 
 
Variables Methods  
Main results Dependent Independent Sample Analysis 
Technique 
Liao et al. 
(2014) 
 
Carbon disclosure Board diversity, Board 
Independence and 
Environmental 
Committee 
A sample of 329 large 
companies in the UK that 
were included in the 2011 
CDP FTSE 350 reports 
Probit regression 
Models 
The results found that the 
proportion of female directors in the 
board and the existence of an 
environmental committee have a 
positive association with GHG 
disclosure. In addition, board 
independence was positively related 
to GHG disclosure. 
 
Luo & Tang 
(2014b) 
Carbon disclosure Carbon performance A sample of 474 large 
companies that were 
listed as Australian 
Securities Exchange 200 
(ASX 200), Standard 
& Poor’s 500 (S&P 500), 
and Financial Times UK 
Top 350 (FTSE 350) 
companies. 
 
OLS regression 
Model. 
The results indicated that there is a 
positive association between carbon 
disclosure and carbon performance, 
indicating that firms with good 
performance are likely to disclose 
more to distinguish themselves for 
investors and other stakeholders. 
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Tauringana 
& Chithambo 
(2014) 
The extent of GHG 
disclosure 
DEFRA guidance, 
Corporate governance 
(which includes board 
size, proportion of 
non-executive 
directors, director 
share ownership and 
Ownership 
concentration. 
A sample of 215 
companies from a 
population of London 
Stock Exchange FTSE 
350 companies over four 
years (2008-2011). 
Fixed Effects 
Models 
They revealed that board size is 
positively related to GHG 
disclosure, whereas director 
ownership and ownership 
concentration are negatively 
associated with GHG disclosure. In 
contrast, the percentage of non-
executive directors is unrelated to 
GHG disclosure. 
Saka & 
Oshika 
(2014) 
The market value of equity. The volume of carbon 
emissions. Disclosure 
of carbon management 
A sample of 1,094 
observations of firms that 
responded to the CDP 
questionnaire for 2006, 
2007 and 2008. 
OLS regression 
Model. 
They showed that a  negative 
relationship between the volume of 
carbon emissions and the market 
value of equity, while  the 
disclosure of carbon management is 
positively associated with the 
market value of equity. 
 
Peters & 
Romi (2013) 
 
GHG disclosure. Existence of an 
environmental 
committee on the 
board and a 
sustainability officer as 
well as environmental 
A sample of 1,238 firm 
year observations that 
participated in the CDP 
from 2002 until 2006. 
Probit regression 
and Hackman 
two-stage 
regression 
models 
They found that GHG disclosure 
and disclosure transparency were 
significantly positively related to 
the presence of environmental 
committees and corporate 
sustainability officers on the board 
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committee size, 
diligence, expertise, 
knowledge spillover 
and sustainability 
officer expertise 
Further analyses of this study 
showed that the size of 
environmental committee , number 
of environmental committee 
meetings, expertise of 
environmental committee members, 
expertise of the sustainability 
officer and overlap between the 
environmental committee and audit 
committee were also positively 
associated with the likelihood of 
GHG disclosure 
 
He, Tang & 
Wang 
(2013) 
The cost of capital Carbon disclosure, 
carbon performance 
A sample from S&P 500 
firms that participated in 
the Carbon Disclosure 
Project (CDP) in 2010. 
Three-stage least 
squares (3SLS) 
They found that carbon disclosure 
was negatively associated with the 
cost of capital and that this negative 
relationship was largely found in 
firms with poor carbon 
performance. In addition, they 
found that there is an inverse 
relationship between carbon 
disclosure and carbon performance. 
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Ennis, 
Kottwitz, 
Lin & 
Markusson 
(2012) 
Carbon disclosure  Carbon Emissions 
Performance 
A sample of FTSE 350 
companies that have 
reported consistently over 
the period from 2006 to 
2009 using the GHG 
protocol. 
Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) 
regression 
analysis. 
The results indicated that voluntary 
carbon disclosure is insignificantly 
associated with emissions 
performance in FTSE 350 
companies. In addition, the results 
on the relationship between 
emissions performance and 
financial performance show that 
emissions levels are not drivers of 
stock prices at present. 
Busch & 
Hoffmann 
(2011) 
carbon emissions: 
- Carbon intensity 
- Carbon management 
Corporate financial 
performance 
A sample of 174 largest 
U.S. companies in 2007  
OLS regression 
Model. 
The results show that when using 
carbon management as a process-
based measurement, carbon 
management is negatively related to 
Tobin’s Q and ROE as measures of 
corporate financial performance. 
However, when using carbon 
emissions as an outcome-based 
measurement, environmental 
performance is positively associated 
with Tobin’s Q. 
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Prado-
Lorenzo & 
Garcia-
Sanchez 
(2010) 
The level of GHG 
information disclosure 
Board independence, 
CEO duality, women, 
Indebtedness ratio, 
Board size and 
Meeting number. 
 
A sample of 283 
companies that 
participated in the CDP 
2008 questionnaire  
 
 
Multiple OLS 
regression. 
 
 
The results indicated that there is a 
positive relationship between CEO 
duality and the level of GHG 
information disclosed. However, the 
percentage of female board 
members and board independence 
are insignificant association, while 
board size and board meetings have 
significant negative effect. 
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2.5 The Gaps Identified from prior literature 
 
Based on the review of the previous studies, the following gaps are identified.  
First, while there is an increasing number of studies that have investigated the 
association between corporate governance mechanisms and environmental 
disclosure (e.g. Rupley et al. 2012; Kathyayini et al. 2012; Post et al. 2011 & 
Ghazali, 2007), there are limited research examining the relationship between 
corporate governance characteristics and GHG disclosure (e.g. Liao et al. 2014; 
Tauringana & Chithambo, 2014; Peters & Romi, 2013).  
Second, many previous studies examining the impact of corporate governance 
indicators on social/environmental performance (e.g. Boulota, 2013; Hafsi & 
Targut, 2013; Bai, 2012; Walls et al. 2012 & De Villiers et al.  2011) do not 
consider carbon performance. The current study, to the best of my knowledge, is 
one of the first scholarly studies that addresses the variety of array of corporate 
governance mechanisms and their influence on carbon performance. Carbon 
disclosure and performance is one of the dimensions of environmental 
performance, but this is a unique dimension and deserves a separate study.  
Third, most of the studies on corporate governance and environmental issues are 
conducted in a US context, and very few research projects use Australian setting. 
Yet, Australia is one of the countries with the highest GHG emission per capita 
and adopting unique GHG management institution, thus the study can provide 
extra insight in the relationship between corporate governance and corporate 
carbon activity beyond existing literature. 
Fourth, some results of previous studies were inconclusive. For instance, Walls et 
al. (2012) found that an environmental board committee is positively associated 
with both environmental strengths and environmental concerns. However, 
Rodrigue et al. (2013) & McKendall et al. (1999) did not find significant 
association between the presence of environmental committee and environmental 
performance. Another example shows the mixed results between board 
characteristics and GHG disclosure. Liao et al. (2014) found that board 
independence is positively associated with Co2 disclosure. But, Tauringana & 
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Chithambo (2014) found that the percentage of non-executive directors is 
unrelated to GHG disclosure. 
Finally, there is lack of agreement on how to measure social/environmental 
performance in the extant literature. Prior studies have often used environmental 
data, such as waste management; toxic emissions to air, land, and water pollution 
to measure environmental performance (e.g. Johnston, et al., 2008; Sutantoputra et 
al., 2012).1 Since the current study focuses on specific carbon performance, these 
general proxies for environmental performance are not appropriate for our 
purpose. Thus, following prior research (e.g. Luo and Tang, 2014; Clarkson et al., 
2008; Patten, 2002; Sutantoputra et al., 2012), this study adopts carbon intensity 
as proxy of carbon performance, which is measured as the total scope 1 and scope 
2 emissions divided by the total sales at the end of fiscal year. This means a lower 
level of carbon emissions scaled by sales suggests a higher carbon performance. 
There are a number of advantages with the measure. First, public concern about 
climate change which has been caused by the release of CO2 emissions into the 
atmosphere. Therefore, the level of carbon emissions would seem to be an 
appropriate indicator of carbon performance. Second, this is an objective and 
direct measure of carbon performance. Finally the measure reflects the outcome of 
carbon management, because the purpose of carbon management is to control 
excessive carbon emissions.  As this measure uses sales to control the impact of 
fluctuation of business activity on emissions, the proxy can highlight the effect of 
carbon management on Co2 emissions.  
Therefore, the current research attempts to fill the gaps by adding to the existing 
body of evidence regarding the association between corporate governance and 
carbon performance and disclosure of Australian companies. This study considers 
a broader set of dimensions of corporate governance so as to provide more 
insightful empirical evidence which has not been documented in prior literature. 
In sum, Chapter Two provides a comprehensive review of previous studies.  First, 
this chapter began with a discussion of the definitions of corporate governance 
from different sources in the existing literature. Next, the chapter provided a 
                                                          
1 Various databases have been used for measurement of firms’ social or environmental performance, such 
as the Council on Economic Priorities (CEP), the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), the KLD Research & Analytics 
(KLD), the National Pollution Release Inventory (NPRI), and the National Pollutant Inventory (NPI). 
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general overview on the regulatory background about carbon emissions in 
Australia. This chapter also discussed the different theoretical frameworks that 
have been utilised in this thesis. These theories include legitimacy theory, 
stakeholder theory and signalling theory. Then the chapter examined the empirical 
evidence produced by prior studies on the association between corporate 
governance mechanisms and social/environmental performance, and on the 
relationship between corporate governance characteristics and social/ 
environmental disclosure. Finally, this chapter ends by identifying the existing 
gaps in previous studies, which provides opportunities for future research. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  RESEARCH DESIGN AND 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Research methodology or research approach depends on research questions to be 
addressed or hypothesis to be tested (Polit & Beck 2004). Furthermore, the way in 
which the study is designed influences the choice of procedures and techniques. 
However, any research methodology should be established on a systematic and 
rigorous collection and data analysis (Robson, 2002, 45). The previous chapter 
illustrated the relevant literature review and highlighted the theoretical framework 
for the current study to construct the suitable research methodology. The aims of 
this chapter are to develop a theoretical link between the quality of corporate 
governance and carbon performance and disclosure in the Australian companies; 
and to provide a description of the research methods applied and analysis method 
used in collecting data to test the presence of an association between corporate 
governance and carbon performance and disclosure. This chapter proceeds as 
follows: Section 3.2 outlines the sample selection procedure and data sources 
used. Section 3.3.1 outlines the hypotheses related to corporate governance and 
carbon performance. 3.3.2 outlines the hypotheses related to corporate governance 
and carbon disclosures. 3.4 illustrates how the dependent variable was measured. 
3.5 provides information on how the independent variables were calculated. 3.6 
describes the measurement of the control variables. 3.7 provides the statistical 
technique used in this study 3.8 discusses the empirical model used to test the 
hypotheses. 
3.2 Sample Selection and Data 
 
This section provides the procedures of sample selection, the types of data used, 
and the data sources used in carrying out this study. Specifically, this section is 
classified into three subsections. Subsection 3.2.1 will discuss the procedures of 
sample selection; subsection 3.2.2 will explain the data sources used in this study, 
whilst subsection 3.2.3 will provide the criteria for selecting the final sample. 
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3.2.1 Sample Selection  
 
The initial sample for the current study consists of the largest Australian 
companies which participated in the CDP for the period 2009 to 2012. The sample 
includes both financial and non-financial firms based on their sector affiliation as 
defined by the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) (e.g. Consumer 
Discretionary, Energy, Consumer Staples, Financial, Health Care, Information 
Technology, Industrials, Materials, Telecommunications and Utilities). Important 
reasons for choosing these companies and this period are: First, the CDP sent the 
questionnaire to these companies for the period of 2009 through 2012. The second 
reason for selecting this period was because the CDP questionnaire before 2006 
was incomplete and fewer companies responded. Third, the periods between 2006 
until 2009 for these companies were without a template of the CDP Scoring 
Methodology. In addition, an important motivation for choosing the banking, 
insurance, and other industries is that they contribute to climate change mainly by 
purchasing electricity and provide finance for green projects.  
However, some of the observations need to be dropped from this sample due to 
some companies that did not meet certain criteria in the present study. For 
example, companies that did not respond to CDP, firms that do not have details 
publicly available and declined to participate in CDP and companies that provided 
information but did not answer the CDP questionnaire. In addition, companies 
with unpublished annual reports are excluded, companies with missing corporate 
governance data and companies missing data from DataStream are deleted, and 
some companies in 2009 were also omitted due to unavailability of the template of 
CDP 2009 Scoring Methodology. Hence, the current study covered a period of 
four years. So the final sample that meets all of these selection criteria is 205 firm 
year observations. Table 3.1 provides a summary of the sample selection 
procedures.  
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Table 3.1 Sample Selection Procedures for the study period 
Description 2009 2010 2011 2012 Pooled 
Original sample obtained from  CDP database in 
Australia 
192 195 189 236 812 
(less)  
No Response ( did not reply to CDP regarding 
request) 
 
(73) 
 
(73) 
 
(55) 
 
(106) 
 
(307) 
(less)  
Declined to participate (Decline to participate in the 
project) 
 
(17) 
 
(29) 
 
(34) 
 
(29) 
 
(109) 
(less)  
Information provided – View Investor Response (did 
not answer all question) 
 
(3) 
 
(1) 
 
(3) 
 
(1) 
 
(8) 
(less)  
Information provided (provided information relevant 
to the questionnaire, did not answer the questionnaire) 
 
(0) 
 
(0) 
 
(2) 
 
(0) 
 
(2) 
(less)  
Details not publicly available 
 
(22) 
 
(15) 
 
(18) 
 
(17) 
 
(72) 
(less)  
See Another (the response is covered by another 
company usually parent company) 
 
(0) 
 
(3) 
 
(5) 
 
(7) 
 
(15) 
Total Sample of View Investor Response 77 74 72 76 299 
(less)  
Annual reports not available or shorter than 12 
months fiscal year 
 
(10) 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(0) 
 
(13) 
(less)  
Missing Corporate Governance Data 
 
(2) 
 
(1) 
 
(1) 
 
(1) 
 
(5) 
(less)  
Firms without Scoring in 2009 due to  unavailability 
of the  template of CDP 2009 Scoring Methodology 
 
(43) 
 
(0) 
 
(0) 
 
(0) 
 
(43) 
(less)  
Missing data from DataStream(e.g. financial data, 
scope1&2) 
 
(2) 
 
(12) 
 
(3) 
 
(16) 
 
(33) 
Final Test Sample 20 60 66 59 205 
 
3.2.2 Data Sources 
 
To investigate the relationships among good corporate governance structure and 
carbon performance and disclosure, this study focuses its analysis on all 
Australian companies in the CDP database for the period from 2009 until 2012. 
For these companies, data related to corporate governance were manually 
collected from annual reports of the sampled companies. Data related to carbon 
performance and carbon disclosure scores were mainly gathered from a firm's 
response for CDP standardised questionnaire. In addition, data for the control 
variables group (e.g. natural logarithm of total assets, Tobin’s Q, the return on 
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assets, and capital intensity) are obtained from the FinAnalysis database. 
Therefore, the current study relies on the CDP questionnaire responses and annual 
reports of these companies. This results in 205 firm year observations. In terms of 
industry representation 11.70% are in the “energy “industry, 18.54% are in the 
“materials” industry, 17.65% are considered “industrials” firms, another 6.34% 
are in “consumer discretionary” and 6.83% are in “Consumer Staples”. The rest of 
the sample consists of firms in the “Health Care, Financials, Telecommunication 
Services and Utilities” are a (2.44%, 30.24%, 1.95% and 4.39%, respectively). As 
presented in table 3.2 below, this leaves a final sample size of 205 companies. 
Table 3.2 Sample Distribution of Companies by Sector  
 
Sector 
Number of Companies  
percentage 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Energy   1 7 9 6 23 11.22% 
Materials 2 11 13 12 38 18.54% 
Industrials 1 9 14 12 36 17.56% 
Consumer Discretionary 0 3 4 6 13 6.34% 
Consumer Staples 3 4 3 4 14 6.83% 
Health Care 1 2 1 1 5 2.44% 
Financials 10 20 18 14 62 30.24% 
Telecommunication 
Services 
1 1 1 1 4 1.95% 
Utilities 1 3 3 3 10 4.88% 
Total 20 60 66 59 205 100% 
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Figure 3.1: Sector –wise distribution of companies 
 
 
3.2.3 The criteria for choosing the final sample 
 
   To be involved in the final sample, firms have to fulfil the following criteria:  
for carbon information, as mentioned above: (1) companies that have not 
responded to the CDP’s questionnaire.  (2) companies that do not have details 
publicly available and they declined to participate in CDP (3) ompanies that 
provided information but did not answer the CDP questionnaire. For corporate 
governance and financial data (1) a company’s full four-year annual reports from 
2009 to 2012 inclusive must be available either in Connect 4 databases or SIRCA 
database or company website, respectively (2) Financial data must also be 
available in the FinAnalysis database. Therefore, all firms that completed the CDP 
2009 -2012 questionnaire and allowed their responses to be published on the CDP 
website are chosen since this study is constructed on the assumption that all 
carbon emissions information must be publicly available. 
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Using the above criteria, and as Table 3.2 shows, the full data required is obtained 
for a total of 205 out of the 299 firms constituting the remaining companies which 
have completed and published their response to CDP’s  questionnaire.   For 18 of 
the remaining 94 firms, one or more years of corporate governance data and/or a 
company’s annual reports are not available in Connect 4 databases or SIRCA 
database or company website, respectively, or shorter than 12 months fiscal year. 
For the remaining 76 firms, neither carbon information data nor financial data are 
available in DataStream. 
3.3 Hypothesis Development  
 
In sum, prior studies indicate that improved carbon performance involves extra 
cost in the short run. Conversely, it may reduce expected litigation cost and cost 
of capital, uphold a positive corporate social responsibility image which will 
eventually attract and retain customers and quality employees (Cong & Freedman, 
2011). If a governance structure only targets financial performance and health of 
an organisation, then top management of those organisations have to make a 
trade-off between the short term cost of carbon performance and the potential 
long-term financial benefits. It is expected that a significant relationship exists 
between the structure and quality of corporate governance and carbon 
performance and disclosure in the Australian companies listed on the Australian 
Stock Exchange (ASX). Therefore, the following section provides a detailed 
discussion and theoretical justification underlying the choice of each variable of 
corporate governance as well as the development of hypotheses for each of these 
variables to be investigated in the study. 
3.3.1 Corporate Governance and Carbon Performance 
 
3.3.1.1 Board of Directors’ Characteristics 
 
Fama & Jensen (1983) reported that characterise the responsibilities of the board 
of directors as being both the ratification of management decisions process and 
the monitoring of management’s performance. In addition, the board of directors 
plays an important role in corporate governance and impacts on all significant 
corporate decisions, including a company’s social performance (Jo & Harjoto 
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2011; Schwartz et al. 2005). Based on the evidence from these studies along with 
the theoretical framework of the current study, this section provides the 
hypotheses related to board characteristics. Six characteristics of board of 
directors will be investigated, namely: Board Size, Board Independence, Board 
Diversity, Board Meeting, Audit Committee Independence, and Environmental 
Committee Presence. 
3.3.1.1.1 Board Size 
 
Board size is considered to be one of the most important elements of corporate 
governance mechanism that can contribute to affect the board effectiveness. 
Alexander et al. (1993) indicate that larger boards (relative to others) serve a 
‘‘buffering’’ function by connecting the firm to its environment and provide 
protections from environmental disturbances. Furthermore, larger board size also 
provides broader representation from stakeholders and wider expertise across 
various tasks, which in turn lead to greater monitoring capacities (Siciliano 1996). 
In addition, larger and more diverse boards of directors help companies to reduce 
environmental uncertainties (Goodstein et al. 1994) and enhance company 
performance (Pearce and Zahra, 1992). Moreover, larger boards can more 
effectively reduce detrimental GHG opaqueness (Liao et al. 2014; Brown et al. 
2006). Moreover, it is arguable that a large board is likely to include experienced 
and knowledgeable directors who possess expertise when it comes to managing 
environmental issues. On the other hand, large boards may face some problems in 
reaching a consensus on important decisions, and may hinder the effectiveness of 
the board in ensuring that the firm is responsive to environmental change 
(Goodstein et al. 1994). This is because of the lack of coordination related to a 
large board, which slows down the decision making process and decreases board 
efficiency (Jensen, 1993; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). 
Empirical literature that has provided evidence on the association between board 
size and carbon performance are generally rare. However, some evidence has 
found a positive and significant relationship between the size of board and 
environmental concerns (Walls et al. 2012). Another study by Brown et al. (2006) 
also indicates that the board size is positively associated with corporate 
philanthropy actions. Similarly, Kassinis & Vafeas, (2002) point out that board 
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size is positively related to environmental litigation. Further, de Villiers et al. 
(2011) find evidence that environmental performance is higher in firms that have 
larger boards. Whereas, Bai, (2012) found that board size is negatively associated 
with social performance in for-profit organizations, but positively related to social 
performance in non-profit organizations. On the other hand, Hafsi & Turgut 
(2013) found that board size has no significant effect on firms’ social performance 
in companies listed in the S&P500 Index. Therefore, due to mixed results in prior 
literature, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 1.1: There is no significant association between the number of 
directors on the board and carbon performance. 
3.3.1.1.2 Board Independence 
 
A common feature of international corporate governance guidelines is that 
company boards should have a majority of independent directors. The OECD 
(2004) reports that the independence of directors brings an objective view, can 
contribute significantly to decision‐making, and play an important role where the 
interests of management, the company and shareholders may diverge. In 
Australia, the ASX (2003) Recommendation 2.1 specifies that majority members 
of the board should be independent, and lists seven criteria for assessing 
independence. Furthermore, the NYSE, (2009), cited in Larcker & Tayan, (2011) 
defined independence as having “no material relationship with the listed company 
(either directly or as a partner, shareholder, or officer of an organization that has a 
relationship with the company).” Zahra & colleagues (1993) have indicated that 
the presence of outside directors as members on the board increases the racial, 
ethnic, and gender diversity of the company’s board. Independent directors on the 
firm’s board are more concerned about certain components of CSP (Ibrahim & 
Angelidis, 1995) and show greater social responsiveness (Zahra & Stanton 1988). 
Accordingly, the presence of independent directors on the board can provide more 
objective feedback regarding the operations of a company and its performance 
(Liao et al. 2014). Moreover, independent directors may face higher incentives to 
pursue environmental innovations as they are more likely be conscious about how 
corporate social performance improves a firm’s standing with constituencies such 
as investors, government, and lenders (Johnson & Greening, 1999). Consequently, 
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it can be argued that the presence of independent directors can contribute to the 
effective management of stakeholders through enhanced stakeholder management, 
which in turn, leads to elevated carbon performance. 
The empirical academic studies have provided contradictory results. While some 
studies found that the presence of outside directors is significantly positively 
associated with CSR performance within a firm’s industry. Zhang et al, (2013), 
Dunn & Sainty (2009) found that board independence is positively related to 
corporate social performance A similar study was provided by Johnson & 
Greening (1999), who indicated that the independence of a board is positively 
associated with its people (women and minorities, community, employee 
relations) and product quality (product and environmental) dimension of CSR. 
Another study by Wedd (2004) has also found evidence that having outside 
directors is positively associated with socially responsible behaviour of firms. 
Similarly, Ibrahim et al, (2003) pointed out that outside directors is positively 
related to the discretionary components of corporate responsibility. Further, de 
Villiers et al. (2011) have provided evidence that environmental performance is 
higher in firms that have higher board independence. Some empirical studies, on 
the other hand, report that engaging outside directors is negatively related to 
environmental litigations (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002). Whilst other studies found 
no relationship between outside directors and the legal and ethical dimensions of 
CSR (Ibrahim et al, 2003; Ibrahim & Angelidis, 1995). Moreover, McKendall, 
S´anchez, & Sicilian (1999) were unable to find a significant relationship between 
board independence and environmental violations. In sum, the role of board 
independence in carbon performance is still not clear. Hence, given the above 
evidence, the following un-directional hypothesis is tested: 
Hypothesis 1.2: There is significant association between board 
independence and carbon performance. 
3.3.1.1.3 Board Diversity 
 
Board diversity refers to the various characteristics that may be present among 
directors in the boardroom that can influence the decision–making process (Van 
der Walt & Ingley, 2003). Board diversity may derive from multiple sources, 
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including age, gender, ethnicity, culture, religion, constituency representation, 
independence, knowledge, educational and professional background, technical 
skills and expertise, commercial and industry experience, career and life 
experience (Milliken & Martins, 1996).  From a signalling perspective, the 
presence of females on a company’s board may act as a signal to observers 
indicating that the firm pays attention to women and minorities, and thus, is 
socially responsible (Bear et al, 2010). Nielsen & Huse (2010) suggests that the 
presence of women directors on the board may be particularly sensitive to 
‘‘certain organizational practices, such as corporate social responsibility and 
environmental politics (p. 138)’’. Moreover, representation of female directors on 
boards may have social consequences (Hafsi & Turgut, 2013).  Therefore, having 
more female directors on the board may sensitize boards to environmental 
initiatives, and provide perspectives that can be helpful in addressing 
environmental issues. 
Little empirical evidence to date exists on the association between board gender 
diversity and carbon performance. However, in the context of corporate social 
performance in general, a positive relationship exists between the proportion of 
women directors on the board and corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
performance as documented by Zhang et al. 2013; Boulouta 2013; Webb, 2004; 
Hafsi & Turgut, 2013. Wang & Coffey (1992) & Williams (2003) have found a 
positive and significant link between the proportion of female board members and 
corporate philanthropy. With respect to environmental performance, Post et al. 
(2011) have found weak evidence of a positive relationship between the presence 
of females on a firm’s board of directors and its environmental performance. On 
the other hand, insignificant relationship between the percentage of women board 
members and corporate philanthropy has been found (Coffey & Wang, 1998).  In 
sum, overwhelming evidence suggests board diversity has a positive impact on 
environmental accountability which can enhance the company’s carbon 
performance. Therefore, the following hypothesis is formulated:  
Hypothesis 1.3: There is a positive association between corporate board 
diversity and carbon performance  
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3.3.1.1.4 Board Meetings 
 
According to Jensen (1993), an important proxy for measuring the effectiveness 
and corporate boards’ monitoring power is the frequency of board meetings. In 
addition, Vafeas (1999a) has contended that the frequency of board meetings is an 
important dimension of board operations that can have important implications for 
performance. In a similar argument, Conger et al (1998) suggest that the 
frequency of board meeting is an important resource for improving board 
performance. Boards that meet more often in response to company events are 
more likely to perform their duties in accordance with shareholders' interests 
(Vafeas 1999a) and are more likely to effectively monitor management, reduce 
manipulation of corporate earnings (Xie et al. 2003) and can result in a higher 
quality of financial reporting (Laksmana, 2008). Therefore, the frequency of board 
meetings may increase the company boards’ monitoring, improving the 
effectiveness of board, enhance performance, and which in turn, reduces 
information asymmetry. 
 There is limited recent empirical evidence regarding the relationship between the 
frequency of board meetings and environmental performance, particularly for 
carbon performance. However, in the area of social performance, although Prado 
et al. (2009b) did not find a statistically significant impact between board 
meetings and CSR, evidence of a significant negative association between the 
number of meetings and the dissemination of information on GHGs is found by 
Prado-Lorenzo & García-Sánchez, (2010). Consequently, it can be arguable that a 
board of directors that meet more often are more likely to improve carbon 
performance via increased capacity to effectively advise and monitor 
management. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 1.4: There is a positive association between the number of 
board meetings and carbon performance. 
3.3.1.1.5 Audit Committee Independence 
 
The existence of an audit committee on the board of directors plays an important 
role because it is concerned with monitoring the accounting processes, and 
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providing the credibility of the accounting information to the firm’s stakeholders 
(Pincus et al. 1989; Beasley, 1996), to prevent fraudulent accounting statements 
(Klein 2002a), and reducing information asymmetry problems (Li 2012), which 
mitigates agency costs (Ho & Wong, 2001), thereby enhancing overall company 
performance (Weir et al. 2002). The audit committee on the company's board 
takes an active role in overseeing the firm’s financial reporting and accounting 
process (Whittington & Pany, 2000). More importantly, in order for the audit 
committee to more effectively fulfil its oversight role and protect the interest of 
shareholders, it must be independent of the management of the company (Bédard 
et al. 2004; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Therefore, the Australian Corporate 
Governance Principles and Recommendations (ACGPR) (Australian Securities 
Exchange Corporate Governance Council 2007) recommend that an audit 
committee should be comprised of at least three independent board members. The 
common assumption is that a higher level of audit committee independence is 
associated with improved monitoring of the financial reporting process (e.g. 
Bronson et al. 2009; Bédard et al. 2004; Klein, 2002a). Therefore, audit 
committees will be asked to integrate climate change and sustainability into 
enterprise wide risk assessment, focus on quality of disclosure, and evaluate the 
reporting systems (Peters & Romi, 2013) 
There is limited empirical evidence on the link between the audit committee 
independence and environmental performance, including carbon performance. 
However, in the context of company performance in general, some empirical 
studies found that the independence of the audit committee is positively associated 
with the quality of financial reporting (Mangena & Tauringana, 2007, Klein 
2002a) and negatively related to misleading and fraudulent reporting  (Abbott et 
al. 2000). Based on this argument, the independence of the committee can 
contribute to improve overall corporate performance, thereby enhancing the 
carbon performance of the company. Thus, the following hypothesis is developed: 
Hypothesis 1.5: There is a positive association between the independence 
of an audit committee and carbon performance. 
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3.3.1.1.6 Environmental Committee Presence2 
 
Prior studies (e.g. Liao, et al 2014) suggest that an environmental committee plays 
a significant role to bring greater objectivity and a higher level perspective to bear 
on environmental matters than could a full board. The aim of an environmental 
committee is to motivate a firm into implementing sustainability policies and 
activities (Liao et al. 2014). Establishing an environmental committee on the 
board can be viewed as a means of dealing with stakeholders and responding to 
their expectations (Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012). The existence of an 
environmental committee on the firm’s board can help to systematically plan and 
implement carbon-reduction actions (Liao et al. 2014). The environmental 
committee can provide strategic advice to management in the handling of an 
environmental incident and may also underscore the board's focused commitment 
to achieve a realistic balance between environmental concerns and the operations 
of the firm.  
There is little empirical study that explicitly has examined directly the link 
between the presence of an environmental committee on the board and carbon 
performance. Nevertheless, some empirical studies were unable to find significant 
association between the existence of an environmental committee on the board 
and environmental performance which is measured in terms of regulatory 
compliance, pollution prevention, and environmental capital expenditures 
(Rodrigue et al. 2013). A similar study by Berrone & Gomez-Mejia (2009a) did 
not find that environmental performance had a higher impact on chief executive 
officer (CEO) pay in firms with environmental committees. Another study by 
McKendall et al. (1999) has also failed to find significant association between 
social responsibility committee and environmental violations.  In contrast, Lam & 
Li (2008) point out that a firm with an environmental committee on its board is 
related to a significant increase in environmental performance for high polluting 
firms. Furthermore, Walls et al. (2012) indicates that an environmental board 
committee is positively associated with both environmental strengths and 
                                                          
2 Note:  Such committees can be labelled under various names, such as Compliance and Ethics 
Committee, Environmental Committee, Public Policy Committee, Sustainability Committee, 
Corporate Social Responsibility Committee, Environment, Health, and Safety Committee, and 
Social Welfare Committee, but they all have jurisdiction over environmental issues. 
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environmental concerns. Consequently, the present study argues that the existence 
of an environmental committee will have substantial influence on the firm, and it 
enables a firm to credibly collect, record and account for GHG emissions (Liao et 
al. 2014) and therefore is likely to see the importance of GHG reporting 
(Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012). Hence, the existence of environmental 
committees can be seen as a proxy for strategic environmental orientation that 
should have a positive impact on firm performance.  
Hypothesis 1.6: There is a positive association between the presence of 
environmental committee and carbon performance. 
3.3.1.2 CEO Compensation Structure 
 
Broadly speaking, CEOs are responsible for developing talent management; as 
well as their responsibilities in front of the board to lead the company to success 
which requires them to make decisions that can maximize the firm’s value 
(Larcker &Tayan, 2011). In the context of corporate governance- social 
performance relations, McGuire et al. (2003) state that “socially pro-active” 
CEOs, who are most likely to take strong social actions, avoid firms with a 
“bottom line” orientation. The CEO compensation packages are generally divided 
into three main components, namely: fixed compensation (salary), Short-term 
incentives including annual incentives, bonuses, commissions, gain sharing, and 
Long-term incentives including restricted stock, stock options and other long-term 
compensation. Based on the empirical evidence from these studies along with the 
theoretical framework of the present study, this section provides the hypotheses 
related to CEO compensation structures. Two components of a CEO 
compensation structure will be examined in this study, namely, CEO stock 
options and long term bonus. 
3.3.1.2.1 CEO Stock Options 
 
Stock options are typical forms of long term compensation used to foster a longer 
decision horizon among managers. Moreover, stock options provide compensation 
only when executives have increased the stock price to the point at which the 
options trade (Larcker & Tayan, 2011).  Further, stock options can also contribute 
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to align the managers' interests and shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Jensen & Murphy, 1990), because it is the part that is most sensitive to 
performance. Sander (2001) argues that stock options encourage riskier strategies 
by concentrating attention on potential gains, rather than loss. Accordingly, the 
executives that receive stock options are more likely to take actions consistent 
with maximizing the interests of the firm in the longer term (Mahoney & Thorne, 
2006). 
There has been mixed empirical evidence on the relationship between the CEO 
stock options and environmental performance. On the one hand, evidence of the 
existence of a significant positive association between the CEO stock options in 
long term and corporate social performance is documented by Mahoney and 
Thorne, (2005, 2006); Deckop et al. (2006); Callan & Thomas, (2012), 
respectively. Furthermore, Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, (2009a) found that long-term 
pay such as stock options is positive and highly significant for pollution 
prevention performance. On the other hand, Coombs & Gilley (2005) have found 
no relationship between stock options and any CSR dimensions, and McGuire et 
al. (2003) failed to find relationship between long-term incentives including stock 
options and good social performance. Further, McGuire et al. (2003) provided 
empirical evidence that the stock options are positively associated with poor social 
performance. Walls et al. (2012) found evidence that environmental performance 
was best when the CEO stock option was low, particularly if the institutional 
ownership was high. Therefore, the following null hypothesis is formulated: 
Hypothesis 1.7: There is no significant association between CEO stock 
options and carbon performance. 
3.3.1.2.2 CEO Long Term Bonus 
 
The CEO long term bonuses are an alternative compensation that provide long 
term incentives to executives intended to align the managers' interests and 
shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen & Murphy, 
1990:  Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009a), because their final value is contingent on 
future performance (Murphy, 1999), and it is possible this may enhance future 
environmental performance (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009a).   
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Callan & Thomas (2012) provide evidence that the long term compensation which 
includes restricted stock and long-term incentive plans is positively associated 
with social performance. Moreover, Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, (2009a) found that 
long-term pay has positive impact on pollution prevention performance. A similar 
study by Deckop et al. (2006) finds a positive and statistically significant 
association between long-term CEO pay and corporate social performance. 
However, from their study, Rekker et al. (2014) found that there is a negative 
relation between long term compensation, such as long term bonus, and socially 
responsible firms. Thus, based on the inclusive empirical evidence documented in 
the previous literature, the following null hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 1.8: There is no significant association between the CEO long 
term bonus and carbon performance. 
3.3.1.3 Ownership Structure 
 
Ownership structure is one of the most important instruments in the corporate 
governance system (Perrini et al., 2008) that can resolve the conflict of interest 
between managers and the shareholders of the company (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Shan & McIver, 2011) and enhance company 
performance (Filatotchev & Nakajima, 2010). Based on the empirical evidence 
from these studies along with the theoretical framework of the present study, this 
section provides the hypotheses related to ownership structures. Two aspects of a 
firm’s ownership structure will be examined in this study, namely; ownership 
concentration and managerial ownership. 
3.3.1.3.1 Ownership concentration   
 
According to Shleifer & Vishny (1997), concentration of ownership leads to better 
monitoring of managers, who may attempt to pursue their own goals. Similarly, 
Admati et al. (1994) suggest that minor shareholders may attempt to free -ride on 
the social contributions and undermine firm performance. Moreover, Ullmann 
(1985) and Adams & Hardwick (1998) indicated the more dispersed the 
ownership structure, the more sensitive to social problems the companies. 
Earnhart & Lizal. (2006) found that greater concentration of ownership as 
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measured by the single largest shareholder in a company leads to better 
environmental performance with respect to absolute emissions. On the other hand, 
Brown et al. (2006) did not find a relationship between concentration of 
ownership and corporate philanthropy. Similarly, Adams & Hardwick (1998) 
found evidence that ownership concentration as measured by the proportion of the 
total number of shares held by the top three shareholders is insignificantly 
associated with the level of corporate discretionary donations. Finally, Reverte 
(2009) noted that companies with widely held shareholdings are more likely to 
use carbon performance reporting than companies with a concentrated ownership 
structure. Again, both the theoretical argument and empirical evidence is 
ambiguous, so we provide a null hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1.9: There is no significant association between ownership 
concentration and carbon performance. 
3.3.1.3.2 Managerial Ownership  
 
Managerial ownership has an important alignment effect on the interests of 
managers vs. shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 
2009), because managerial ownership provides an incentive for managers to act in 
accordance with the interests of shareholders. As per Jensen & Meckling, (1976), 
a manager who holds a percentage of shares in the company bears the 
consequences of managerial actions, therefore it assists to align the interests of 
company managers with those of the owners. In this regards, company managers 
that hold a higher portion of ownership can better manage the company from the 
perspective of equity owners (Paek et al. 2013).  
There are quite limited studies that have investigated the relationship between 
managerial ownership and environmental performance. Prior studies found that 
managerial ownership had a positive and significant association with CSP factors 
such as donation probability and charity (Jia & Zhang, 2013) and a positive link 
between top management equity and social performance in terms of environment 
and product quality (Johnson & Greening 1999). Coffey & Wang, (1998) 
demonstrated that there is a positive relationship between managerial control as 
measured by the percentage of total stock owned by inside board members and 
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corporate philanthropy. In contrast, Oh et al. (2011) documented that managerial 
ownership is significantly negatively associated with CSR rating of the firms. 
Similarly, Simerly & Bass (1998) provide evidence of significant negative 
relationship between a firm’s corporate social performance and the proportion of 
stock equity owned by top management, whereas Paek et al. (2013) indicate that 
managerial ownership has an insignificant relationship with CSR performance in 
terms of community, environment, and product dimensions. Hence, given the 
foregoing evidence, a null hypothesis appears to be appropriate.  
Hypothesis 1.10: There is no significant association between managerial 
ownership and carbon performance. 
3.3.2 Corporate Governance and Carbon Disclosure. 
 
3.3.2.1 Board of Directors’ Characteristics 
 
The board of directors is one of the most important internal control mechanisms. 
The disclosure literature investigates the effect of a number of board 
characteristics on the extent of disclosure. Based on the evidence from these 
studies along with the theoretical framework of the current study this section 
provides the hypotheses related to board characteristics. Eight characteristics of 
board directors will be investigated, namely: Board Size, Board Independence, 
Board Diversity, Board Meeting, Audit Committee Independence, Compensation 
Committee Independence, Nomination Committee Independence and 
Environmental Committee Presence. 
3.3.2.1.1 Board Size 
 
As explained in the previous section the size of a board of directors is one of the 
most important components of board structure that can affect board effectiveness. 
Stakeholder theory argues that larger boards increase the diversity of board 
composition. A greater number of directors lead to greater monitoring and 
advising capacity (Coles et al. 2008) and may bring directors with more 
experience, knowledge and expertise (Larmou & Vafeas 2010). On the other 
hand, a smaller board is found to have lower communication difficulties, less 
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problems with free-riders and better coordinating among members (Ahmed et al. 
2006). Thus firms with smaller boards are more effective (Yermack, 1996, Jensen 
1993) in monitoring the CEOs.   
Empirical literature has provided limited evidence on the association between 
board size and environmental disclosure especially for carbon disclosure. The size 
of board has been found to be positively associated with the voluntary disclosure 
of GHG emissions (Liao et al. 2014) and with environmental disclosure (Cormier 
et al. 2011, Akhtaruddin et al. 2009). Size of board is found to be negatively 
associated with information asymmetry as demonstrated by Cormier et al. (2010).  
However, some studies have provided evidence that there is inverse association 
between board size and the level of voluntary disclosure on intellectual capital 
(Cerbioni & Parbonetti 2007), and no relation between board size and voluntary 
disclosures (Halme & Huse, 1997; Cheng & Courtenay, 2006). In my context, it 
can be argued that an increase in the number of directors on the board could 
provide a high degree of diversity and bring the board with more expertise and 
different ideas to consider. Such a board should be more representative for various 
stakeholders with a focus not only on financial performance but also on non-
financial aspects of operation. Thus, a large board is more likely to provide their 
GHG information to a variety of stakeholders via comprehensive carbon 
disclosure. Consistent with this argument, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 2.1: There is a positive association between board size and the 
extensiveness of carbon disclosure.   
3.3.2.1.2 Board Independence 
 
Board independence is measured by the proportion of independent directors on the 
board. It can be argued that an independent board can be more effective to 
monitor management (Liao, Luo & Tang, 2014, Fama, 1980), and pursue interests 
of large groups of stakeholders (Weir et al. 2002). Fama & Jensen (1983) indicate 
that board independence is regarded as a reliable mechanism in the process of 
reducing agency conflicts between managers and owners, and thus enhances the 
board monitoring effectiveness (Franks et al. 2001). In addition, boards with a 
larger proportion of independent directors has better alignment with stakeholders' 
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interests, and are more likely to moderate the conflicts of interest of different 
stakeholders. Independent directors are generally not involved in day-to-day 
operations so that it can more effectively monitor the behaviour of the executives. 
Moreover, independent directors seem less attached to economic performance 
(Ibrahim & Angelidis, 1995) and more concerned with corporate social 
responsibility (Ibrahim, Howard, & Angelidis, 2003; Webb, 2004). 
Empirically, prior literatures has tested the association between board 
independence and voluntary disclosures in general and found mixed outcomes. 
While, Arcay & Vazquez (2005); Cheng & Courtenay, (2006); Huafang & 
Jianguo, (2007); Lim et al. (2007); Patelli 7 Prencipe, (2007) & Donnelly & 
Mulcahy, (2008) have found a significant positive association, Eng & Mak, 
(2003) and Barako et al. (2006) have documented a negative association. 
Whereas, Ho & Wong, (2001) did not find a significant association between 
outside directors on the board and voluntary disclosure in a Hong Kong setting. 
Regarding environmental disclosure some studies were unable to confirm a 
significant association between outside directors and environmental disclosure 
(Brammer & Pavelin, 2006). Despite this, Haniffa & Cooke (2005) found that the 
composition of non-executive directors is significantly and positively associated 
with corporate social disclosure, and also positively related to the quantity and 
quality of corporate environmental disclosures (Post et al. 2011; Rupley et al. 
2012).  Further, Liao et al. (2014) found that the coefficient of board 
independence is positively associated with the GHG disclosure. Overall, the above 
argument and empirical evidence appears to justify my next hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2.2: There is a positive association between the number of 
independent directors in the boards and the extensiveness of carbon 
disclosure. 
3.3.2.1.3 Board Diversity 
 
As discussed earlier, board diversity relates to various characteristics that may be 
represented among directors in the boardroom in relation to board process and 
decision-making (Milliken & Martins, 1996; Walt & Ingley, 2003). It was argued 
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that board diversity can enhance the board’s expertise (Hillman et al. 2002) and 
decision- making process (Daily & Dalton, 2003).  
Broadly speaking, there are limited samples in empirical literature that have 
examined the association between board diversity and carbon disclosure. Prior 
studies indicated no significant relationship between the proportion of female 
board members and voluntary information disclosure in company annual reports 
(Nalikka, 2009). Similarly, Prado-Lorenzo & Garcia-Sanchez (2010) show that 
gender diversity is not significantly associated with GHG emission disclosure.  On 
the other hand, most of the previous research shows a positive association. For 
example, Liao et al, (2014) have acknowledged a significant positive relationship 
between gender diversity (measured as the percentage of female directors on the 
board) and the voluntary disclosure of GHG emissions in the form of a Carbon 
Disclosure Project report. The results suggest women are more likely to care about 
quality of life and the natural environment is extremely important to maintain the 
quality of life. Thus, it can be argued that the increase in the number of female 
directors should increase the probability of carbon disclosure and transparency. 
Other empirical evidence is consistent with this argument. For instance, Bear et al. 
(2010) demonstrated that the number of women board members is positively 
associated with the strength of corporate social responsibility disclosures and 
Rupley et al. (2012) found that the proportion of females on the board is 
positively associated with the quality of voluntary environmental disclosures. 
Fodio & Oba (2012) documented that the percentage of female directors on the 
board has positive impact on its environmental responsibility information 
disclosure. Hence, the following next hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 2.3: There is a positive association between the number of 
female “directors” on the board and the extensiveness of carbon 
disclosure. 
3.3.2.1.4 Board Meetings 
 
The frequency of board meetings is considered an important proxy for measuring 
the intensity of a board’s activities, and the effectiveness of corporate monitoring 
and disciplining (Jensen, 1993; Vafeas 1999a; Conger et al, 1998).  Frequent 
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board meetings would facilitate greater information sharing among company 
directors and would allow better workload distribution as well as board committee 
assignments, leading to more effective board decisions and increased transparency 
(Laksmana, 2008). In addition, the board with regular meetings is able to allocate 
more time to issues such as social and environmental responsibility. On the other 
hand, the board that has fewer meetings can reduce the ability to build their 
collective strength (Demb & Neubauer, 1992). 
Recently, there are few reported studies that link the frequency of board meetings 
and carbon emissions disclosure. Nonetheless, in the context of voluntary 
disclosure in general, for example, Allegrini & Greco, (2013) indicated that the 
number of board meetings is positively correlated to the level of voluntary 
disclosure. A similar study by Laksmana (2008) provided evidence that the 
frequency of board meeting is positively associated with greater voluntary 
disclosure of executive compensation information.  Kent & Stewart (2008) found 
that the quantity of disclosure is positively related to the frequency of board 
meetings. Further, Aburaya, (2012) has found that the board meetings frequency 
is significantly and positively associated with the quantity and quality of 
environmental disclosure. However, Liao et al. (2014) were unable to find 
significant relationship between the number of board meetings and the voluntary 
disclosure of GHG emissions.  Nelson et al. (2010) also did not find any 
significant relationship between board meeting frequency and the nature and 
extent of statutory executive stock option disclosures by Australian listed 
companies.  Notwithstanding, it is expected that a board with high frequency of 
meetings is more active, thus are more likely to provide financial and non-
financial information, including carbon emissions, for decision making. Thus, the 
following hypothesis is stated:  
Hypothesis 2.4: There is a positive association between that the number of 
board meetings and the extensiveness of carbon disclosure. 
3.3.2.1.5 Audit committee independence 
 
The independence of the audit committee is required to ensure the committee’s 
effectiveness as a monitoring device. According to the Principles of Good 
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Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations (ASX GCG, 2003), 
the board should establish an audit committee and the majority of its members 
should be independent directors. Cerbioni & Parbonetti (2007) provide evidence 
that an audit committee that consists of a majority of independent directors can 
enhance the quality of information disclosure to allow for a more accurate 
assessment of top management decisions and performance. Further, Forker (1992) 
argues that firms with a higher proportion of independent directors in the audit 
committee may reduce the opportunistic behaviour of the manager and improve 
the quality of disclosures. 
There is little academic literature regarding the association between the 
independence of the audit committee and carbon emissions disclosure. 
Nonetheless, previous studies have proven that the existence of an audit 
committee in the board is positively associated with the voluntary disclosure in 
general (Ho & Wong, 2001; Arcay & Vazquez, 2005; Barako et al. (2006). 
Similarly, O‟Sullivan et al. (2008) provided evidence that the existence and 
independence of an audit committee are positively related to the disclosure of 
forward- looking information. In addition, Said et al. (2009) have also found that 
the  proportion of independent non-executive directors who sit on audit 
committees are positively and significantly correlated with the level of corporate 
social responsibility disclosure. Recently, Aburaya (2012) confirmed a positive 
and significant association between audit committee independence and the 
disclosure of environmental information in the UK. Whereas, Allegrini & Greco, 
(2013) have found that the existence of audit committee and its independence are 
insignificant associated with voluntary disclosure. Yet, examining intellectual 
capital disclosures, Li et al. (2012) failed to find a significant association between 
the independence of an audit committee and intellectual capital disclosure by UK 
listed firms. Despite the mixed results, it is generally accepted that the 
independent directors on the audit committee are likely to enhance the quality of 
corporate governance, thus, should have a positive influence on a firm’s ecologic 
transparency. Then, my next hypothesis is assumed as follows: 
Hypothesis 2.5: There is a positive association between the independence 
of an audit committee and the extensiveness of carbon disclosure. 
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3.3.2.1.6 Compensation (Remuneration) Committee Independence 
 
The Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice 
Recommendations (2003, 2007) recommended that the board should establish a 
compensation committee with the majority of which being independent directors 
and with at least three members.  This committee is supposed to be associated 
with improved corporate governance (Forker 1992). The compensation committee 
can also contribute to sound governance, playing a positive role in the top 
management control (Allegrini & Greco, 2013), and aligning the management’s 
and the interests of shareholders (Conyon & Peck 1998; Laksmana 2008). 
Therefore, the presence of independent directors on the compensation committee 
could make the control over the top management team more effective.  
There are limited studies that have examined the relationship between 
compensation committee independence and environmental disclosure, particularly 
that of carbon emissions disclosure. However, in the area of voluntary disclosure 
in general, an empirical study such as Laksmana (2008) provides evidence of a 
significant and positive association between the independence of a compensation 
committee and the voluntary disclosure of executive compensation practices. A 
similar study by O‟Sullivan et al. (2008) documented that there is a positive 
association between the presence and independence of a compensation committee 
and voluntary disclosure of forward- looking information. On the other hand, 
Cerbioni & Parbonetti (2007) pointed out that the existence and independence of a 
remuneration committee are negatively associated with the level of voluntary 
disclosure on intellectual capital in European biotechnology firms. Whilst, 
Allegrini & Greco (2013) found that the existence of a compensation committee 
in the board, and its independence, are insignificantly associated with voluntary 
disclosure.  Similarly, Aburaya, (2012) found that the independence of 
remuneration committee is insignificant associated with the quantity and quality 
of environmental disclosure. In this light, it can be expected that the independent 
directors on the remuneration committee may enhance the carbon emissions 
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disclosure. Therefore, consistent with the above justification, the following 
hypothesis is formulated:   
Hypothesis 2.6: There is a positive association between the independence 
of compensation committee and the extensiveness of carbon disclosure 
3.3.2.1.7 Nomination Committee Independence 
 
The ASX Good Governance Principles and Recommendations (2003; 2007) 
recommends that nomination committees should be composed by a majority of 
independent directors. The nomination committee gives more possibilities for the 
minority shareholders to advocate a nominee in the presence of large controlling 
shareholders (Jensen 1993; Shivdasani & Yermack1999). In addition, Andrews 
(1987) advocated that using the nominating committees in the board is considered 
as a means that can enhance the independence of the board. Further, when the 
nomination committee is formed, the directors who staffed in this committee are 
most likely to guard the interests of shareholders (Vafeas, 1999b).  
Empirical research has not been undertaken to examine the relationship between 
nomination committee independence and environmental disclosure, particularly in 
regard to carbon emissions. Yet, in the area of voluntary disclosure, previous 
academic studies such as O‟Sullivan et al. (2008) found that the nomination 
committee presence is positively related to the voluntary disclosure of forward- 
looking information. On the other hand, Aburaya, (2012) found that the 
nomination committee independence is significantly and negatively associated 
with the quantity and quality of environmental disclosure. Whereas, Cerbioni & 
Parbonetti (2007) found that the presence of nomination committee and its 
independence are negatively related to with the level of voluntary disclosure on 
intellectual capital. Allegrini & Greco, (2013) provided evidence of insignificant 
relationship between the existence and independence of nomination committee in 
the board and voluntary disclosure. On the basis of the foregoing, the nomination 
committee independence results in increased monitoring and accountability to 
stakeholders, thus lead to enhanced reporting transparency (O‟Sullivan et al. 
2008). Consequently, it can be expected that the nomination committee 
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independence might enhance the carbon emissions disclosure. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is proposed:   
Hypothesis 2.7: There is a positive association between the independence 
of nomination committee and the extensiveness of carbon disclosure. 
3.3.2.1.8 Environmental Committee Presence 
 
As stated previously, the presence of an environmental committee or of a person 
responsible for environmental issues at the board level indicates the company has 
an active strategic posture regarding stakeholders (Ullman 1985; Michelon & 
Parbonetti, 2012) and the firm's willingness to balance the often conflicting 
interests of stakeholders regarding financial and environmental performance 
(Monks & Minow, 1995). The existence of an environment committee suggests 
that the firm is concerned about environmental protection and attempt to enhance 
their environmental reputation, through long -term strategies, as an objective (Neu 
et al, 1998). The environmental committee may also enhance the awareness of 
employees of environmental aspects of their jobs and their responsibility to reduce 
negative impacts (Liao et al. 2014). Thus, firms with an environmental committee 
on the board are expected to publicly disclose their emissions, and to provide 
more credibility in a voluntary disclosure regime to indicate their commitment to 
climate change (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). 
Currently, there is very limited evidence regarding the relationship between the 
presence of an environmental committee and environmental disclosure, especially 
for carbon-activity disclosure. Although some research found positive association 
between an environmental committee or CSR committee presence and 
environmental disclosure (Peters & Romi, 2011; 2013; Aburaya, 2012), other 
empirical literature suggests no association (Rankin et al. 2011; Rupley et al. 2012 
and Cowen et al. 1987).  Notwithstanding, we argue that the existence of 
environmental committee on the board is considered as an effective monitoring 
device to address the broader stakeholders' interests. Therefore, it can be expected 
that the environmental committee will be more likely to respond to stakeholder 
demands for disclosures related to carbon emission information (Liao et al 2014).  
Subsequently, we pose the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 2.8: There is a positive association between the presence of an 
environmental committee and the extensiveness of carbon disclosure. 
3.3.2.2 Ownership Structure 
 
As mentioned formerly, ownership structure is considered to be as an important 
element of corporate governance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Morck, 2000; Shan & 
McIver, 2011). Ownership structure mechanisms help investors by aligning the 
interest of shareholders and managers (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Eng and 
Mak, 2003; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Chau & Gray, 2002). Based on the empirical 
evidence from these studies along with the theoretical framework of the present 
study, this section provides the hypotheses related to ownership structures. Two 
aspects of a firm’s ownership structure will be examined in this study, namely; 
ownership concentration and managerial ownership.  
3.3.2.2.1 Ownership concentration 
 
Stakeholder perspective suggests that when shares in a company are widely held 
by multiple stakeholders the accountability issue becomes more important 
(Ghazali, 2007).  Substantial shareholders are expected to have both the greatest 
incentives and power to monitor management, as their own personal wealth is tied 
to the company’s performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shan & McIver, 2011). 
Moreover, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that large shareholders can help 
reduce agency conflicts because of their dominant power and incentive to prevent 
expropriation by insiders. Therefore, large shareholders play a crucial role in 
monitoring executives and can be expected to put more pressure on management 
to disclose more corporate information. Birt et al. (2006) argue that when 
ownership is concentrated in the hands of large shareholders, they have the ability 
to mitigate agency problems by influencing information disclosure. Similarly, Ho 
and Tower (2010) suggest that firm’s with concentrated ownership structure tend 
to provide more information. In this regard, McKinnon & Dalimunthe (1993, p. 
37) argue that voluntary disclosure may be useful in mitigating the severity of 
conflicts between managers and shareholders that arise when a company’s shares 
are widely held.  
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Currently, a number of studies have provided mixed results. For instance, Haniffa 
& Cooke (2002) have provided evidence of a significant positive association, but 
Hossain et al (1994); Barako et al, (2006);  García-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta 
(2010); Cormier et al. (2005), Brammer & Pavelin, (2006), & Prado-Lorenzo et al. 
2009) have found negative association, and Eng & Mak, (2003) failed to find a 
significant association between ownership concentration and voluntary disclosure.   
In the context of carbon disclosure, with the growing pressure from the 
government and the public it can be argued that carbon emissions are likely to 
negatively affect firm value. Thus, the knowledge of carbon emissions and 
corporate carbon mitigation programs is becoming more and more important for 
the decision-making of investors. So the intuition is large shareholders should 
have more concern about carbon emissions, because if emissions reduce firm 
value they will suffer more than small shareholders.  Thus, it is expected large 
shareholders tend to have more incentives to demand a transparent carbon 
disclosure. This is probably the main reason why  large institutional investors  
continuously sponsored CDP (Carbon Disclosure Project) which requests the 
large companies in the world to disclose comprehensive GHG information (Luo et 
al 2012). Thus we believe the ownership concentration should have a positive 
impact on disclosure.  
Hypothesis 2.9: There is a positive association between ownership 
concentration and the extensiveness of carbon disclosure. 
3.3.2.2.2 Managerial Ownership   
 
According to Jensen & Meckling (1976), a manager who owns a high percentage 
of a company’s shares bears the consequences of managerial actions thus it serves 
to align the interests of the manager with those of the owners. If the corporate 
managers own substantial equity in the company, they are more likely to make 
decisions maximizing the shareholders’ wealth (McConnell and Servaes 1990; 
Denis et al. 1997; Oh et al. 2011). Therefore, the greater ownership in a 
company's management tends to increases productivity and performance of the 
company.  
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Prior literature has found mixed results with regard to the association between 
managerial ownership and voluntary disclosure in general. For example, Nagar et 
al, (2003) have found that the value of shares held by the CEO is positively 
associated with disclosure in the context of the US, and Leung and Horwitz, 
(2004) noted that managerial ownership is positively related to voluntary 
disclosure in Hong Kong. Other empirical literature provided evidence that 
managerial ownership is negatively associated with voluntary disclosure (Eng & 
Mak (2003); Baek et al. (2009); Chau & Gray, (2010); Ghazali 2007; Oh et al. 
2011; Khan et al, 2013) or shows no relationship at all (Huafang & Jianguo 
(2007) and Zourarakis (2009)). We predict a positive association between 
managerial ownership and voluntary disclosures because high percentage of 
managerial ownership aligns the interest of managers and the owners and 
encourages them to disclose more information including financial and non-
financial information to shareholders. Thus, my last hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 2.10: There is a positive association between managerial 
ownership and the extensiveness of carbon disclosure. 
 
3.4 Conceptual Framework 
 
Based on the review of relevant literature, we posit a conceptual model linking 
corporate governance, carbon performance and the extensiveness of carbon 
disclosure (Figure 3.2, and 3.3). 
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Figure 3.2: Conceptual model linking corporate governance and carbon 
performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Conceptual model linking corporate governance and the extensiveness 
of carbon disclosure. 
 
3.5 Measurement of Dependent Variables 
 
The dependent variables of the present study are carbon performance and carbon 
disclosure.  
3.5.1 Measure of Carbon performance 
 
The Carbon Performance Index (CPI) is a proxy focusing on the result of carbon 
reduction activities. The proxy of carbon performance uses four items (Luo and 
Tang, 2011), where each item is assigned a weight based on the importance of 
perceived. First, three scores are awarded if the firm reduced intensity emissions 
relative to the previous year and the intensity emission is the total of Scope 1 and 
2 emissions divided by the total sales at the end of a fiscal year. Second, two 
scores are awarded if a firm’s carbon intensity is lower than its industry average; 
two scores are awarded as per the CDP scoring methodology. Third, two scores 
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are awarded if a firm has realised reduction through its initiative activities. Forth, 
one score is awarded if a firm met at least one of its carbon targets including 
intensity and absolute targets. So the range of carbon performance is from zero to 
eight. The first two items are chosen to use intensity measure instead of an 
absolute measure in order to facilitate comparisons between companies and 
reduction potentials become more transparent (Hoffmann & Busch, 2008). Also, 
this measure can avoid the influence of fluctuation of macro-economics on 
emissions. This measure is different from that of environmental performance in 
prior study. For instance, Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004), use the percentage of toxic 
waste recycled to measure environmental performance. This study used the total 
Scope1 and Scope23 divided by the total sales at the end of a fiscal year as 
measure of carbon performance. 
3.5.2 Measure of Carbon Disclosure: Carbon Disclosure Score  
 
We used an index to measure the extent of carbon disclosure based on relevant 
prior studies using the CDP method (e.g. Tang & Luo, 2011; Cotter & Najah, 
2012; Luo & Tang, 2014b). The CDP 2011 scoring methodology has been 
developed by CDP with guidance from PricewaterhouseCooper (PwC) in its 
capacity as Global Advisor and report-writer. The responses to each of the 
questions in the questionnaire are scored and aggregated and then a final score is 
assigned to a firm based on the content of the information provided in the answer 
in a carbon report of the firm. For example, the participant receives a point of "1" 
if  the company gives a "yes" answer or "0" if a company gives a "no" answer 
(Luo & Tang, 2014b).  The final score is the number of points that have been 
awarded divided by the total available scores4 and then normalised to 100 point 
scale (CDP Rating Methodology, 2010; Tang & Luo, 2011; Najah, 2012; Luo & 
Tang, 2014b).  
                                                          
3 Scope 1 is direct emissions, which occur onsite or from sources that a company owns and 
controls. It includes the combustion of fuels (e.g. boilers, furnaces, turbines); its own vehicle 
fleet, etc., while Scope 2 is indirect emissions that result from the generation of the electricity, 
heat or steam a company purchases (see in Luo and Tang, 2011). 
Tang & Luo, (2011) suggested that the CDP has changed the design of company CDP report from 
previous years, but the contents of CDP report are basically the similar. 
4 Note the total available scores ignore irrelevant questions, thus firms were not penalised for not 
answering irrelevant questions.  
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3.6 Definition and Measurement of Independent Variables 
 
The independent variables of this study are the corporate governance 
characteristics of all Australian companies that completed the CDP 2009 -2012 
questionnaire and allowed their responses to be published on the CDP website. As 
such the independent variables tested in the present study can be categorized into 
three groups. The first group is Board of Directors Characteristics: board size, 
board independence, board diversity, CEO duality, board meetings, audit 
committee independence; compensation committee independence; nomination 
committee independence, and environmental committee presence. The second 
group is the aspects of compensation structure: stock option and long term bonus. 
The third group of corporate governance mechanisms is ownership structure: 
ownership concentration and managerial ownership. 
3.6.1 Board of Directors Characteristics 
 
The board of directors are the brain of the companies who manage, control and 
supervise the companies. According to Fama (1980) and Fama & Jensen. (1983), 
who described the board of directors as a major internal mechanism in the 
corporate governance structure. They argue that establishing a board that provides 
effective monitoring of management actions on behalf of shareholders. In 
addition, According to Jensen & Meckling (1976), the board of directors acts on 
shareholders’ behalf to monitor managers as a market solution to the contracting 
problems inherent in organizations. Therefore, board of directors’ characteristics 
are expected to have a bearing on carbon performance. In the following section I 
will provide detailed information about the measurement of each characteristic of 
the board of director: board size, board independence, board diversity, CEO 
duality, board meetings, audit committee independence; compensation committee 
independence; nomination committee independence, and environmental 
committee presence. 
3.6.1.1 Board size (NDB) 
 
A previous study has considered the size of the board to be one of the most 
important parts of the ability of boards to effectively monitor management 
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(Persons, 2006). Therefore, the size of the board refers to the number of directors 
on the board (e.g. Zahra & Pearce II, 1989; Beasley, 1996; Yermack, 1996; 
Vafeas, 2000; Agrawal & Knoeber, 2001;  Kassinis & Vafeas, 2002; Abbot et al. 
2004; Coles et al. 2008; de Villiers et al. 2011 ). The current study measures the 
size of the board (NDB) as the number of directors serving in the board. This 
information on board size was manually collected by using the corporate 
governance statements in the “Directors’ report” section of the annual report for 
each firm. 
3.6.1.2 Board Independence (NIDB) 
 
With respect to the independence of the board which is another key characteristic 
of boards of directors, board independence is regarded as a reliable mechanism  in 
the process of reducing agency conflicts between managers and owners (Fama & 
Jensen 1983) and it enhances the board monitoring effectiveness (Franks et al. 
2001). Furthermore, the NYSE (2009) cited in Larcker & Tayan, (2011) defined 
independence as having “no material relationship with the listed company (either 
directly or as a partner, shareholder, or officer of an organization that has a 
relationship with the company).” Following Core et al., 1999; de Villiers et al. 
2011 & Kathyayini &Lester, 2012, this study calculates board independence 
(NIDB) as the number of independent directors on the board. The information on 
board independence was mainly gathered from corporate governance statement in 
the “Directors’ report” section of the annual report for each firm. 
3.6.1.3 Board Diversity (NFDB) 
 
Board diversity is defined as being inclusive of various attributes that may be 
represented among directors in the boardroom in relation to board process and 
decision-making, including age, gender, ethnicity, culture, religion, constituency 
representation, independence, knowledge, educational and professional 
background, technical skills and expertise, commercial and industry experience, 
career and life experience (Milliken & Martins, 1996; Van der Walt & Ingley, 
2003). This study will focus on gender diversity for two reasons: first, recent 
legislation and diversity efforts worldwide have drawn more attention to the 
importance of female representation on boards of directors (Miller & Triana, 
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2009). second, there are growing numbers of females in top management positions 
today, with the pipeline for women CEOs and directors expected to increase 
(Giscombe & Mattis, 2002; Helfat, Harris & Wolfson, 2006). Therefore, 
following the prior work of Coffey & Wang, 1998; Wedd 2004; Dunn & Sainty, 
2009 & Walls et al, 2012, this study measured board diversity (NFDB) as the 
number of female directors in the board. The data of gender diversity was 
gathered by looking at the biographical details in “Directors’ report” section at 
corporate governance statement of the annual report for each firm. 
3.6.1.4 Board Meetings (NBM) 
 
The number of board of director meetings held annually is considered another 
measure of board effectiveness. According to Conger et al. (1998) who suggested 
that frequent board meetings is an important resource in improving the board 
effectivenes, frequent board meetings would allow for better communication and 
information sharing between management and directors (Shivdasani & Zenner, 
2004). Therefore, consistent with the previous studies, (e.g. Vafeas, 1999; Nelson 
et al. 2010; Brick & Chidambaran 2010), this research calculates board meetings 
(NBM) by the number of board meetings per year. The information on board 
meetings was selected and obtained using the corporate governance statement in 
the “Directors’ report” section of the annual report for each firm.  
3.6.1.5 Audit committee independence (NIDAC) 
 
The independence of an audit committee is considered the key characteristic of 
the committee’s effectiveness to oversee the firm’s financial reporting process. 
The report of principles of good corporate governance and best practice 
recommendations (2003) and the recommendations of the blue ribbon committee 
(1999) recommended that the majority of audit committee member be 
independent. Therefore, following the previous research (e.g. B´edard, Chtourou, 
& Courteau, 2004; Anderson et al. 2004), this study measured the independence 
of an audit committee by the number of independent directors in that audit 
committee (NIDAC). The source of this variable was hand- collected   using the 
corporate governance statement found in the “Directors’ Report” section of the 
annual report for each firm. 
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 3.6.1.6 Compensation “Remuneration” Committee Independence (NIDCC) 
 
The independence of compensation committee members is seen as the most 
important characteristic in the board’s composition. The ASX good corporate 
governance and best practice and recommendations (ASX CGC, 2003) 
recommended that the majority of compensation committee members be 
independent. Therefore, following the ASX good governance principles and 
recommendations of 2003, compensation committee independence (NIDCC), is 
measured by the number of independent directors in the Compensation 
(Remuneration) Committee. The keywords of this variable are “Compensation 
(Remuneration) Committee” which was handpicked and manually collected by 
using corporate governance statements in the “Directors’ report” section of the 
annual report for each firm. 
3.5.1.7 Nomination Committee Independence (NIDNC) 
 
According to Jensen 1993; Shivdasani and Yermack 1999, the nomination 
committee plays a significant role in the existence of large controlling 
shareholders, as it gives more possibilities to the minority shareholders to 
advocate a nominee. In addition, the ASX good governance principles and 
recommendations of 2003; 2007 recommends that nomination committee is 
composed of a majority of independent directors. Hence, following the ASX CGC 
(2003), Nomination Committee independence (NIDNC) is calculated by the 
number of independent directors in the nomination committee. The data of this 
variable was selected and gathered from corporate governance statements in the 
“Directors’ report” section of the annual report for each firm. 
3.6.1.8 Environmental Committee Presence (EC_D) 
 
The presence of an environmental committee or of a person responsible for 
environmental issues at the board level indicates the company has an active 
strategic posture regarding stakeholders (Ullman, 1985; Michelon & Parbonetti, 
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2012) and the firm's willingness to balance the often conflicting interests of 
stakeholders (Monks & Minow, 1995). This study follows the previous work to 
measure the presence of an environmental committee (McKendall et al, 1999; 
Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012; Peters & Romi, 2011) which measured as a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the company has a board-level environmental committee and 
0 otherwise (EC_D). The information of environmental committee presence was 
hand gathered from the corporate governance statement in the “Directors’ report” 
section of the annual report for each firm. 
3.6.2 CEO Compensation Structure 
 
Generally speaking, CEOs are responsible for developing talent; as well as their 
responsibilities in front of the board to lead the company to success which 
requires them to make decisions that can maximize the firm’s value (Larcker & 
Tayan, 2011). The CEO compensation packages generally divided into three main 
components, namely, fixed compensation (salary), Short-term incentives 
including annual incentives, bonuses, commissions, gainsharing, and Long-term 
incentives including restricted stock, stock options and other long-term 
compensation. The following section will include detailed information about the 
measurement of two elements of compensation, namely: long term bonus and 
stock options. In addition, the information of these components were manually 
collected from remuneration reports’’ plus the “Key management and director 
remuneration” section in the corporate governance statement of firms” section of 
annual report for each firm. 
3.6.2.1 Stock Option (CEO_SO) 
 
Stock options are the most typical form of long term incentive compensation 
which is likely to foster a longer decision horizon among managers. Moreover, 
stock options provide compensation only when executives have increased the 
stock price to the point at which the options trade (Larcker & Tayan, 2011). 
Therefore, stock options (CEO_SO) are measured by a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if CEO compensation includes a stock option and 0 otherwise (McGuire 
et al, 2003; Fich & Shivdasani, 2004; Arcay & Vazquez, 2005). 
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3.6.2.2 Long Term Bonus (CEO_LTB) 
 
In addition to CEO stock options, long term bonus is considered as another 
measure of long term incentives that can contribute to the alignment of managers’ 
and shareholders’ interests. In the current study, long term bonus is measured by a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if CEO compensation includes a long term bonus 
and 0 otherwise. (Stanwick & Stanwick, 2001; Mahoney & Thorne, 2005; 
Deckop, Merriman, & Gupta, 2006) 
3.6.3 Ownership Structure 
 
Ownership structure is considered to be an important element of corporate 
governance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Morck, 2000; Shan & McIver, 2011). 
Ownership structure mechanisms help investors by aligning the interest of 
shareholders and managers (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986; Eng & Mak, 2003; 
Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Chau & Gray, 2002). According to Demsetz & 
Villalonga, (2001), who indicate that all ownership structure measurements 
employed by Demsetz & Lehn (1985) are based on the percentage of shares 
owned by a firm’s most significant shareholders, the most attention being “given 
by them” to the proportion owned by the five largest shareholders. The studies 
that were written after the Demsetz and Lehn paper (e.g. Morck et al. 1988; 
McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Loderer & Martin, 1997; Cho, 1998; Holderness et 
al. 1999; Himmelberg, Hubbard & Palia, 1999) focus on the percentage of shares 
owned by board members, CEO, and top management. In this study, ownership 
structure is characterized by ownership concentration and management ownership. 
In addition, the data of these variables hand-gathered from the “Additional 
Information” section in the corporate governance statements of the annual report 
for each firm. 
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3.6.3.1 Ownership concentration (OWN_CONC)  
 
Ownership concentration refers to the percentage of ordinary shares owned by 
substantial shareholders. Jensen & Meckling (1976) argue that substantial 
shareholders are expected to have both the greatest incentives and power to 
monitor management, as their own personal wealth is tied to the company’s 
performance. A commonly employed measure of ownership concentration is the 
proportion of ordinary shares owned by the largest shareholder (see McKinnon & 
Dalimunthe, 1993; Hossain et al, 1994; Halme & Huse, 1997; Haniffa & Cooke, 
2002; Eng & Mak, 2003; Huafang & Jianguo, 2007). Accordingly, ownership 
concentration is measured in the present study using the logarithm of the 
percentage of ordinary shares owned by substantial shareholders. 
3.6.3.2 Managerial Ownership (MANG_OWN)  
 
Managerial ownership refers to the percentage of total outstanding shares held by 
all directors, including the CEO, executive directors and non-executive directors. 
According to Jensen & Meckling (1976), who indicated that a manager who owns 
a proportion of a firm’s shares bears the consequences of managerial actions thus 
it serves to align the interests of management with those of other shareholders. 
Managerial ownership has been used in the literature using the proportion of 
ordinary shares held by the CEO and executive directors (see Holderness et al. 
1999; Johnson & Greening, 1999; Eng & Mak, 2003; Huafang & Jianguo, 2007; 
Oh et al. 2011; Khan et al. 2013). Accordingly, managerial ownership is 
calculated in this study by using a logarithm of the percentage of total outstanding 
shares held by all directors, including the CEO, executive directors and non-
executive directors. 
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Table 3.3: Description of Individual Governance Variables 
Area Abbreviation/ 
Code 
Variable Name Measurement 
Board of 
Directors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CEO_ 
Compensation 
Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
Ownership 
Structure  
NDB 
 
NIDB 
 
NFDB 
NBM 
 
NIDAC 
 
NIDCC 
 
 
NIDNC 
 
EC_D 
 
 
 
 
CEO_SO 
 
 
CEO_LTB 
 
 
 
 
OWN_CONC 
 
 
MANG_OWN  
Board Size 
 
Board Independence 
 
Board Diversity 
Board Meetings 
 
Audit Committee Independence 
 
Compensation Committee 
Independence 
 
Nomination Committee 
Independence 
Environmental Committee 
Presence 
 
 
 
Stock Option 
 
 
Long Term Bonus 
 
  
 
 
Ownership Concentration 
 
 
Managerial Ownership 
Number of directors serving on the 
board. 
Number of independent directors on the 
board. 
Number of female directors on the board. 
Number of board meetings per year.  
 
Number of independent directors in audit 
committee. 
Number of independent directors in 
Compensation (remuneration) 
Committee.  
Number of independent directors in 
Nomination committee. 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
company has a board-level 
environmental committee and 0 
otherwise. 
 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if CEO 
compensation includes a stock option 
and 0 otherwise. 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if CEO 
compensation includes a long term bonus 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
Logarithm of the percentage of ordinary 
shares owned by substantial shareholder 
 
Logarithm of the percentage of total 
outstanding shares held by all directors. 
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3.7 Measurement of Control Variables 
 
This study included a number of control variables based on prior literature that 
may influence the firms’ response to the CDP. The information for the control 
variables group is obtained from the FinAnalysis database. These control variables 
include: Firm Size, Profitability, Leverage, Tobin’s Q, Capital Intensity and 
IntensiveSector. As presented below, the current study provides these variables 
individually, along with the method of measurement for each variable. 
3.7.1 Firm size (FSIZE)  
 
Firm size is an important control variable in most previous finance and accounting 
literatures, because large firms would disclose more information than smaller 
firms, in order to reduce the information asymmetry problem. In addition, it has 
been well known that larger firms tend to incur higher political costs and a high 
degree of public scrutiny and media attention than smaller firms (Stanny & Ely 
2008; Shan & Taylor, 2014). In the context of environmental performance and 
disclosure, particularly, in respect of environmental performance, several studies 
have found a significant association between firm size and environmental 
performance (e.g.  McGuire et al. 1988; McKendall et al. 1999; McGuire et al. 
2003; Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009; De Villiers et al. 2011; Walls et al. 2012). 
According to McKendall et al. (1999), large firms are associated with stronger 
environmental performance. This views is consistent with de Villiers et al. (2011) 
who found that firm size is positively related to the existence of strong 
environmental performance. Other studies, however, found a negative and 
significant relationship between firm size and pollution prevention performance 
(Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009). In addition, this relationship is revealed not 
only in the context of environmental performance but also for environmental 
disclosure.  Numerous previous studies have found that firm size is significantly 
associated with the level of environmental disclosure (e.g. Deegan & Gordon, 
1996; Halme & Huse, 1997; Patten, 2002; Freedman & Jaggi, 2005; Al-Tuwaijri 
et al. 2004; Brammer & Pavelin, 2006, 2008; Clarkson et al., 2007; Cormier et al. 
2005; Peters and Romi, 2011;   Rupley et al. 2012; Stanny & Ely, 2008; Luo et al. 
2013; Shan & Taylor, 2014; Peng et al. 2015). According to Stanny & Ely (2008), 
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who found that the CDP disclosure rates to be positively related to firm size. 
Further, Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009a) found that the size of the firm is positively 
associated with the disclosure of GHG emissions information.  Firm size has been 
addressed in different measures in the literature: for example, total sales, total 
assets, number of employees and market capitalization.   According to Hassan, 
Giorgioni & Romilly, (2006), who indicated that there is no suitable criterion to 
select the best proxy of firm size. Reviewing the literature, however, the most 
popular measure of firm size is total assets. Therefore, in this study, the size of the 
firm (FSIZE) is included as a control variable to examine the association between 
corporate governance structure and carbon performance and carbon disclosure. 
Following the prior literature review, the firm size is measured as the natural 
logarithms of total assets (e.g. Bloom & Milkovich, 1998; Finkelstein & Boyd, 
1998; McKendall et al. 1999; Patten 2002; Al-Tuwaijri et al. 2004; Cormier et al. 
2005; Brammer & Pavelin, 2006, 2008; Clarkson et al. 2007; Berrone & Gomez-
Mejia, 2009; Luo & Tang 2011; De Villiers et al. 2011; Rupley et al. 2012; Walls 
et al. 2012; Luo et al. 2013; Shan & Taylor, 2014).  
3.7.2 Profitability (ROA)  
 
The second control variable of the present study is Profitability which may 
influence the firms’ response to the CDP.  Profitable firms could more easily 
afford the expenditures needed to conduct and report carbon actions (Luo et al. 
2013). Moreover, less profitable companies may be more reluctant to release 
climate change information that may indicate a decline in future earnings. Firms 
that are more profitable may be inclined to respond to the CDP to assure investors 
that their high quality earnings can withstand a more constrained regulatory 
environment (Stanny & Ely, 2008).  
A number of empirical studies show somewhat mixed evidence of the association 
between profitability and environmental performance and disclosure. In the 
respect of environmental performance, while some studies found that profitability 
is positively associated with environmental performance (Jaggi & Freedman, 
1992; Russo & Fouts, 1997; Kock & Santaló, 2005; De Villiers et al. 2011), other 
studies found no relationship (McKendall et al.1999; Delmas & Nairn-Birch, 
2011). In regards to environmental disclosure level, many empirical studies 
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demonstrated a positive relationship between profitability and environmental 
disclosures (Neu et al. 1998; Cormier & Magnan, 1999; Li & McConomy, 1999; 
Bewley & Li. 2000; Al-Tuwaijri et al. 2004; Haniffa & Cooke,2005; Luo et al. 
2012; Luo et al. 2013) other studies, however, indicated a negative association 
(Chen & Jaggi, 2000; Ho & Taylor, 2007; Rupley et al. 2012) whereas some prior 
work found no association between  profitability and environmental disclosures 
(Eng & Mak, 2003; Patten, 1991;  Stanny & Ely, 2008; Peters & Romi, 2011; 
Wegener et al. 2013). Drawing on the prior research (Patten, 1991; Li and 
McConomy, 1999; Lim et al. 2007; Stanny & Ely, 2008; Cormier et al. 2010; Luo 
& Tang 2011; Cormier et al. 2011; De Villiers et al. 2011; Peters & Romi, 2011; 
Rupley et al. 2012 Luo et al. 2012; Luo et al. 2013), the current study measured 
profitability (ROA) as the firm’s return on assets. 
3.7.3 Leverage (LEV) 
 
Leverage has been widely used as a control variable in the context of 
environmental performance and disclosure (e.g.; Haniffa & Cooke,2005; Clarkson 
et al. 2007; Huafang & Jianguo, 2007; Stanny & Ely, 2008; Peters & Romi, 2011; 
De Villiers et al. 2011; Walls et al. 2012; Luo et al. 2013; Wegener et al. 2013). 
There is an expectation that more highly leveraged firms will have stricter debt 
covenants to restrain shareholders’ actions, and creditors will likely demand more 
information to monitor management behaviour (Leftwich et al, 1981). Thus, 
highly leveraged firms may be motivated to make voluntary disclosures in order 
to reduce contracting costs. Moreover, higher-leverage firms have heavier debt 
burdens, and thus fewer assets available for a proactive carbon-reporting system 
(Luo et al. 2013). 
Several studies in the environmental disclosure and performance literature have 
shown mixed results in the relationship between leverage and environmental 
performance and disclosure. Some studies found that leverage is positively 
associated with environmental performance (De Villiers et al. 2011; Walls et al. 
2012) and is negatively related to environmental performance (Clarkson et al. 
2011c). This relationship was conducted not only in the context of environmental 
performance but also for environmental disclosure level, some Empirical studies 
found that leverage is significant and positive with environmental disclosure 
 107 
 
(Bradbury,1992; Clarkson et al. 2007; O’Sullivan et al. 2008), other studies, 
however, provide evidence that  the relationship between leverage and 
environmental disclosure was negative (Meek et al. 1995; Luo et al. 2013; 
Wegener et al. 2013) whereas other research have not found any relationship (e.g. 
Craswell & Taylor,1992; Raffournier, 1995; Freedman & Jaggi, 2005; Rankin et 
al. 2011; Luo et al, 2012). Following previous literature (e.g. Raffournier, 1995; 
Brammer & Pavelin, 2006; Clarkson et al. 2007; 2011c; Huafang and Jianguo, 
2007; Stanny and Ely, 2008; O’Sullivan et al. 2008; Peters & Romi, 2011; De 
Villiers et al. 2011; Rankin et al. 2011; Walls et al. 2012; Luo et al. 2013; 
Wegener et al. 2013), this study computed leverage (LVE) as total debt divided 
by total assets.  
3.7.4 Tobin’s Q (TOBINSQ) 
 
The Tobin’s Q is considered to be one of the most common explanatory variables 
that have been used in previous empirically studies  to represent a firm’s relative 
amount of intangible assets and growth opportunities (Barth & Kasznik, 1999; 
Clarkson et al. 2007; Stanny & Ely, 2008). Healy & Palepu (2001) indicate that 
managers seek to reduce information asymmetry through voluntary disclosures in 
order to decrease the firm’s cost of capital. Therefore, a higher Tobin’s Q means 
the firm has higher intangible assets and/or the firm has higher growth prospects, 
which are harder to value because of the higher information asymmetry (Stanny & 
Ely, 2008). Tobin’s Q is widely used in previous empirical works of the 
environmental-financial performance association and environmental disclosure 
literature (e.g.; Dowell et al. 2000;  Konar & Cohen, 2001; King  & Lenox, 2001; 
Elsayed & Paton, 2005; Clarkson et al. 2007; Stanny & Ely, 2008; Busch & 
Hoffmann, 2011; Zhongfu et al. 2011).  Some studies find that firm performance 
as measured by Tobin’s Q is positively associated with adherence to stringent 
environmental standards (Dowell et al. 2000). Busch & Hoffmann (2011) also 
provided strong evidence that corporate carbon performance has a positive 
association with Tobin’s Q. Other studies indicate that increasing carbon 
emissions negatively impact on market based measures of financial performance 
(using Tobin’s Q) in the US companies (Delmas & Nairn-Birch 2011). In respect 
to environmental disclosure context, some researchers found that Tobin’s Q, as 
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the indicator of economic performance, is positively associated with environment 
information disclosure (Zhongfu et al. 2011). Whereas, other studies found no 
significant association between Tobin’s Q and disclosures to CDP (Stanny et al, 
2008; Wegener et al, 2013). Nonetheless, the present study follows the previous 
researches to measure Tobin’s Q (TOBINSQ), which is measured as market value 
measured of equity, plus book value of preferred stock, book value of long term 
debt and current liabilities, divided by book value of total assets (Chung & Pruitt, 
1994; King & Lenox, 2001; Clarkson et al. 2007; Stanny and Ely, 2008; Zhongfu 
et al. 2011; Busch & Hoffmann, 2011; Wegener et al. 2013). 
3.7.5 Capital Intensity (CAPINT) 
 
A number of prior studies test capital intensity as a variable that may affect the 
environmental performance and disclosure (e.g. Russo & Fouts, 1997; Elsayed & 
Paton, 2005; King & Lenox, 2002; Clarkson et al. 2007; Stanny & Ely, 2008; 
Walls et al, 2012). According to Aerts et al. (2009) indicate that the magnitude of 
a firm's capital investment makes it less flexible with regard to government 
actions on environmental issues. In addition, firms with higher capital 
expenditures are more likely to have higher carbon emission, but may want to 
disclose that they are investing in new equipment that reduces overall emissions 
(Stanny & Ely, 2008). Empirical evidence on the association between capital 
intensity and environmental performance disclosure are quite limited.  Russo & 
Fouts (1997) found evidence of a positive association between capital intensity 
and environmental performance. In addition, Walls et al. (2012) found that capital 
intensity is positively associated with environmental strengths and negatively with 
environmental concern. In the context of environmental disclosure, Clarkson et al. 
(2007); Gao & Connors, (2011) documented that capital intensity is significantly 
and positively associated with environmental disclosure, while Stanny & Ely 
(2008) were unable to confirm any significant relationship between capital 
intensity and disclosure. In the current study, capital expenditures over sales are 
used as a measure of capital intensity (CAPINT) (Russo & Fouts, 1997; Elsayed 
& Paton, 2005; King & Lenox, 2002; Clarkson et al. 2007; Gao & Connors, 2011; 
Walls et al. 2012).  
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3.7.6 Intensive Sectors (INTSECTOR) 
 
Intensive sectors are also a control variable that may influence the firms’ response 
to the CDP. In line with prior literature, intensive sectors are classified as Global 
Industry Classification Standard (GICS): 10 (Energy), 15 (Materials), 20 
(Industrials), 25 (Consumer Discretionary), 30 (Consumer Staples), 35 (Health 
Care), 40 (Financials), 45 (Information Technology), 50 (Telecommunication 
Services), 55 (Utilities). This study measures Intensive Sectors (INTSECTOR) as 
a dummy variable that is coded one if a firm operates in the Materials, Energy or 
Utilities sector, and otherwise, zero (Luo & Tang 2011, Luo et al. 2012).   
Table 3.4: Measurement of Control Variables 
Acronym/ Code Variable Name Measurement 
FSIZE 
ROA 
LEV 
TOBINSQ 
 
 
 
CAPINT 
INTESECTOR 
Firm size 
Profitability 
Leverage 
Tobin’s Q 
 
 
 
Capital Intensity 
IntensiveSector 
The natural logarithms of total assets. 
The firm’s return on assets. 
Total debt divided by total assets. 
Logarithm of market value measure of 
equity, plus book     value of preferred 
stock, book value of long term debt 
and current liabilities, divided by book 
value of total assets. 
Logarithm of the capital expenditure 
over sales. 
A dummy variable that is coded 1 if a 
firm operates in Materials, Energy or 
Utilities sector, and 0 otherwise 
 
 
3.8 Data Analysis Procedures 
 
This section illustrates an overview of the statistical techniques used in the current 
study. In order to test the hypotheses, descriptive statistics are used first that 
include sample values such as the Mean, Median, Standard Deviation, Minimum, 
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Maximum, 25th and 75th percentile of the variables and Skewness-Kurtosis to 
analyse the data for four years. And then, the Pearson correlation coefficients are 
carried out to identify the correlation between the dependent and independent 
variables in the current study. In addition, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) multiple 
regression analysis is the primary statistical technique used to test the predicted 
association between two dimensions. First I investigate the association between 
corporate governance and carbon performance. Second is examination of the 
association between corporate governance and carbon disclosure.  While the first 
has carbon performance as the dependent variable, the second has carbon 
disclosure as the dependent variable. Previous studies (e.g. Gujarati, 2003 and 
Hair et al. 2010) point out that the regression analysis is not applicable for 
inference beyond the sample if the assumptions are not met in the following: 
linearity, independence of errors, homoscedasticity, normality and 
multicollinearity. These assumptions were tested for multicollinearity based on 
the correlation coefficients as well as the variance inflation factor (VIF). In 
addition, an analysis of residuals, plots of the residuals (P.P plot), histogram of 
residuals as well as the Q–Q plot, have been performed to test for 
homoscedasticity, linearity and normality assumptions. Normality tests based on 
skewness and kurtosis have been also carried out. Finally, robust analysis is 
undertaken to check the robustness of the main regression analysis. This study has 
employed the software package STATA to conduct the statistical analysis. 
3.9 Empirical Model 
 
In order to investigate the link between corporate governance structure and carbon 
performance and the extensiveness of carbon disclosure together with the possible 
impact of the institutional environment in determining this relationship, the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) multiple regression analysis is the primary model 
used in this study to examine this relationship, while other models are used to test 
the robustness of the overall model. The first has carbon performance as the 
dependent variable. The two models are the following: 
Model (1): in order to test the relationship between corporate governance and 
carbon disclosure, the study uses the following regression model: 
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Model (1):- 
LOG_C_PER = ß0 + ß1 NDB + ß2 NIDB + ß3 NFDB + ß4 NBM + ß5 NIDAC 
+ + ß6 EC_D + ß7 CEO_SO + ß8 CEO_LTB + Є 
………………………………….………………… (1) 
LOG_C_PER = ß0 + ß1 NDB + ß2 NIDB + ß3 NFDB + ß4 NBM + ß5 NIDAC 
+ ß6 EC_D + ß7 CEO_SO + ß8 CEO_LTB + ß9 LOG_OWN_CONC + ß10 
LOG_MANG_OWN + Є………………….…. (2) 
 
LOG_C_PER = ß0 + ß1 NDB + ß2 NIDB + ß3 NFDB + ß4 NBM + ß5 NIDAC 
+ ß6 EC_D + ß7 CEO_SO + ß8 CEO_LTB + ß9 LOG_OWN_CONC + ß10 
LOG_MANG_OWN + ß11 FSIZE + ß12 ROA + ß13 LEV + ß14 
LOG_TOBINSQ + ß15 LOG_CAPINT + Є………………………. (3) 
 
LOG_C_PER = ß0 + ß1 NDB + ß2 NIDB + ß3 NFDB + ß4 NBM + ß5 NIDAC 
+ + ß6 EC_D + ß7 CEO_SO + ß8 CEO_LTB + ß9 LOG_OWN_CONC + ß10 
LOG_MANG_OWN + ß11 FSIZE + ß12 ROA + ß13 LEV + ß14 
LOG_TOBINSQ + ß15 LOG_CAPINT + ß16 INTSECTOR + 
Є………………… (4) 
Model (2): in order to test the relationship between corporate governance and 
carbon disclosure, the study uses the following regression model: 
Model (2):- 
C_DIS = ß0 + ß1 NDB + ß2 NIDB + ß3 NFDB + ß4 NBM + ß5 NIDAC + ß6 
NIDCC + ß7 NIDNC + ß8 EC_D+ Є 
………………………………….………………… (1) 
C_DIS = ß0 + ß1 NDB + ß2 NIDB + ß3 NFDB + ß4 NBM + ß5 NIDAC + ß6 
NIDCC + ß7 NIDNC + ß8 EC_D + ß9 LOG_OWN_CONC +ß10 
LOG_MANG_OWN + Є…………………….…. (2) 
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C_DIS = ß0 + ß1 NDB + ß2 NIDB + ß3 NFDB + ß4 NBM + ß5 NIDAC + ß6 
NIDCC + ß7 NIDNC + ß8 EC_D + ß9 LOG_OWN_CONC +ß10 
LOG_MANG_OWN + ß11 FSIZE + ß12 ROA + ß13LEV + ß14 
LOG_TOBINSQ + ß15 LOG_CAPINT + Є………………………. (3) 
 
C_DIS = ß0 + ß1 NDB + ß2 NIDB + ß3 NFDB + ß4 NBM + ß5 NIDAC + ß6 
NIDCC + ß7 NIDNC + ß8 EC_D + ß9 LOG_OWN_CONC + ß10 
LOG_MANG_OWN + ß11 FSIZE + ß12 ROA + ß13LEV + ß14 
LOG_TOBINSQ + ß15 LOG_CAPINT + ß16 INTSECTOR + 
Є……………………………..… (4) 
 
Description of the variables 
Dependent Variables: 
LOG_C_PER        = Logarithm of the total Scope1 and Scope2 divided by the 
total sales at the end of fiscal year 
C_DIS        = is the total level of carbon disclosure scored using an index 
developed by Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP).   
Independent Variables: 
NDB            = Number of directors serving on the board. 
NIDB           = Number of independent directors on the board. 
NFDB          = Number of female directors on the board. 
NBM            = Number of board meetings per year. 
NIDAC         = Number of independent directors on audit committee. 
NIDCC     = Number of independent directors on Compensation (remuneration) 
Committee.  
NIDNC         = Number of independent directors on Nomination committee. 
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EC_D         = A dummy variable equal to 1 if the company has a board-level 
environmental committee and 0 otherwise. 
CEO_SO      = A dummy variable equal 1 if CEO compensation includes a stock 
option and 0 otherwise. 
CEO_LTB     = A dummy variable equal 1 if CEO compensation includes a long 
term bonus and 0 otherwise. 
LOG_OWN_CONC = Logarithm of the percentage of ordinary shares owned by 
substantial shareholder. 
 LOG_MANG_OWN = Logarithm of the percentage of total outstanding shares 
held by all directors.   
Control Variables: 
FSIZE             = the natural logarithms of total assets. 
ROA                = the firm’s return on assets. 
LEV                 = Total debt divided by total assets. 
LOG_TOBINSQ     = Logarithm of the market value measured of equity, plus 
book     value of preferred stock, book value of long term debt and current 
liabilities, divided by book value of total assets. 
LOG_CAPINT            = Logarithm of the capital expenditure over sales. 
INTESECTOR = A dummy variable that is coded 1 if a firm operates in 
Materials, Energy or Utilities sector, and 0 otherwise. 
β0                 = is the intercept coefficients 
β1…16         = are the coefficients of each of the independent variables 
 Є                 = Error term. 
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3.10 Concluding Comments 
 
This chapter has presented a description of the research methods applied and 
analysis method used in collecting data to test the presence of an association 
between corporate governance and carbon performance and the extensiveness of 
carbon disclosure. The chapter begins by providing an overview of the sampling 
procedures and the principal sources of data. In order to fulfil the purposes of this 
thesis, data related to corporate governance were manually collected from 
companies’ annual reports and data related to carbon performance and carbon 
disclosure scores were mainly gathered from firm's responses for the CDP 
standardised questionnaire. The final sample for the study consisted of the 205 
largest Australian companies that participated in the CDP questionnaire over the 
period of 2009 until 2012. Moreover, the chapter presents in detail the criteria for 
choosing the final samples for this study. In addition, this chapter has developed 
two groups of hypotheses that are based on the literature review in Chapter Two. 
First, ten hypotheses are formulated to examine the relationship between corporate 
governance characteristics ( board size, board independence, board diversity, 
board meeting, audit committee independence, the presence of environmental 
committee, CEO stock option, CEO long term bonus, ownership concentration 
and managerial ownership) and carbon performance. Second, ten hypotheses are 
developed to test the impact of corporate governance characteristics ( board size, 
board independence, board diversity, board meeting, audit committee 
independence, compensation committee independence, nomination committee 
independence, the presence of environmental committee, ownership concentration 
and managerial ownership) on the extensiveness of carbon disclosure. The chapter 
also discussed in detail how to measure carbon performance and carbon 
disclosure. The measurement of independent and control variables are also 
discussed in this chapter. Finally, this chapter ends with an explanation of the 
regression models used to investigate the impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms on both carbon performance and the extensiveness of carbon 
disclosure. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: EXAMINING THE ASSOCIATION 
BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
CARBON PERFORMANCE 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter serves to provide an overview of the data analysis and the statistical 
techniques undertaken in the current study. This chapter presents the analysis 
related to Hypotheses 1.1 to 1.10.  These hypotheses are addressing the first 
research question which is concerned with the relationship between the indicators 
of corporate governance and carbon performance. The present chapter is outlined 
as follows: section 4.2 describes the diagnostic tests conducted on the data 
employed in this chapter; section 4.3 discusses the descriptive statistics for all 
variables (dependent, independent, and control variables); section 4.4 addresses 
the potential multicollinearity problem between independent variables; section 4.5 
depicts the correlation coefficients between dependent variables,  independent 
variables and control variables; section 4.6 presents the multiple regression results 
of testing the hypotheses set out in Chapter Three; section   4.7 illustrates and 
discusses additional analysis and the robustness checks; section 4.8 shows 
conclusions for the chapter.  
4.2 Testing the validity of the regression model  
 
As explained earlier the main model of the current study is Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) multiple regression analysis to test ten hypotheses that have been 
discussed in section 3.3.1 in Chapter Three. As a result, in order to determine the 
validity of the underlying regression model, previous studies (e.g. Gujarati, 2003, 
Pallant, 2007 and Hair et al. 2010) point out that the regression analysis is not 
applicable for inference beyond the sample if the following assumptions are not 
met:  
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4.2.1 Linearity 
 
 This assumption indicates that the dependent variable is linearly related to the 
model coefficients (Myers, 1990). To check the assumption of linearity, the 
current study has been used for the plot of residuals in a graph (not reported), 
which is the most common method of assuring the linearity existence among the 
variables. If the linearity exists, a residual plot will see the data points 
symmetrically distributed around the identity line. However, if the data points are 
not identically distributed around the identity line, the data represent nonlinear 
relationships and adjustments will need to be made to avoid erroneous predictions 
(Hopkins & Ferguson, 2014). Therefore, it can be concluded that the majority of 
variables met the condition of linearity assumption.  
4.2.2 Independent error terms 
 
 Another assumption of multiple regression analysis is that the errors associated 
with one observation are not correlated with the errors of any other observation. 
To check the assumption of independent error terms, this study has employed the 
Durbin-Watson test to determine the independence of error terms (Durbin & 
Watson, 1951). According to Field (2005), the Durbin-Watson statistic ranges in 
value from 0 to 4, with a value of 2 meaning that there is no autocorrelation in the 
sample. In this study the Durbin-Watson test statistic was 1.31 for the final model 
(not reported) being close to 2, which is the ideal value for independence of error 
terms; this means that the distribution of the errors was independent. 
4.2.3 Homoscedasticity  
 
The homoscedasticity assumption is considered to be one of the important 
assumptions of multiple regression analysis. This assumption requires the error 
variance of the dependent variable have the same values of independent variable 
or constant variance (Hair et al. 2010). The homoscedasticity can be evaluated by 
two methods; graphical and statistical methods. This study has employed the 
graphical method by plotting the residuals in a graph, which is relatively easily 
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accomplished with popular software packages such as SPSS, SAS and STATA. 
Therefore, the graphs of residual scatter plots (which are not reported) indicate 
that the assumption of homoscedasticity was satisfied.   
4.2.4 Normality Assumption 
 
 This assumption asserts that the sampling distribution of the mean is normal. 
Normality of residuals in the current study can be applied by two statistical 
approaches: graphical approaches and numerical approaches. The normal 
probability plot of the residuals (P.P plot) and histogram of residuals have been 
performed in this study to assess the normality assumptions, which indicates that 
the residuals are normally distributed (not reported). The first graphical method is 
the histogram of residuals, which considers the simplest option that can be made 
upon visual inspection, an output available through most of the statistical software 
programs. This output can assist researchers to identify non-normality by noting 
areas that fall outside of the normal distribution. Another graphical technique for 
evaluating normality of the data is the normal probability plot (P.P plot). Hair et 
al. (2010) suggested that the normal probability plot can be a reliable approach of 
graphical analysis as actual data values are compared with the cumulative 
distribution of normal distribution. In addition, there are various numerical 
approaches to test the normality assumption. However, the current study has used 
skewness and kurtosis as a common statistical test for normality. Table 4.1 shows 
Skewness and Kurtosis values of all variables are within the normal range, which 
means that the presented data are largely normally distributed. Thus, the statistical 
techniques used in this study met the general rule of thumb, and assures the 
assumption of normality is not violated. 
4.2.5 Multicollinearity 
 
 Another fundamental assumption in regression analysis refers to the existence of 
a linear relationship among one or more of the explanatory variables of the 
regression model. This assumption was tested by conducting the Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) with tolerance values and correlation coefficient among the 
variables. If a Pearson’s rank correlation coefficient is less than 0.9, the limit or 
cut off correlation percentage, prior studies suggest multicollinearity is likely not 
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to exist (see Field, 2009; Hair et al. 2010, and Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013).  
However, there has been no definitive criterion for the level of correlation that 
constitutes a serious multicollinearity problem (Tsui, Ashford, StClair, & Xin, 
1995; Chen & Francesco, 2003). While some researchers indicated that 
correlations of 0.8 or higher are problematic (e.g. Gujarati, 2003 and Cooper and 
Schindler, 2003); others suggest that the general rule of thumb is that it should not 
exceed 0.75 (e.g. Tsui, Ashford, StClair, & Xin, 1995 and Green, 1978). The 
Pearson correlations in Table 4.3 offered that the highest correlation coefficient 
between board size and board independence is 0.838, implying that 
multicollinearity is not likely to be a potential problem because the Pearson 
correlation indicators for all independent and control variables are less than 0.9. 
Another place to check for multicolinearity is in the tolerance (TOL) and variance 
inflation factor (VIF) of all the independent and control variables calculated.  
Tolerance is an indicator of how much of the variable in the independent variable 
is not explained by the other independent variables in the model. If the tolerance 
values are greater than 0.1 (TOL> 0.10), it suggests that multicollinearity does not 
exist among all independent variables (Pallant, 2007). Another means to evaluate 
the multicollinearity problem is to look at the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), 
which is the inverse of the Tolerance measure (1 divided by Tolerance), it 
regresses each independent variable of the remaining independent variables to 
capture any linear dependencies. As a rule of thumb, if the VIF values are less 
than 10 (VIF< 10), it also indicates that there is no issue of multicollineraity (e.g. 
Myers, 1990; Gujarati, 2003). It can be observed in Table 4.2 that the highest VIF 
value is 5.48   and the mean VIF is 1.93, the lowest tolerance coefficient is 0.182.  
Therefore, the results of the values of tolerance (TOL) and variance inflation 
factor (VIF) confirm that there is no issue of multicollineraity in the current study.  
Generally, if any of these assumptions are violated by the nature of data; then the 
forecasts, confidence intervals and the outcomes of the regression model are likely 
to be inaccurate or seriously biased. In this case, non-parametric tests become more 
appropriate (Balian, 1982). This study has used the statistical software STATA to 
carry out the above statistical analysis. 
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4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 4.1 depicts the descriptive statistics for all variables (dependent, 
independent, and control variables) performed in the empirical model. 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for all variables (N: 205) 
Variables Mean Std. D Median Min Max Skewn
ess 
kurtosi
s 
LOG_C_PER -2.815 1.897 -2.589 -7.849 0.820 -0.261 2.148 
NDB 8.234 1.900 8 5 13 0.409 3.070 
NIDB 6.385 1.969 7 2 12 0.123 2.920 
NFDB 1.254 0.807 1 0 4 0.296 2.950 
NBM 11.741 3.650 11 4 24 0.750 3.647 
NIDAC 3.693 1.124 4 2 9 1.560 8.521 
EC_D 0.429 0.496 0 0 1 0.286 1.081 
CEO_SO 0.683 0.466 1 0 1 -0.786 1.618 
CEO_LTB 0.868 0.399 1 0 1 -2.178 5.744 
LOG_OWN_CONC 0.293 2.187 0 -3.034 4.579 0.488 1.901 
LOG_MANAG_OWN -6.044 2.430 -6.668 -11.077 0 1.099 3.472 
FSIZE 16.284 2.171 15.807 12.360 23.337 1.018 3.658 
ROA 0.037 0.153 0.031 -0.467 1.795 7.553 89.022 
LEV 0.236 0.133 0.226 0.002 0.695 0.801 3.979 
LOG_TOBINSQ 1.169 0.801 0.969 -0.268 3.493 0.700 2.867 
LOG_CAPINT -2.480 1.720 -2.587 -7.118 1.635 -0.056 2.350 
INTSECTOR 0.357 0.480 0 0 1 0.601 1.361 
Notes: All variables are described in the model development section and Tables 3.3 & 3.4 for 
variable definitions. N is the number of observations. 
 
According to the above table, the mean (median) of carbon performance for the 
overall sample period is -2.815(-2.589), the standard deviation of carbon 
performance is approximately 1.897, with a minimum of -7.849 and a maximum 
of 0.820. Because of the high skewness and kurtosis statistics for the original 
value of the variable carbon performance, this variable has been transformed 
using a natural logarithm transformation in the empirical model. After the 
transformation, the skewness statistics of the variable were reduced from 3.189 to 
-0.261 and kurtosis from 14.174 to 2.148, respectively (Table 4.1). The mean 
(median) board size in this study sample is 8.234(8) directors, of which 6.385 are 
independent directors, indicating that board size in Australia seems to be smaller 
than board size in US companies (e.g., the median value of board size in US 
companies is approximately 11 in Bhagat & Black, 2002), and the majority of the 
directors are independent, which is in line with the ASX Good Governance 
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Principles and Recommendations (2003, 2007). In addition, there is a substantial 
variability in board size, ranging from a minimum of 5 directors to a maximum of 
13 directors.   The data show that the average of the number of female directors on 
the board is 1.253, with standard deviation of .807. In addition, on average 11.741 
board meetings were held each year, with a wide range from a minimum of 5 to a 
maximum of 24. With respect to board committees, the average (median) number 
of directors in an audit committee is 3.693(4) with standard deviation of 1.124, 
and a maximum and a minimum size of 9 and 2, respectively. On average, 42.6 % 
of the sample firms have an environmental committee. Regarding compensation 
structure, Table 4.1 also presents that 68.3% of firms offered stock options and 
86.8% offered long term bonuses as part of CEO compensation. With regards to 
ownership structure, it can be observed that, the mean level of ownership 
concentration which is measured as the percentage of ordinary shares owned by 
substantial shareholder is 29.3%. While managerial ownership was measured by 
the percentage of total outstanding shares held by all directors, it has a mean of -
6.044 (median -6.669), with standard deviation of 2.429. It can be also seen in the 
above table that the ownership concentration and managerial ownership had high 
values for skewness and kurtosis. Thus, a natural logarithm has been used to 
transform these variables to reduce the skewness and kurtosis statistics to a lower 
and acceptable level. A log of ownership concentration reduced skewness from 
2.070 to 0.488 and kurtosis from 7.087 to 1.901. A log of managerial ownership 
reduced skewness from 3.959 to 1.099 and kurtosis from 18.533 to 3.472. Finally, 
regarding the control variables, Table 4.1 shows that the mean (median) value of 
firm size measured as the natural logarithms of total assets is approximately 
16.284(15.807), indicating that the sample of this study comprises relatively 
larger companies in Australia, with a standard deviation of 2.171, a minimum size 
and a maximum of 12.359 and 23.337, respectively. The data also show that the 
mean (median) value of ROA is 36.6 %( 3.1%) and leverage (LEV) is 23.5 %( 
22.6%), respectively. The mean (median) of Tobin’s Q and Capital Intensity are 
1.168(.969) and -2.479(-2.586), respectively, with a standard deviation of .801 
and 1.720. The Tobin’s Q and Capital Intensity variables initially had very high 
values for skewness and kurtosis. Thus, following previous study (e.g. Al-Akra & 
Ali, 2012: Delmas & Nairn-Birch, 2011; Iwata & Okada 2011), these variables 
have been transformed by using a natural logarithm transformation. A log 
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transformation of Tobin’s Q and Capital Intensity provided the most suitable 
distribution.  A log of Tobin’s Q mitigated skewness from 2.439 to 0.700 and 
kurtosis from 9.566 to 2.867. A log of capital intensity mitigated skewness from 
6.253 to -0.056 and kurtosis from 55.723 to 2.349. The average percentage of 
firms in emission intensive sectors is 35.6%, ranging from 0-1.  
4.4 Results of Multicollinearity check 
 
As can be shown in Table 4.2 below, the highest VIF value is 5.48   and the mean 
VIF is 1.93. Moreover, the lowest tolerance coefficient is 0.182. Consequently, 
the above results of VIF with tolerance values indicate that there is no 
multicollinearity issue between the independent and control variables. Therefore, 
these variables can be used in the empirical model. 
Table 4.2: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of corporate governance structures and 
control variables 
 
Variables 
 
 
  
VIP Tolerance (1/VIF) 
NIDB  5.48 0.182 
NDB  4.57 0.218 
CEO_LTB  1.83 0.546 
LOG_TOBINSQ  1.85 0.539 
NFDB  1.81 0.553 
FSIZE  1.67 0.599 
NIDNC  1.68 0.594 
CEO_SO  1.57 0.635 
LOG_MANAG_OWN  1.51 0.662 
INTSECTOR  1.36 0.734 
EC_D  1.35 0.742 
LOG_CAPINT  1.31 0.764 
NBM  1.32 0.756 
LEV  1.28 0.783 
LOG_OWN_CONC  1.20 0.835 
ROA  1.17 0.858 
Mean VIF  1.93 
                 Note: Definition of variables are described in the model development section 
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4.5 Correlation Coefficients Analysis 
 
Table 4.3 provides the Pearson correlation coefficients for all variables 
(dependent, independent, and control variables) performed in the empirical model. 
The results show that the carbon performance (LOG_C_PER) is significantly 
negatively correlated with the board size (NDB), board independence (NIDB), 
board diversity (NFDB) which is measured by the number of female directors on 
the board and audit committee independence (NIDAC) at the 1% level (p < 0.01, 
two-tailed). Significant and positive correlation exists with the presence of the 
environmental committee (EC_D) (p < 0.01, two-tailed), which is consistent with 
the hypothesis (1.6). In contrast, the positive but not significant correlation 
amongst carbon performance (LOG_C_PER), and the annual number of board 
meetings (NBM), ownership concentration (LOG_OWN_CONC) and managerial 
ownership    (LOG_MANAG_OWN), while the presence of a share option 
(CEO_SO) and long term bonuses (CEO_LTB) are insignificantly negative 
correlated with carbon performance (LOG_C_PER). The analysis indicates that 
carbon performance(LOG_C_PER) is significantly negatively correlated with 
both the natural logarithms of total assets (FSIZE) and Tobin’s Q (TOBINSQ) at 
the 1% level (p < 0.01, two-tailed), whereas positive correlations are identified 
between the carbon performance (LOG_C_PER) and Capital Intensity (CAPINT) 
and Intensive Sector (INTSECTOR) at the same level. In contrast, no significant 
relationship is detected between carbon performance (LOG_C_PER) and 
profitability (ROA)  
A number of significant correlations also existed between the numerous 
independent variables. More specifically, the number of directors serving in the 
board (NDB) is positively correlated with board independence (NIDB), number of 
female directors in the board (NFDB), audit committee independence (NIDAC) 
and CEO long term bonuses (CEO_LTB) at the 1% level (p < 0.01, two-tailed), 
and significant negative correlations with board meetings (NBM) and with 
managerial ownership (LOG_MANAG_OWN). Nevertheless, the insignificant 
relationship of the presence of an environmental committee (EC_D), the presence 
of a share option (CEO_SO) and ownership concentration (LOG_OWN_CONC) 
are confirmed for board size (NBM). The correlations analysis indicates that 
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board independence (NIDB) is positively correlated with the number of female 
directors in the board (NFDB), audit committee independence (NIDAC), the 
presence of an environmental committee (EC_D) and long term bonuses 
(CEO_LTB) at the 1% level (p < 0.01, two-tailed), and significant and negative 
correlated with board meetings (NBM) and with managerial ownership 
(LOG_MANAG_OWN) at the same level. However, no significant relationship is 
detected between board independence (NIDB) and each of the presence of a share 
option (CEO_SO) and ownership concentration (LOG_OWN_CONC). In 
addition, the number of female directors on the board (NFDB) has significant 
positive correlation with only audit committee independence (NIDAC). 
Furthermore, audit committee independence (NIDAC) is only negatively 
correlated with managerial ownership (LOG_MANAG_OWN).  The presence of 
an environmental committee (EC_D) has significant and positive correlation with 
CEO long term bonuses (CEO_LTB) at the 5% level, but is negatively correlated 
with managerial ownership (LOG_MANAG_OWN) at the same level.  In 
addition, the presence of a share option (CEO_SO) is positively related to CEO 
long term bonuses (CEO_LTB) at the 1% level, and negatively related to 
managerial ownership (LOG_MANAG_OWN) at the same level. The Pearson 
Correlation analyses also shows that the CEO long term bonuses (CEO_LTB) 
have significant and positive correlation with managerial ownership 
(LOG_MANAG_OWN) at the 1% level, and negative correlation with ownership 
concentration (LOG_OWN_CONC). Additionally, managerial ownership is 
significantly positively correlated with ownership concentration 
(LOG_OWN_CONC) at the 5% level. Finally, for the correlations between 
independent variables and control variables, board size (NDB), board 
independence (NIDB) and board diversity as measured by the number of female 
directors on the board (NFDB), these are positively correlated with both the 
natural logarithms of total assets (FSIZE) and Tobin’s Q (TOBINSQ) at the 1% 
level (p < 0.01, two-tailed), and significantly negatively correlated with Capital 
Intensity (CAPINT) at the same level. Whereas weak correlation exists between 
board independence (NIDB) and Intensive Sector (INTSECTOR) at the 10% level 
(p < 0.10, two-tailed), significant negative correlations are identified between the  
number of female directors on the board (NFDB) and Intensive Sector 
(INTSECTOR) at the 1% level (p < 0.01, two-tailed). The analysis also indicates 
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that the number of board meetings (NBM) is positively correlated with firm size 
(FSIZE), and negatively correlated with profitability (ROA). Another significant 
result shows that audit committee independence is positively correlated with both 
firm size (FSIZE) and Tobin’s Q (TOBINSQ), and negative correlated with 
Capital Intensity (LOG_CAPINT) and with Intensive Sector (INTSECTOR) at the 
1% level. In addition, the presence of environmental committee (EC_D) is 
significantly negatively correlated with Tobin’s Q (TOBINSQ), and positively 
with Intensive Sector (INTSECTOR) at the 10% level (p < 0.10, two-tailed). With 
regard to CEO compensation structure, both stock options (CEO_SO) and long 
term bonuses (CEO_LTB) are significantly and negatively correlated with both 
leverage (LEV) and Capital Intensity (CAPINT), and positively correlated with 
Intensive Sector (INTSECTOR) at the same level, while stock options (CEO_SO) 
and Tobin’s Q (TOBINSQ) were positive at the 5% level. Finally, in respect to 
ownership structure, ownership concentration (LOG_OWN_CONC) is positively 
correlated with only profitability (ROA) at the 5% level and managerial 
ownership (LOG_MANAG_OWN) is significantly negatively correlated with 
both firm size (FSIZE) and Tobin’s Q (TOBINSQ) at the 1% level.
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 Table 4.3: Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients (N=205)  
 LOG_C_PER NDB NIDB NFDB NBM NIDAC EC_D CEO_SO CEO_LTB LOG_OWN_C
ONC 
LOG_C_PER 
NDB 
1.000 
-0.207*** 
 
1.000 
        
NIDB -0.209*** 0.838**** 1.000        
NFDB -0.358*** 0.399*** 0.521*** 1.000       
NBM 0.053 -0.294*** -0.183** -0.061 1.000      
NIDAC -0.289*** 0.291*** 0.484*** 0.432*** 0.076 1.000     
EC_D 0.313*** 0.090 0.186*** 0.021 -0.014 0.044 1.000    
CEO_SO -0.086 0.077 0.102 -0.020 0.078 0.066 0.019 1.000   
CEO_LTB -0.029 0.223 0.253*** 0.105 -0.004 0.048 0.0134** 0.541*** 1.000  
LOG_OWN_CONC 0.094 -0.042 -0.115* -0.087 -0.028 0.002 -0.031 0.036 -0.224*** 1.000 
LOG_MANAG_OWN 0.029 -0.172* -0.289*** -0.096 -0.111 -0.278*** -0.154*** -0.229*** -0.296*** 0.137** 
FSIZE -0.214*** 0.388*** 0.396*** 0.355*** 0.166*** 0.346*** -0.074 0.054 0.079 -0.026 
ROA -0.068 0.081 -0.049 -0.053 -0.153*** -0.064 -0.072 0.075 0.062 0.143** 
LEV 0.135** 0.085 -0.039 0.130** -0.007 -0.084 -0.042 -0.181*** -0.225*** -0.044 
  LOG_TOBINSQ 0.521*** 0.418*** 0.428*** 0.333*** -0.059 0.316*** -0.258*** 0.147** 0.109 -0.089 
LOG_CAPINT 0.344*** -0.232*** -0.276*** 0.171*** 0.097 -0.309*** 0.012 -0.135** -0.146** -0.107 
INTSECTOR 0.478*** -0.087 -0.125* -0.348*** -0.089 -0.169*** -0.199*** 0.135** 0.139** 0.061 
 
 LOG_MANAG_
OWN 
FSIZE ROA LEV LOG_TOBI
NSQ 
LOG_CAB
INT 
INTSECTOR 
LOG MANAG OWN 1.000       
FSIZE -0.330*** 1.000      
ROA -0.108 -0.035 1.000     
LEV 0.013 0.059 -0.078 1.000    
LOG_TOBINSQ 
 
-0.288*** 0.462*** -0.021 0.197*** 1.000   
LOG_CAPINT 0.007 -0.186*** 0.041 0.056 -0.189*** 1.000  
INTSECTOR -0.054 -0.149** 0.104 -0.091 -0.163*** 0.229*** 1.000 
Notes: *, ** and ***denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. All variables are described in model 
development section and Tables 3.3 & 3.4 for variable definitions. 
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4.6 Multivariate Analysis and Hypotheses Testing  
 
As has been illustrated in Chapter Three, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) multiple 
regression analysis is the primary model used in this study to examine all the 
hypotheses. OLS regression has been generalised using linear modelling technique 
that may be used to model a single response variable (dependent variable) which has 
been recorded on at least an interval scale. This techniques may be applied to single 
or multiple explanatory variables and also categorical explanatory variables that have 
been appropriately coded (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999). OLS have been also 
considered as a powerful technique since it is relatively easy to check the model 
assumptions such as linearity, constant variance and the effect of outliers using 
simple graphical methods. So, four equations of regression model have been 
employed to test the impact of various corporate governance mechanisms on carbon 
performance. The first model was employed to test the impact of board structure (e.g. 
board size, board independence, board meetings …etc.) on carbon performance while 
the second model was utilised to investigate whether board structure and ownership 
structure have any influence on a firm’s carbon performance. Model three was used 
to examine the effect of board structure and ownership structure including control 
variables which might have an influence on carbon performance namely: firm size, 
profitability, leverage, Tobin’s Q and Capital Intensity, without the Intensive Sector 
in the model (i.e. industry dummy variables are not presented), whereas model four 
was performed to investigate the impact of all governance variables and all control 
variables on carbon performance. The results of the OLS models are shown in the 
Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4: results of OLS Regression between Governance Variables and Carbon Performance 
Notes: *, ** and ***denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. All variables are described in the model development section 
and Tables 3.3 & 3.4 for variable definitions. 
 
 
Variables 
 
Pred. 
Sign 
Model (1)  
Board  Structure 
Model (2) 
 Board  Structure and 
Ownership Structure 
 
 
 
Model (3) 
Mode (1)+Model (2)+ control 
variables without Intensive  
sector variable 
Model (4) 
Model (3)+  Intensive sector 
variable   
 
NDB 
 
+ 
Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value 
0.149 1.27 0.135 1.14  0.112 1.00    0.112 1.09 
NIDB      +  -0.299** -2.34  -0.289** -2.22 -0.128 -1.08   -0.128 -1.18 
NFDB +   -0.525*** -3.05   -0.507*** -2.92     -0.355*** -2.26   -0.055 -0.36 
NBM - 0.024 0.73 0.023 0.70 -0.002 -0.06    0.022 0.78 
NIDAC +     -0.172 -1.38 -0.200 -1.57 -0.028 -0.24   -0.046 -0.44 
EC_D +     1.388*** 5.81     1.361*** 5.68      0.792*** 3.46       0.542*** 2.54 
CEO_SO + -0.405 -1.37 -0.497* -1.65 -0.151 -0.56    -0.233 -0.95 
CEO_LTB +  0.275 0.66 0.378 0.86  0.629 1.59     0.359 0.99 
LOG_OWN_CONC +   0.074 1.33  0.091 1.83    0.068 1.48 
LOG_MANAG_OWN +   -0.038 -0.71 -0.055 -1.09   -0.055 -1.20 
FSIZE ?      0.075 1.27     0.064 1.18 
ROA ?      0.389 0.55     0.226 0.35 
LEV ?          2.924*** 2.47       3.421*** 4.41 
LOG_TOBINSQ ?         -1.076*** -6.35      -1.095*** -7.06 
LOG_CAPINT ?          0.266*** 4.14       0.176*** 2.90 
INTSECTOR ?             1.356*** 6.11 
Constant  -1.682** -2.05 -1.802** -2.19     -3.502*** -3.74      -4.308*** -4.96 
Observations  205 205 205 205 
F-Value  10.11(.000) 8.31(.000) 11.53(.000) 15.22(.000) 
Adjusted R2  
 
 26.32% 26.38% 43.64% 52.73% 
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4.6.1 Discussion of statistical Results 
 
This section provides the results obtained from regressing the carbon performance 
variable on the various independent variables. Table 4.4 reports an adjusted R2 are 
26.32%, 26.38%, 43.64% and 52.73%, and the F- Values are 10.11, 8.31, 11.53 and 
15.22respectively for the four models and are highly statistically significant at the 
1% level. These results indicate that all four models show a high explanatory power 
of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. 
Results of model 1  
 
The first model examines the association of the eight variables that proxy for board 
structure with carbon performance. The results from model 1, reported in the third 
column of Table 4.4, show that a strong significant positive association between the 
presence of environmental committee and carbon performance (β= 1.388, p < 0.01, 
two-tailed). The results also indicate that board independence is negatively and 
significantly related to carbon performance at the 5% level (β= -0.299, p < 0.05, two-
tailed). The result also shows that the number of female directors in the board is 
negatively and significantly associated with carbon performance (β= -0.525, p < 
0.01, two-tailed). On the other hand, the regression result observed that no significant 
association is documented between carbon performance and board size, board 
meetings and the independence of audit committee. Turning to the findings for the 
compensation package, the results indicate CEO Stock Options and CEO Long Term 
Bonus are both statistically insignificantly related to carbon performance, with 
coefficient estimate of -0.405 and 0.275 and a p-value of -1.37 and 0.66, 
respectively. The adjusted R2 of this model is 26.32%, indicating that 26.32% of 
variance in carbon performance can be explained by the model in the current study.  
The F- Value for this model is 10.11 and is highly statistically significant at the 1% 
level. These results indicate that the model shows a reasonably acceptable 
explanatory power of the relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables. 
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Results of model 2  
 
The second model tests the joint impact of board structure and ownership structure 
on carbon performance. The findings in this model, stated in the fifth column  of 
Table 4.4, observe that the presence of an  environmental committee is statistically 
significantly positively associated with carbon performance (β= 1.361, p < 0.01, two-
tailed). The empirical results also show that board independence is significant and 
has a negative association with carbon performance (β= -0.289, p < 0.05, two-tailed). 
The result also indicates that the number of female directors in the board is 
negatively and significantly associated with carbon performance (β= - 0.507, p < 
0.01, two-tailed). Nevertheless, the regression result displays that no significant 
association is found between carbon performance and board size, board meetings and 
the independence of audit committee . Regarding compensation structure, the result 
of regression indicates that the CEO stock options has a slightly significant negative 
association with carbon performance (β= -0.497, p < 0.1, two-tailed). However, the 
CEO long term bonus has a positive, but insignificant, association with coefficient of 
0.378 and a p-value of 0.86. In respect of ownership structure, the results suggest that 
two aspects of ownership structure, namely ownership concentration and managerial 
ownership have insignificant association with carbon performance, with coefficient 
estimate of 0.074 and -0.038 and a p-value of 1.33 and -0.71, respectively. The 
adjusted R2 of the model is 26.38 %, indicating that 26.38%   of variance in carbon 
performance can be explained by the current model; the F- Values for this model is 
8.31 and is highly statistically significant at the 1% level. These results indicate that 
the models show a high explanatory power of the relationship between variables. 
Results of model 3  
 
The third model tests the relationship between all corporate governance variables and 
carbon performance, including control variables, but without the Intensive Sector 
variable. The findings from model 3, described in the fourth column of Table 4.4, 
imply that two variables of corporate governance characteristics, namely board 
independence and the presence of environmental committee are significantly 
associated with carbon performance at the 1% level. However, for the other 
corporate governance characteristics including board size, board diversity, board 
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meetings and the independence of audit committee, the results indicate the 
insignificant relationship with carbon performance, Concerning the two aspects of 
compensation packages, the results of OLS regression indicate that the two variables 
of executive compensation, namely the CEO stock options and the CEO long term 
bonus have insignificant association with carbon performance, with coefficient of – 
0.151 and 0.629 and a p-value of – 0.56 and 1.59 respectively. With reference to 
ownership structure, this model provides the same results at the second model, which 
shows that neither of the two aspects of ownership structure, namely ownership 
concentration and managerial ownership was found to be significant related to 
carbon performance, with coefficient of 0.091 and – 0.055, a p-value of 1.83 and – 
1.09 respectively. 
 Among the control variables, only leverage, Tobin’s Q and Capital Intensity are 
found to be significantly related to carbon performance at the 1% level. Nonetheless, 
no significant relationship is detected between carbon performance and firm size and 
profitability. The adjusted R2 of this model is 43.64% indicating that 43.64 per cent 
of variance in carbon performance can be explained by the model in the current 
study; the F- Values for this model is 11.53 and is highly statistically significant at 
the 1% level. These results indicate that the model shows a high explanatory power 
of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. 
Results of hypothesis testing for the fourth model  
 
This study developed ten principal testable hypotheses to investigate the impact of 
corporate governance on carbon performance. In this section, based on descriptive 
statistics and Pearson’s correlation coefficients, this study performed the Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) multiple regression model to testing this relationship. The rule 
of decision in this study is based on the significances of the t-statistics which are 
symbolized by the p-value flagged by the statistical packages used. 
The results from regression model 4, reported in the sixth column of Table 4.4, 
indicates that the adjusted R2 of the model is 52.73% indicating that 52.73 per cent 
of variance in carbon performance can be explained by the primary model in the 
current study, the F- Values for this model is 15.22 and is highly statistically 
significant at the 1% level. These results indicate that the model showed an 
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acceptable high explanatory power of the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables. 
The results of regression model in column 6 of Table 4.4 showed that the coefficient 
of board size is positive but not statistically significant associated with carbon 
performance, with coefficient estimate of 0.112 and a p-value of 1.09, which is 
inconsistent with my expectation (H1). This result implies that larger boards are 
ineffective in improving carbon performance. One of the possible reasons is 
companies with large board may be more likely to suffer from agency problems. 
Larger boards might have a lack of coordination, communication and have free rider 
problems, which leads to slower and less-efficient decision-making and decreased 
board efficiency (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). In an 
Australian context, the size of Australian boards is usually small with an average 
number of less than 10 directors (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003; Stapledon & Lawrence, 
1996 & Bonn, 2004). This implies that board size of Australian companies tends to 
be smaller than optimal. In sum, this result failed to find support for hypothesis H1, 
but is in line with findings that were gathered by Hafsi & Turgut (2013), who failed 
to find any significant association between board size and social performance. The 
result, however, differs with the findings of Walls et al. (2012) who provides 
evidence that board size is positively related to environmental concerns. The result 
also contradicts the findings of de Villiers et al. (2011) who indicate that 
environmental performance is higher in firms that have larger boards. As for board 
independence, the result shows that the board independence is not statistically 
significantly related to carbon performance. The coefficient estimate on independent 
directors is -0.128 with a p-value of -1.18, this is inconsistent with my hypothesis 
H2. The result implies board independence may be less effective as monitors of 
management (Barako et. al. 2006) because they might not be provided sufficient 
information on a company’s carbon activities. Another possible explanation is that 
the NIDB prefer to focus on corporate financial performance rather than 
environmental performance.  Although the finding is inconsistent with Zhang et al, 
(2013); Dunn & Sainty (2009) and Johnson & Greening (1999), who found positive 
association  in contrast with Kassinis & Vafeas (2002), who report negative 
association between board independence and environmental litigations The result is 
consistent with previous study by Ibrahim et al (2003); and Ibrahim & Angelidis 
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(1995) who document an insignificant relationship between outside directors and the 
legal and ethical dimensions of CSR and also similar to McKendall, Sanchez, & 
Sicilian, (1999) who were unable to find a significant relationship between board 
independence and environmental violations. Overall the hypothesis H2 in this study 
is supported based on the statistical results.  
With regards to board diversity measured by the number of female directors on the 
board; inconsistent with this study’s expectation, the empirical result displays that an 
insignificant negative association between the numbers of female directors on the 
board and carbon performance.  It produced a coefficient estimate of -0.055 and with 
a p-value of -0.36. The plausible explanation for this could be that because the 
percentage of females on the board is relatively small (as seen in the descriptive 
statistics section, the average of females on the board is 1), which hinders the ability 
of female directors to exert influence on board. According to critical mass theory, 
firms that have one or two women on their board may not be sufficient for change to 
happen (Konrad et al. 2008). Also, as Rosener (1995) indicates, one woman on the 
board is often regarded as a token, two women on the board might not be enough to 
influence the board’s decision process. In this respect, this result is consistent with 
previous empirical findings of Coffey & Wang, (1998) who found insignificant 
relationship between the percentage of women board members and corporate 
philanthropy. However, it is contradictory to the evidence presented by Hafsi & 
Turgut, (2013); Boulouta (2013) & Zhang et al (2013), who found a positive and 
significant relationship exists between the proportion of women directors on the 
board and corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance. Hence, this study does 
not find support for the prediction that there is a positive association between 
corporate board diversity and carbon performance. 
Concerning the board meeting, the regression result depicts that insignificant 
association observed between the frequency of board meetings and carbon 
performance, with a coefficient estimate of 0.022 and a p-value of 0.78. Therefore, 
this finding does not support hypothesis H4 which anticipated that the number of 
board meetings is negatively related to carbon performance. This result is in line with 
the argument that board meetings are not necessarily useful to shareholders (Ntim & 
Osei, 2011& Vefeas, 1999a) because the limited time directors spend together is not 
used for the meaningful exchange of ideas with directors or management (Vefeas, 
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1999a; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). This result is consistent with previous findings that 
board size is unrelated to carbon performance. If a large board does not effectively 
monitor management and a large board would have more meetings, then the more 
meetings of a large board should have less impact on carbon performance. Currently, 
there are few empirical studies investigating the relationship between board meetings 
and carbon performance in particular. However, previous research on Corporate 
Social Responsibility in general found mixed results. Although Prado et al. (2009b) 
did not find any significant impact of the number of annual meetings of the 
administration on the volume of information on Corporate Social Responsibility, 
Prado-Lorenzo & García-Sánchez, (2010) opined that the number of meetings held 
by the board of directors during a financial year is negatively and significantly 
associated with the dissemination of information on GHG. 
As for the independence of audit committee, the result of regression indicates that the 
independence of audit committee is insignificantly negatively related to carbon 
performance.  The regression produced a coefficient estimate of -0.046 and a p-value 
of -0.44. This is inconsistent to my expectation indicated in H5. A possible 
explanation for this result is the majority of firms do not undertake any social or 
environmental audit.  
Referring to the environmental committee, the results of the regression model 
displayed the presence of an environmental committee is strongly and positively 
associated with carbon performance at the 1% level (p- value < 0.01, two-tailed), 
which is consistent with H6. The result suggests firms that created an environmental 
committee are likely to adopt a proactive environmental strategy and they probably 
have an environmental orientation in their decision-making. Such a strategy can 
translate into detailed carbon reduction programs that facilitate carbon performance. 
In addition, the presence of an environmental committee can be viewed as a means to 
better monitor management in terms of their environmental actions and performance 
and as an effective way to provide advice to management when addressing the 
environmental issues (Rodrigue et al. 2013). Furthermore, the setting up of an 
environmental committee can be seen as a way of addressing stakeholders' interests 
and resolving the problem of legitimacy gap (Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012). In this 
regard, this result can be deemed consistent with Walls et al. (2012), who indicated 
that an environmental board committee is positively associated with both 
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environmental strengths and environmental concerns. The result also is in line with 
the argument of Lam & Li (2008) who pointed out that firms with an environmental 
committee on their board are related to a significant increase in environmental 
performance for high polluting firms. However, the result contradicts the evidence 
presented by Rodrigue et al. (2013), who failed to find significant association 
between the existence of an environmental committee on the board and 
environmental performance which is measured in terms of regulatory compliance, 
pollution prevention and environmental capital expenditures,   as with McKendall et 
al. (1999), who also failed to find significant association between social 
responsibility committee and environmental violations.  
Regarding CEOs, the empirical result indicates that neither of the two components of 
compensation for CEOs was found to be significant at the 1% or 5% levels in all the 
four models. The findings in the sixth column of Table 4.4 show that the CEO stock 
options are not statistically significantly associated with carbon performance the 
coefficient estimate on CEO stock options is -0.233 with a p-value of -0.95. Such 
insignificant and negative association is inconsistent to my expectation. A possible 
reason for this result is due to excessive focus on a financial performance even in the 
longer term goals that may be detrimental to the promotion of social and 
environmental objectives (Mahoney & Thorne, 2006). In this respect, this result 
supports the argument of Coombs & Gilley (2005), who suggested no relationship 
between stock options and any CSR dimensions. This result is also similar to the 
findings from the exploratory study by McGuire et al. (2003), who failed to find 
relationship between long term incentives including stock options and good social 
performance. The result, however, is in contrast to the findings of Mahoney & 
Thorne, (2005, 2006); Deckop et al. (2006) and Callan & Thomas, (2012), who 
document positive association between the CEO stock options in long term and 
corporate social performance and also in contrast with Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 
(2009a) who provide evidence that long term pay such as stock options is positive 
and highly significant for pollution prevention performance. Thus, based on the 
result, the current study does not reject hypothesis H7 that the CEO stock options in 
the long term are not positively associated with carbon performance.  
The sixth column of Table 4.4 shows that CEO long term bonus has a positive 
coefficient, which is consistent with my expectation. However, the coefficient value 
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is 0.359 and a p-value of 0.99, so it is not statistically significant. Thus, the result 
does not strongly reject H8. Recently, there is no empirical study that linked CEO 
long term bonus to carbon performance. Nevertheless, in the context of social 
performance in general, Callan & Thomas (2012), provides evidence that the long 
term compensation which includes restricted stock, stock options and long term 
incentive plans, is positively associated with social performance, whereas Rekker et 
al. (2014), found that there is a negative relation between long term compensation 
such as long-term bonus and socially responsible firms. 
With reference to ownership structure, as can be observed in the column 6 of Table 
4.4, ownership concentration is not statistically significantly correlated with carbon 
performance, with the coefficient value of 0.068 and a p-value of 1.48. This is in 
keeping with my expectation. A possible explanation for this finding could be that, 
carbon activities incur costs (Liao et al. 2014) and the existence of substantial 
shareholders may prevent managers from engaging in conspicuous social and 
environmental activities. Another possibility is that ownership concentration may 
give firms less freedom to pursue carbon policies that go above and beyond 
compliance. This is consistent with the result provided by Brown et al. (2006) who 
did not find any significant relationship between the concentration of ownership and 
corporate Philanthropy, and Adams & Hardwick (1998), who failed to find any 
connection between concentration ownership and corporate giving. This result, on 
the other hand, is inconsistent with the work of Earnhart & Lizal. (2006) who found 
that greater concentration of ownership in the company leads to better environmental 
performance with respect to absolute emissions. Therefore, this result does not reject 
hypothesis H9, that there is no significant association between ownership 
concentration and carbon performance. 
The results described in the last column of Table 4.4 indicate the managerial 
ownership is negatively but not significantly related to carbon performance, with 
coefficient of – 0.055 and a p-value of – 1.20. This is also consistent with this study's 
earlier expectation. The plausible explanation for this result may be due to the fact 
that the level of managerial ownership in the current study sample is negligible. 
Another possibility is that managers with less shares in the companies are relatively 
less concerned about social and environmental activities. This result is in line with 
the work of Paek et al. (2013), who provide evidence that managerial ownership has 
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an insignificant association with CSR performance in terms of community, 
environment, and product dimensions but, however, not inconsistent with Jia & 
Zhang (2013), who found that managerial ownership had a positive and significant 
association with CSP factors such as donation probability and charity. The result also 
disagrees with Johnson & Greening (1999), who found a positive association 
between top management equity share and social performance in terms of 
environment and product quality. This result also in contrast to the findings of Oh et 
al. (2011), who documented that managerial ownership is significantly negatively 
associated with CSR rating of the firms, and with Simerly & Bass (1998) who 
provide evidence of significant negative relationship between a firm’s corporate 
social performance and the proportion of stock equity owned by top management. 
Therefore, Results reported in Table 4.4 fail to reject hypothesis H10 that no 
association exists between managerial ownership and carbon performance.  
Among the control variables, the results in the last column of Table 4.4 show that the 
coefficient of leverage is significantly positive associated with carbon performance at 
the 1% level. The findings suggest that companies with higher degrees of leverage 
might be inclined to improve carbon performance. This result corroborates the study 
by De Villiers et al. (2011) & Walls et al. (2012), who found that leverage is 
positively associated with environmental performance. Similarly, Capital Intensity 
has significant and positive relationship with carbon performance at the 1% level (β= 
0.176, p < 0.01, two-tailed). This result indicates that companies with higher 
sustaining capital expenditures may want to signal their environmental type through 
more disclosures regarding their environmental performance. This result is consistent 
with the previous literature of Russo & Fouts, (1997) & Walls et al. (2012). It is also 
observed that Intensive Sectors is positively associated with carbon performance at 
the 1% level. This finding indicates that companies operating in the higher level of 
carbon emissions will lead to increased carbon exposure so that these companies tend 
to promote carbon performance. The results also display that the coefficient of 
Tobin’s Q is statistically significantly and negatively associated with carbon 
performance (β= - 1.059, p < 0.01, two-tailed). The result is consistent with prior 
work by Delmas & Nairn-Birch (2011), who found that increasing carbon emissions 
negatively impact on market based measures of financial performance (using Tobin’s 
Q) in US companies. On the other hand, the results indicate that the coefficient of 
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firm size is not statistically significant associated with carbon performance (β= 
0.064, p- value = 1.18). This result is inconsistent with the prediction that bigger 
companies tend to provided more information on GHG emissions than smaller 
companies (Luo et al. 2013). In addition, it is argued that firms that are smaller in 
size may not exhibit high level socially responsible behaviours as do larger firms 
(Waddock & Graves, 1997; Busch & Hoffmann, 2011). One possible explanation is 
that the majority of firms in the sample study are the largest Australian companies. 
This result is congruent with the work of Grant, Jones, & Bergesen, (2002) who 
documented that firm size is not related to pollution prevention performance. 
Similarly, profitability is statistically insignificant associated with carbon 
performance (β= 0.226, p- value = 0.35). Although it can be argued that firms with 
more profit could more easily afford the expenditures needed for carbon activity 
(Luo & Tang, 2011), Delmas & Nairn-Birch (2011) found that direct carbon 
emissions have insignificant association with ROA in 1100 US companies. 
4.7 Further analysis and Robustness Checks  
 
In this section I provided several tests that could validate the robustness of the main 
results. That is, board size measured using a cut-off basis, audit committee 
independence measured using a cut-off basis and alternative measure for firm size  
4.7.1 Board Size measured using a cut-off basis.  
 
Following Jensen (1993), who suggested that more than eight members on a board 
are less likely to function effectively in the US, this study used eight members as the 
cut-off basis as an alternative measure for board size. Therefore, the current study 
measured board size as a dummy variable by taking the value of 1 if board size is 
equal or more than eight members, and 0 otherwise. The summaries of analysis 
(which are un-tabulated) confirm the initial evidence that board size is an 
insignificant factor influencing carbon performance. The findings on other variables 
are the same as those reported in Table 4.4.  
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4.7.2 Audit committee independence measured using cut-off basis.  
 
Prior studies, such as Klein (2002a), Bedard, Chtourou & Courteau (2004), Davidson 
et al. (2005) and Baxter & Cotter (2009), examined the sensitivity of audit committee 
independence to specific cut-offs. In order to confirm the credibility of the results of 
regression analyses, this study repeated the OLS regression model with alternative 
measures of audit committee independence, where measured as a dummy variable by 
taking the value of 1 if the audit committee is composed solely of independent 
directors and 0 otherwise. The current study has chosen 100% threshold as the cut-
off point, following the published literature and governance reports e.g. Menon & 
Williams, (1994); BRC, (1999); ASX, (2003) & Davidson et al. (2005), who 
suggested that an audit committee should consist exclusively of non-executive or 
independent directors. The results (un-tabulated) confirm that audit committee 
independence has no significant effect, which is consistent with the original results of 
the regression analyses. While the results for the other variables are virtually similar 
to those reported in Table 4.4, except board independence, which had a weak 
relationship with carbon performance at the 10 % level.  
4.7.3 Alternative measure for company size  
 
A number of prior studies, such as Stanwick & Stanwick, (2001) & Berrone et al. 
(2010) have employed the logarithm of the firm’s total sales as a proxy for firm size. 
Therefore, the current study used this measure as an alternative measure for firm 
size. The analysis results (which are un-tabulated) confirmed that firm size as 
measured by logarithm of the firm’s total sales has no significant influence on carbon 
performance, which is consistent with the main test results. The rest of other 
variables have similar results to those presented in Table 4.4. Furthermore, instead of 
using the total assets, I have re-tested my results again by using the total market 
capitalisation as another alternative measure of firm size. The findings (which are un-
tabulated) show similar results to those in Table 4.4. 
4.7.4 Alternative Measures of independent variable 
 
Another additional test is carried out to investigate the surprising results of an 
insignificant association between CG and CP. I used the proportion proxy of board 
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independence, board diversity, audit committee independence, compensation 
committee independence and nomination committee independence as alternative 
measures instead of using the actual numbers of these variables, for example, NIDB 
to NDB as board independence, NFBD to NDB as female percentage, NIDAC to 
NAC as the proportion of independent directors on the audit committee, NIDCC to 
NCC as the proportion of independent directors on the compensation committee  and 
NIDNC to NNC as the proportion of independent directors on the nomination 
committee . The results of these alternative variables (not reported) are consistent 
with the continuous variable results in the key regression. 
4.7.5 Endogeneity Test 
 
Previous studies (e.g. Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Kole, 1996 & Himmelberg et al. 
1999) argue that the firm’s ownership structure is endogenously determined. 
Endogeneity occurs when ownership and performance are interdependent (a causality 
problem), or when unobserved firm characteristics affecting both variables present (a 
missing variable problem). Therefore, in order to check whether endogeneity exists 
between the dependent variables (e.g. carbon performance) and independent variable 
(e.g. managerial ownership) in this study, the Hausman test was performed (Gujarati 
and Porter, 2008).  The results of Hausman test (which are un-tabulated) display 
insignificant evidence of an endogeneity bias (p-value = 0.44), suggesting that the 
results do not seem to suffer from the problem of endogeneity. Thus, I can remain 
with OLS regression analysis as the original results. 
4.8 Concluding Comments 
 
This chapter aimed to investigate empirically the impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms, namely: board size, board independence, board diversity, board 
meetings, audit committee independence, presence of environmental committee, 
CEO stock option, CEO long term bonuses, ownership concentration and managerial 
ownership, on carbon performance in a sample of the largest Australian companies 
over the period of four years from 2009 to 2012. The association between corporate 
governance mechanisms and carbon performance has been performed based on a 
variety of statistical techniques and analyses, including descriptive statistics, 
correlation coefficient analysis and the multivariate analysis with a regression 
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analysis. This chapter begins by providing the descriptive statistics for all variables 
(dependent, independent, and control variables) performed in the empirical model. 
Table 4.1 indicates that some variables had high values for skewness and kurtosis. 
This means that these variables were not normally distributed, so transformations of 
these variables are needed. In addition, this study has performed the VIF and 
correlation coefficient to test the existence of multicollinearity in the empirical 
model. These results indicate that there is no multicollinearity issue between the 
independent and control variables. Therefore, these variables can be fitted into the 
empirical model. 
In addition, an OLS regression model is adopted in order to explain the impact of 
various corporate governance mechanisms on carbon performance. In order to 
determine the validity of the underlying OLS multiple regression, the data have been 
examined to validate the OLS regression assumptions. These assumptions are 
linearity, independence of errors, homoscedasticity, normality and multicollinearity.  
Based on the findings of the empirical section, it is concluded that only the presence 
of an environmental committee was statistically significantly positively associated 
with carbon performance. However, other variables of corporate governance 
mechanisms (board size, board independence, board diversity, board meetings, audit 
committee independence, CEO stock option, CEO long term bonus, ownership 
concentration and managerial ownership) are not statistically significant associated 
with carbon performance. Further, the results also indicate that leverage, Tobin’s Q, 
Capital Intensity and industry types, as a control variable, have a strong positive 
association with carbon performance. In contrast, the study did not provide any 
evidence that firm size and profitability are related to carbon performance. Finally, 
several additional tests were undertaken to check the robustness of the main 
regression model.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: EXAMINING THE ASSOCIATION 
BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
CARBON DISCLOSURE 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter provided the first phase of this thesis which focused on a 
quantitative investigation of the impact of various corporate governance mechanisms 
on carbon performance. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the second stage of 
this thesis to provide an overview of the data analysis based on statistical techniques 
used to investigate the association between corporate governance mechanisms and 
the extensiveness of carbon disclosure in Australian companies. Therefore, this 
chapter begins by providing five statistical assumptions to determine the validity of 
the regression model in this study. The chapter then outlines a comprehensive 
descriptive analysis of the variables used in the second part of this empirical work, 
which aims to examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the 
extensiveness of carbon disclosure. In addition, this chapter conducts a correlation 
coefficients analysis to detect the problem of collinearity and multicollinearity 
among variables.  The chapter also conducts a Multicollinearity check by way of a 
variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis to test the existence of multicollinearity in the 
empirical model.  Furthermore, the chapter presents multiple regression results of 
testing the hypotheses established in Chapter Three. The chapter further discusses an 
additional analysis to check the robustness of the main regression analysis. Finally, 
this chapter ends by presenting a brief summary of the statistical techniques used and 
their results. 
5.2 Testing the validity of the regression model  
 
As previously explained, the main model of the current study is Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) multiple regression analysis to test ten hypotheses that have been 
discussed in section 3.3.2 in Chapter Three. Consequently, in order to determine the 
validity of the underlying regression model, previous studies (e.g., Gujarati, 2003; 
Pallant, 2007 & Hair et al. 2010) point out that the regression analysis is not 
applicable for inference beyond the sample if the following assumptions are not met: 
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first, assumption of linearity: this assumption indicates that the relationships between 
the predictors and the outcome variable should be linear. As mentioned in chapter 4, 
section 4.2.1, the plot of residuals in a graph has been performed in this study to 
determine the existence of a linear relationship among the variables, which is the 
most common method of assuring the linearity. Therefore, the results, which are un-
tabulated, suggest that the majority of variables met the condition of linearity 
assumption. Second, independence of errors: this assumption suggests that the errors 
associated with one observation are not correlated with the errors of any other 
observation. As mentioned, the Durbin-Watson test is used to determine the 
independence of error terms (Durbin & Watson, 1951). According to Field (2005, 
2009) the Durbin-Watson statistic ranges in value from 0 to 4 with a value of 2 
meaning that there is no autocorrelation in the sample. In this study, the Durbin-
Watson test statistics were 1.63 for the final model (un-tabulated) being close to 2, 
which is the ideal value for independence of error terms; this means that the 
distribution of the errors was independent. Third, homoscedasticity assumption: this 
assumption requires the error variance of the dependent variable has the same values 
of an independent variable or constant variance (Hair et al. 2010). As illustrated 
earlier, the graphical method, by plotting the residuals in a graph, has been employed 
in the current study to check the assumption of independent error terms, which is 
accomplished relatively easily with popular software packages such as STATA, 
SPSS, and SAS. Therefore, the graphs of residual scatter plots (un- tabulated) 
indicate that the assumption of homoscedasticity was satisfied. Fourth, normality 
assumption: this assumption asserts that the sampling distribution of the mean is 
normal. As acknowledged earlier, this assumption is tested by conducting two 
statistical approaches: graphical approaches and numerical approaches. The normal 
probability plot of the residuals (P.P plot) and histogram of residuals have been 
performed in this study to assess the normality assumptions, which indicate that the 
residuals are normally distributed, which are not reported. In addition, skewness and 
kurtosis test statistics are conducted (see Table 5.1) to test the normality assumption. 
Table (5.1) shows skewness and kurtosis values of all variables are within the normal 
range, which means that the presented data are largely distributed normally. Hence, 
the statistical technique used in this study has met the condition of normality. Finally, 
the assumption of multicollinearity: this assumption refers to the existence of a linear 
relationship among one or more of the explanatory variables of the regression model. 
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As discussed earlier, this assumption was tested by conducting the Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) and correlation coefficient among the variables. When a Pearson's rank 
correlation coefficient is less than 0.90, the limit or cut off correlation percentage, 
prior studies suggest multicollinearity is likely not to exist (see Field, 2009; Hair et 
al. 2010; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Nonetheless, there has been no definitive 
criterion for the level of correlation that constitutes a serious multicollinearity 
problem (Tsui, Ashford, StClair, and Xin, 1995; Chen and Francesco, 2003). While 
some researchers indicated that correlations of 0.8 or higher are problematic (e.g., 
Gujarati, 2003; Cooper & Schindler, 2003) others suggest that the general rule of 
thumb is that it should not exceed 0.75 (e.g. Tsui, Ashford, StClair, and Xin, 1995; 
Green, 1978). The Pearson correlations in Table 5.3 showed that the highest 
correlation coefficient that existed between board size and board independence is 
0.838, implying that multicollinearity is not likely to be a potential problem. In 
addition, the tolerance (TOL) and variance inflation factor (VIF) of all the 
independent and control variables have been calculated. It can be observed in Table 
5.2 that the highest VIF value is 5.60 and the mean VIF is 1.90, the lowest tolerance 
coefficient is 0.179, indicating that there is no problem as the VIF is < 10 and the 
tolerance coefficient is > 0.10 (Myers, 1990; Gujarati, 2003). Therefore, the results 
of the values of TOL and VIF confirm that there is no serious problem of 
multicollineraity in this model.  In general, if any of these assumptions are violated 
by the nature of the data, then the forecasts, confidence intervals, and economic 
insight yielded by a regression model may be inefficient or seriously biased. In this 
case, non-parametric tests have become more appropriate (Balian, 1982).  
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5.3 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 5.1 displays the descriptive statistics for all variables used in this study over 
the sample years, 2009-2012 inclusive.  
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics for all variables (N: 205) 
Variables Mean Std. D Median Min Max Skewn
ess 
kurtosi
s 
C_DIS 71.278 13.576 71 23 97 -0.253 3.019 
NDB 8.234 1.900 8 5 13 0.409 3.070 
NIDB 6.385 1.969 7 2 12 0.123 2.920 
NFDB 1.254 0.807 1 0 4 0.296 2.950 
NBM 11.741 3.650 11 4 24 0.750 3.647 
NIDAC 3.693 1.124 4 2 9 1.560 8.521 
NIDCC 3.043 1.463 3 0 7 -0.792 3.425 
NIDNC 3.312 2.555 3 0 11 0.353 2.566 
EC_D 0.429 0.496 0 0 1 0.286 1.081 
LOG_OWN_CONC 0.293 2.187 0 -3.034 4.579 0.488 1.901 
LOG_MANAG_OWN -6.044 2.430 -6.668 -11.077 0 1.099 3.472 
FSIZE 16.284 2.171 15.807 12.360 23.337 1.018 3.658 
ROA 0.037 0.153 0.031 -0.467 1.795 7.553 89.022 
LEV 0.236 0.133 0.226 0.002 0.695 0.801 3.979 
LOG_TOBINSQ 1.169 0.801 0.969 -0.268 3.493 0.700 2.867 
LOG_CAPINT -2.480 1.720 -2.587 -7.118 1.635 -0.056 2.350 
INTSECTOR 0.357 0.480 0 0 1 0.601 1.361 
Notes: All variables are described in the model development section and Tables 3.3 & 3.4 for 
variable definitions. N is the number of observations. 
 
As shown in the above table, the mean (median) of carbon disclosure for the whole 
sample is 71.28% (71%) out of 100 indicating disclosing companies have a good 
level of understanding and awareness regarding carbon related issue and 
management. It ranges from a minimum of 23 to a maximum of 97 among the 
sampled firms, suggesting considerable variation in the extent of disclosures made in 
responses to their CDP questionnaire. The mean (median) board size in this study 
sample is 8.234(8) directors, of which 6.385 are independent directors, indicating 
that board size in Australia seems to be smaller than board size in US companies 
(e.g., the median value of board size in US companies is approximately 11 in Bhagat 
& Black, 2002), and the majority of the directors are independent, which is in line 
with the ASX Good Governance Principles and Recommendations of (2003; 2007). 
In addition, there is a substantial variability in board size, ranging from a minimum 
of 5 directors to a maximum of 13 directors.   The data show that the average of the 
number of female directors on the board is 1.253, with standard deviation of .807. In 
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addition, on average 11.741 board meetings were held each year, with a wide range 
from a minimum of 4 to a maximum of 24. With respect to board committees, the 
average (median) number of directors in audit, remuneration, and nomination 
committee are 3.693(4), 3.043(3) and 3.312(3), respectively, with standard deviation 
of 1.124, 1.463 and 2.555, respectively, and 42.6% of surveyed firms had established 
a board- level environmental committee.   With regards to ownership structure, it can 
be observed that the mean level of ownership concentration which is measured as the 
percentage of ordinary shares owned by substantial shareholder is 29.3%. Managerial 
ownership, measured by the percentage of total outstanding shares held by all 
directors, has a mean of -6.044 (median -6.668), with standard deviation of 2.430. It 
can also be seen in the above table that the ownership concentration and managerial 
ownership had high values for skewness and kurtosis. Thus, a natural logarithm has 
been used to transform these variables to reduce the skewness and kurtosis statistics 
to a lower and acceptable level. A log of ownership concentration reduced skewness 
from 2.070 to 0.488 and kurtosis from 7.087 to 1.901. A log of managerial ownership 
reduced skewness from 3.959 to 1.099 and kurtosis from 18.533 to 3.472. Finally, 
regarding the control variables, Table 5.1 shows that the mean (median) value of firm 
size measured as the natural logarithms of total assets is approximately 16.284 
(15.807), indicating that the sample of this study comprises relatively larger 
companies in Australia, with a standard deviation of 2.171, a minimum size and a 
maximum of 12.360 and 23.337, respectively. The data also show that the mean 
(median) value of ROA are 3.7 % ( 3.1%) and leverage are 23.5 % ( 22.6%), 
respectively. The mean (median) of Tobin’s Q and Capital Intensity are 1.169 (.969), 
-2.480 (-2.587), respectively, with a standard deviation of .801 and 1.720. The 
Tobin’s Q and Capital Intensity variables initially had very high values for skewness 
and kurtosis. Thus, following previous study (e.g. Al-Akra & Ali, 2012: Delmas & 
Nairn-Birch, 2011; Iwata and Okada, 2011), these variables have been transformed 
by using a natural logarithm transformation. A log transformation of Tobin’s Q and 
capital intensity provided the most suitable distribution.  A log of Tobin’s Q 
mitigated skewness from 2.439 to 0.700 and kurtosis from 9.566 to 2.867. A log of 
capital intensity mitigated skewness from 6.253 to -0.056 and kurtosis from 55.723 
to 2.350. The average number of firms in emission intensive sectors is 35.7%, 
ranging from a minimum of zero to a maximum of one.                                                                                                                                           
 146 
 
5.4 Results of Multicollinearity check 
 
The VIF has been undertaken as another effective method for testing the 
multicollinearity in the regression model. According to previous studies (e.g., Myers, 
1990; Gujarati, 2003) there is no problem if the VIF is < 10 and the tolerance 
coefficient is > 0.10. As can be presented in Table 5.2 below, the highest VIF value 
is 5.60 and the mean VIF is 1.90. Moreover, the lowest tolerance coefficient is 0.179. 
Consequently, the below results of the values of tolerance (TOL) and VIF values 
indicate that there is no multicollinearity issue between the independent and control 
variables. Therefore, the overall results show that there is no alert for a 
multicollinearity threat when performing a regression analyses. 
Table 5.2: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of corporate governance structures and 
control variables 
 
Variables 
 
 
  
VIP Tolerance (1/VIF) 
NIDB  5.60 0.179 
NDB  4.58 0.218 
NFDB  1.82 0.550 
LOG_TOBINSQ  1.81 0.553 
NIDAC  1.76 0.569 
FSIZE  1.71 0.583 
NIDNC  1.44 0.693 
LOG_MANAG_OWN  1.44 0.696 
NIDCC  1.43 0.700 
NBM  1.34 0.743 
INTSECTOR  1.35 0.739 
EC_D  1.33 0.744 
LOG_CAPINT  1.26 0.792 
LEV  1.19 0.837 
ROA  1.17 0.856 
LOG_OWN_CONC  1.14 0.878 
Mean VIF  1.90 
                 Note: Definition of variables are described in the model development section 
5.5 Correlation Coefficients Analysis 
 
Table 5.3 provides the Pearson correlation coefficients for all variables (dependent, 
independent, and control variables) performed in the empirical model. The results 
show that the carbon disclosure is significantly positively correlated with the board 
size, board independence, board diversity which is measured by number of female 
directors on the board and audit committee independence (p < 0.01, two-tailed). In 
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contrast, the correlation coefficients for carbon disclosure and nomination committee 
independence and the presence of environmental committee are positive but not 
significant, while there is a negative but insignificant relationship between carbon 
disclosure and each of board meetings, compensation committee independence, 
ownership concentration and managerial ownership. The analysis of the Pearson 
correlation coefficient also indicates that carbon disclosure is significantly positively 
correlated with each of the natural logarithms of total assets, Tobin’s Q and 
negatively with Intensive Sector at the 1% level (p < 0.01, two-tailed). In contrast, 
positive but not significant correlations are identified between carbon disclosure and 
profitability, while the coefficients for carbon disclosure and leverage and Capital 
Intensity are negative but not significant. 
A number of significant correlations also existed between the numerous independent 
variables. More specifically, number of directors serving on the board is positively 
correlated with board independence, number of female directors on the board, audit 
committee independence, nomination committee independence and compensation 
committee independence at the 1% level (p < 0.01, two-tailed), and significant 
negative correlations with board meetings and with managerial ownership. 
Nonetheless, there is not any significant correlation existing between board size and 
the presence of an environmental committee or with ownership concentration. The 
correlations analysis indicates that board independence is positively correlated with 
audit committee independence, nomination committee independence, compensation 
committee independence and the presence of environmental committee at the 1% 
level (p < 0.01, two-tailed), and significant and negatively correlated with both board 
meetings and managerial ownership at the same level. However, no significant 
correlation is confirmed between board independence and ownership concentration. 
In addition, the number of female directors on the board has significant positive 
correlation with the audit committee independence, compensation committee 
independence and nomination committee independence at the 1% level. Furthermore, 
the number of board meetings is significantly negatively correlated with nomination 
committee independence at the 1% level but weakly correlated with compensation 
committee independence at the 10% level. Moreover, audit committee independence 
is statistically significantly positively correlated with both compensation committee 
independence and nomination committee independence at the 1% level, but 
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negatively correlated with managerial ownership at the same level. The Pearson 
Correlation analyses also show that compensation committee independence have 
significant and positive correlation with nomination committee independence at the 
1% level, whereas weak correlation exists between compensation committee 
independence and the presence of environmental committee at the 10% level. The 
independence of nomination committee has a weak correlation with ownership 
concentration at the 10% level. In addition, managerial ownership has negative 
correlation with each of the presence of environmental committee, compensation 
committee independence and nomination committee independence at the 1% level, 
but significantly positively correlated with ownership concentration at the 5% level. 
Finally, for the correlations between independent variables and control variables, 
board size, board independence, board diversity as measured by number of female 
directors on the board, board meetings and audit committee independence, are 
positively correlated with the natural logarithms of total assets at the 1% level (p < 
0.01, two-tailed). However ownership concentration has significant and negative 
correlation with the natural logarithms of total assets at the same level. In addition, 
Tobin’s Q is statistically significantly positively correlated with each of board size, 
board independence, board diversity as measured by number of female directors in 
the board, audit committee independence and nomination committee independence at 
the 1% level, but significantly negatively correlated with both compensation 
committee independence and ownership concentration at the same level. Moreover, 
board meetings is significantly negatively correlated with profitability at the 5% 
level, but significantly positively correlated with ownership concentration at the 
same level. Whereas, weak correlation exists between board size and profitability at 
the 10% level (p < 0.10, two-tailed).  In addition, Capital Intensity is significantly 
negatively correlated with each of board size, board independence, board diversity as 
measured by number of female directors in the board, audit committee independence 
and nomination committee independence. The analysis also indicates that both the 
number of female directors in the board and audit committee independence are 
negatively correlated with Intensive Sector at the 1% level (p < 0.01, two-tailed).  
But, significant and positive correlations are identified between the existence of 
environmental committee and Intensive Sector at the same level. While, a weak sign 
exists board independence and Intensive Sector at the 10% level.  
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Table 5.3: Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients (N=205)  
 C_DIS NDB NIDB NFDB NBM NIDAC NIDCC NIDNC EC_D LOG_OWN_C
ONC 
C_DIS 
NDB 
1.000 
0.255*** 
 
1.000 
        
NIDB 0.352*** 0.838**** 1.000        
NFDB 0.368*** 0.399*** 0.521*** 1.000       
NBM -0.020 -0.294*** -0.183** -0.061 1.000      
NIDAC 0.249*** 0.291*** 0.484*** 0.432*** 0.076 1.000     
NIDCC -0.112 0.342*** 0.426*** 0.261*** -0.121* 0.351*** 1.000    
NIDNC 0.110 0.405*** 0.408*** 0.280*** -0.282*** 0.299*** 0.357*** 1.000   
EC_D 0.056 0.090 0.186*** 0.021 -0.014 0.044 0.123* 0.052 1.000  
LOG_OWN_CONC -0.048 -0.042 -0.115* -0.087 -0.028 0.002 0.073 -0.116* -0.031 1.000 
LOG_MANAG_OWN -0.007 -0.172* -0.289*** -0.096 -0.111 -0.278*** -0.148** -0.171*** -0.154*** 0.137** 
FSIZE 0.318*** 0.388*** 0.396*** 0.355*** 0.166*** 0.346*** -0.075 0.070 -0.074 -0.026 
ROA 0.018 0.081 -0.049 -0.053 -0.153*** -0.064 -0.031 0.042 -0.072 0.143** 
LEV -0.024 0.085 -0.039 0.130** -0.007 -0.084 -0.066 -0.0.25 -0.042 -0.044 
  LOG_TOBINSQ 0.145*** 0.418*** 0.428*** 0.333*** -0.059 0.316*** 0.165*** 0.229*** -0.258 -0.089 
LOG_CAPINT -0.103 -0.232*** -0.276*** 0.171*** 0.097 -0.309*** -0.073 -0.159** 0.012 -0.107 
INTSECTOR -0.179*** -0.087 -0.125* -0.348*** -0.089 -0.169*** 0.082 0.005 0.199*** 0.061 
 
 LOG_MANAG_
OWN 
FSIZE ROA LEV LOG_TOBI
NSQ 
LOG_CAB
INT 
INTSECTOR 
LOG MANAG OWN 1.000       
FSIZE -0.330*** 1.000      
ROA -0.108 -0.035 1.000     
LEV 0.013 0.059 -0.078 1.000    
LOG_TOBINSQ 
 
-0.288*** 0.462*** -0.021 0.197*** 1.000   
LOG_CAPINT 0.007 -0.186*** 0.041 0.056 -0.189*** 1.000  
INTSECTOR -0.054 -0.149** 0.104 -0.091 -0.163*** 0.229*** 1.000 
Notes: *, ** and ***denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. All variables are described in model 
development section and Tables 3.3 & 3.4 for variable definitions. 
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5.6 Multivariate Analysis and Hypotheses Testing  
 
As has been illustrated in Chapter Three, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) multiple 
regression analysis is the primary model used in this study to examine all the 
hypotheses. OLS regression has been generalised linear modelling technique that 
may be used to model a single response variable which has been recorded on at least 
an interval scale. This technique may be applied to single or multiple explanatory 
variables and also categorical explanatory variables that have been appropriately 
coded (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999). OLS have been also considered as a powerful 
technique since it is relatively easy to check the model assumption such as linearity, 
constant variance and the effect of outliers using simple graphical methods. So, four 
equations of regression models have been employed in this chapter. The first model 
was employed to test the impact of board structure (e.g. board size, board 
independence, board meetings……etc.) on carbon performance while the second 
model was utilised to investigate whether board structure and ownership structure 
have any influence on a firm’s carbon performance. Model three was used to 
examine the effect of board structure and ownership structure including control 
variables which might have an influence on carbon performance namely: firm size, 
profitability, leverage, Tobin’s Q and Capital Intensity, without the Intensive Sector 
in the model (i.e. industry dummy variables are not presented), whereas model four 
was performed to investigate the impact of all governance variables and all control 
variables on carbon performance. The results of the OLS models are shown in the 
Table 5.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 151 
 
Table 5.4: results of OLS Regression between Governance Variables and Carbon Disclosure 
Notes: *, ** and ***denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. All variables are described in model development section and 
Tables 3.3 & 3.4for variable definitions. 
 
Variables 
 
Pred. 
Sign 
Model (1)  
Board  Structure 
Model (2) 
 Board  Structure and 
Ownership Structure 
 
 
 
Model (3) 
Mode (1)+Model (2)+ control 
variables without Intensive  
sector variable 
Model (4) 
Model (3)+  Intensive sector 
variable   
 
NDB 
 
+ 
Coef Est. P-value Coef Est. P-value Coef Est. P-value Coef Est. P-value 
-0.565 -0.66 -0.718 -0.83 -1.585* -1.73   -1.583* -1.73 
NIDB      +     2.637*** 2.83      3.993*** 3.14     3.496*** 3.58       3.487*** 3.56 
NFDB +      4.104*** 3.30      3.898*** 3.11     3.262*** 2.55      2.063*** 2.25 
NBM -  -0.021 -0.09   0.047 0.19 -0.101 -0.39 -0.112 -0.43 
NIDAC +  1.243 1.34   1.393 1.49  1.270 1.33  1.256 1.31 
NIDCC +      -3.301*** -5.07      -3.369*** -5.13     -3.184*** -4.84     -3.144*** -4.72 
NIDNC +   0.060 0.16   0.152 0.40   0.297 0.78   0.307 0.80 
EC_D +   0.704 0.41   0.983 0.57   1.343 0.72   1.507 0.79 
LOG_OWN_CONC +      0.211 0.54   0.139 0.35   0.146 0.37 
LOG_MANAG_OWN +        0.610* 1.64       0.989*** 2.47       0.984*** 2.45 
FSIZE ?           1.414*** 2.89       1.424*** 2.90 
ROA ?       7.720 1.34     7.862 1.36 
LEV ?       2.879 0.44     2.434 0.36 
LOG_TOBINSQ ?      -0.949 -0.70    -0.930 -0.68 
LOG_CAPINT ?       0.510 0.98      0.557 1.05 
INTSECTOR ?           -0.855 -0.43 
Constant      59.153*** 10.17 61.446*** 10.32 46.860*** 6.21     47.410*** 6.19 
Observations  205 205 205 205 
F-Value  9.17(.000) 7.07(.000) 5.99(.000) 5.61 (.000) 
Adjusted R2  
 
 24.27% 24.73% 26.85% 26.54% 
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5.6.1 Discussion of statistical Results 
 
This section serves to describe the results gathered from regressing the carbon disclosure 
variable on the various independent variables. Table 5.4 reports an adjusted R2 are 24.27%, 
24.73%, 26.85% and 26.54%, and the F- Values are 9.17, 7.07, 5.99 and 5.61respectively for 
the four models and are highly statistically significant at the 1% level. These results indicate 
that all four models have statistically significant explanatory power of the association 
between the dependent and independent variables. 
Results of Model 1 
 
The first model of this chapter is to investigate the relationship between the eight variables 
that proxy for board structure and the extensiveness of carbon disclosure. The results of the 
third Column of Table 5.4 (Model1) report that board independence is significantly positively 
related to the extensiveness of carbon disclosure at the 1% level (β= 2.637, p < 0.01, two-
tailed), supporting hypothesis H2.2. The results also displayed that the number of female 
directors on the board is positively associated with the extensiveness of carbon disclosure at 
the 1% level (β= 4.104, p < 0.01, two-tailed), which is consistent with hypothesis H2.3. In 
contrast, the results analyses shows that a negative, but not significant, association between 
the extensiveness of carbon disclosure and board size, board meetings, with coefficient 
estimate of -0.565 and -0.021 and a p-value of -0.66 and -0.09. With respect to the board 
committee variable, the findings indicate that compensation committee independence is 
statistically significantly negatively associated with the extensiveness of carbon disclosure at 
the 1% level (β= -3.301, p < 0.01, two-tailed). Therefore, this result provided statistical 
support for H2.6. In contrast, the independence of the audit committee, nomination 
committee independence, and the presence of environmental committee have positive, but not 
significant, associations with the extensiveness of carbon disclosure, with coefficient estimate 
of 1.243, 0.060, and 0.704 and a p-value of 1.34, 0.16, and 0.41. The value of 24.27% for the 
adjusted R2 indicates that the model explains 24.27% of variation in the extensiveness of 
carbon disclosure. Therefore, there is a 75.73% of variation in the extensiveness of carbon 
disclosure that is not explained by the variables included in the model. The F-Value for this 
model is 9.17 and is highly statistically significant at the 1% level. These results indicate that 
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the model has statistically significant explanatory power of the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables. 
Results of Model 2 
 
The second model examines the joint effect of board structure and ownership structure on the 
extensiveness of carbon disclosure. The regression results of model (2) in the fourth column 
of Table 5.4 show that board independence and board diversity, as measured by the number 
of female directors on the board, are positively related to the extensiveness of carbon 
disclosure and significant at the 1% level (β= 3.993 and β= 3.898, respectively), which is 
consistent with hypotheses H2.2 and H2.3. Nonetheless, positive but insignificant 
associations of board meetings is confirmed with the extensiveness of carbon disclosure, with 
coefficient estimate of 0.047 and a p-value 0.19, while, the result of a negative, but not 
significant, association is identified between board size and the extensiveness of carbon 
disclosure. Turning to the findings for board committees variables, the results show that the 
coefficient on compensation committee independence is statistically significantly negative 
associated with the extensiveness of carbon disclosure at the 1% level (β= -3.369, p < 0.01). 
This finding is consistent with hypothesis H2.6.  In contrast, the independence of the audit 
committee, nomination committee independence, the existence of environmental committee, 
and their coefficients are positively, but not significantly, associated with the extensiveness of 
carbon disclosure. Regarding ownership structure, the analysis results in column 4 of Table 
5.4 show that the positive sign on the coefficient of managerial ownership is confirmed with 
the extensiveness of carbon disclosure and significant at the 10% level (β= 0.610, p < 0.1). In 
contrast, no significant relationship is detected between concentration ownership and the 
extensiveness of carbon disclosure. The value of 24.73% for the adjusted R Squared indicates 
that the model explains 24.73% of variation in the extensiveness of carbon disclosure. 
Therefore, there is 75.27% of variation in the extensiveness of carbon disclosure that is not 
explained by the variables included in the model. The F-Value for this model is 7.07 and is 
highly statistically significant at the 1% level. These results show that the current model has 
statistically significant explanatory power of the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables. 
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 Results of Model 3 
 
In column 5 of Table 5.4 (model 3), which examined the relationship between all corporate 
governance variables and carbon performance, including control variables but without the 
intensive sector variable, results display that both board independence and board diversity, as 
measured by the number of female directors on the board, are statistically significantly 
positively associated with the extensiveness of carbon disclosure (β= 3.496 and β= 3.262, 
two-tailed, respectively). These results are the same as in previous models. In addition, the 
result provides weak evidence that board size is significantly negatively associated with the 
extensiveness of carbon disclosure (β= -1.585, p < 0.1). However, a negative but not 
significant association is found between board meetings and the extensiveness of carbon 
disclosure, with a coefficient estimate of -0.101, and a p-value of -0.39.   Concerning the 
board committees variables, the results of OLS regression indicate that only compensation 
committee independence has a negative association with the extensiveness of carbon 
disclosure and significance at the 1% level (β= -3.184, p < 0.01, two-tailed). In contrast, the 
coefficients of the audit committee independence, nomination committee independence and 
the existence of environmental committee are positive but not significantly associated with 
the extensiveness of carbon disclosure, with a coefficient estimate of 1.270, 0.297, and 1.343 
and a p-value of 1.33, 0.78, and 0.72. Regarding the two aspects of ownership structure, the 
results of the regression analysis show that the coefficient of managerial ownership is 
statistically significantly positively associate with the extensiveness of carbon disclosure at 
the 1% level (β= 0.989, p < 0.01, two-tailed). Nonetheless, no significant association is 
identified between concentration ownership and the extensiveness of carbon disclosure, with 
a coefficient estimate of 0.139 and a p-value of 0.35. Among the control variables, the results 
in the fifth column of Table 5.4 show that the coefficient of firm size, as measured by the 
natural logarithms of total assets, is positively related to the extensiveness of carbon 
disclosure and significant at the 1% level (β= 1.414, p < 0.01, two-tailed). However, for the 
other control variables, including profitability, leverage, Tobin’s Q, capital intensity and 
intensive sectors, the results show an insignificant relationship to the extensiveness of carbon 
disclosure. An adjusted coefficient of determination (R2) indicates that 26.85% of the 
variation in the extensiveness of carbon disclosure is explained by variation in the 
independent variables. The F-Value for this model is 5.99 and is highly statistically 
significant at the 1% level. These results show that the present model has a statistically 
significant explanatory power of the model. 
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Results of hypothesis testing for the fourth model 
 
As discussed earlier, this study developed ten principal testable hypotheses to investigate 
empirically the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the extensiveness of carbon 
disclosure. In this section, based on descriptive statistics and Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients, this study conducted the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) multiple regression 
model to test this association. The rule of decision was based on the significances of the t-
statistics which are symbolized by the p-value flagged by the statistical packages used.  The 
adjusted coefficient of determination in this model is 26.54%, indicating that 26.54% of the 
variation in the extensiveness of carbon disclosure is explained by variation in the whole set 
of independent variables, indicating that the explanatory power of the model seems to be 
satisfactory given the nature of the sample.  The F-statistic for this model is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.   
In the sixth column of Table 5.4 (model 4), the result provides weak evidence that board size 
is significantly negative associated with the extensiveness of carbon disclosure at the 10% 
level (β= -1.583, p < 0.1, two-tailed). This result does not support hypothesis 2.1, which 
assumed that board size is positively associated with the extensiveness of carbon disclosure. 
One of the possible reasons for this is that firms with large boards may face a number of 
barriers in reaching a consensus on important decisions, particularly those related to carbon 
activities. Another possible reason is that the large numbers on the board may thwart the 
effectiveness of the board in ensuring that the companies are responsive to strategic actions 
(Goodstein et al. 1994). My empirical finding is consistent with prior studies. For example, 
Aburaya, (2012) did not confirm a significant association between board size and 
environmental disclosure, and Halme & Huse (1997) and Cheng & Courtenay, (2006) did not 
find any significant results with voluntary disclosure in general. Nevertheless, the results 
disagree with the results of Liao et al. (2014) & Cormier et al. (2011), who found a positive 
association between board size and GHG disclosure and environmental disclosure. 
Both bivariate and multivariate analyses indicate that board independence measured by the 
number of independent directors in the board is a significant variable. Table 5.4 shows that 
there is a strong significant positive association of board independence with the extensiveness 
of carbon disclosure at the 1% level (β= 3.487, p < 0.01, two-tailed), which is consistent with 
my expectations. This result indicates that the presence of independent directors on a board is 
more concerned about sustainability (Ibrahim et al. 2003; Webb, 2004).  Another possible 
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explanation is that board independence may assist the firm in building environmental 
credibility by demanding environmental audit, and therefore disclose environmental 
performance information (Post et al. 2011). This result is consistent with the finding of Liao 
et al. (2014) who provided evidence of a positive significant association of board 
independence and the voluntary disclosure of GHG in the UK. Furthermore, my results 
coincide with the findings of Post et al. (2011) and Rupley et al. (2012), who documented 
that the percentage of independent non-executive directors is positively associated with 
environmental disclosure. The result also agrees with evidence from previous studies that 
companies with boards dominated by a majority of independent directors have a significantly 
positive association with the higher levels of voluntary disclosure (Cheng & Courtenay, 
2006; Lim et al. 2007; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). However, my results are in contrast to 
the findings of Eng & Mak, (2003); Barako et al. (2006), who reported a negative association 
between board independence and voluntary disclosure in general. My results also contradict 
the results of Brammer & Pavelin, (2006), who were unable to confirm a significant 
association between outside directors and environmental disclosure. Therefore, based on my 
statistical results, this result supports hypothesis H2.2, which anticipated that there is a 
positive association between board independence and the extensiveness of carbon disclosure. 
Turning to board diversity, it can be observed that board diversity, measured by the number 
of female directors on the board, is significantly and positively associated with the 
extensiveness of carbon disclosure at the 1% level (β= 3.063, p < 0.01, two-tailed), which is 
consistent with this study’s expectation. This result is opposite the argument of critical mass 
theory which suggested that having one or two women on its board may not be sufficient for 
changes to happen (Konrad et al. 2008). Descriptively, it can be seen that the percentage of 
females on the board is relatively small (the average is 1 female on the board), which means 
that board members are skewed-male.   Therefore, the results suggest that a single female on 
the board can make a difference in GHG disclosure decisions (Liao et al, 2014). This result is 
in line with earlier evidence by Liao et al. (2014), who reported a significant positive 
relationship between gender diversity (measured as the percentage of female directors on the 
board) and the voluntary disclosure of GHG emissions. My result is also consistent with 
Rupley et al. (2012), who documented that the proportion of females on the board is 
positively associated with the quality of voluntary environmental disclosures. The result also 
coincides with the findings of Bear et al. (2010), who found that the number of female board 
members is positively associated with the strength of corporate social responsibility 
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disclosures. However, this result is contradictory to the findings of Prado-Lorenzo & Garcia-
Sanchez (2010), who failed to find any association between gender diversity and GHG 
emission disclosure, as well as the study of Nalikka, (2009), who confirmed an insignificant 
relationship between the proportion of female board members and voluntary information 
disclosure in company annual reports. Therefore, this result confirms hypothesis H2.3 that 
board diversity is positively associated with the extensiveness of carbon disclosure. 
Regarding board meetings, the statistical results show that board meetings have an 
insignificant association with the extensiveness of carbon disclosure, with a coefficient 
estimate of -0.112 and a p-value of -0.43, which was opposite to my expectations. This 
implies that boards that meet more often as a group do not appear to foster transparency.  A 
possible explanation for this could be that companies that have too many meetings may have 
some difficulties in reaching agreements on certain aspects regarding carbon activities. This 
finding is considered to be consistent with the earlier results of Liao et al. (2014), who 
confirm that there is no significant association between board meeting frequency and the 
voluntary disclosure of GHG emissions. Authors such as Nelson et al. (2010) were unable to 
find any significant association between board meeting frequency and the executive stock 
option disclosures in Australian listed companies. The results, however, are inconsistent with 
the findings of Allegrini & Greco (2013), who found that the number of board meetings is 
significantly positively related to the level of voluntary disclosure. The result also differs with 
the evidence of Aburaya (2012), who confirmed that board meeting frequency is statistically 
significantly positively associated with the quantity and quality of environmental disclosure 
as well as the study of Laksmana (2008), who provided evidence of a significant and positive 
association between the frequency of board meetings and a voluntary disclosure of executive 
compensation practices. Thus, this result does not support hypothesis H2.4 regarding the 
positive association between the number of board meetings and the extensiveness of carbon 
disclosure. 
With regard to audit committee independence, the empirical result of testing H2.5 shows that 
the independence of the audit committee is statistically insignificant with the extensiveness of 
carbon disclosure, which is contradictory to my expectations. Although an audit committee, 
which consists of a majority of independent directors, can enhance the quality of voluntary 
disclosure (Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007), the role of independent directors on the audit 
committee may not be obvious for disclosing the details of GHG emission information. The 
plausible explanation could be that there are not yet definitive requirements to audit the GHG 
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emission information in the majority of companies. No specific study has investigated the 
relationship between audit committee independence and the extensiveness of carbon 
disclosure. However, my results corroborate those of Li et al. (2012), who did not find any 
significant association between the independence of audit committee and intellectual capital 
disclosure by UK listed firms. The results are also consistent with Allegrini & Greco, (2013), 
who found that the existence of an audit committee and its independence are insignificantly 
associated with voluntary disclosure as well as the study of Akhtarudin et al. (2009), who 
failed to find any relationship. Therefore, results do not support hypothesis H2.5, which 
assumed a positive association. 
Concerning the independence of a compensation committee, as indicated in Table 5.4, there 
is a negative and significant association between compensation committee independence and 
the extensiveness of carbon disclosure at the 1 % level (β= -3.144, p < 0.01, two-tailed), 
which is contrary to my expectation. This result implies that independent directors on 
compensation committees may limit the GHG information disclosed. A possible explanation 
could be that the compensation committees in most companies have not yet achieved the 
degree of independence that enables them to discharge their responsibilities and duties 
effectively. There is no empirical evidence that has explicitly and directly examined whether 
there is a link between compensation committee independence and the extensiveness of 
carbon disclosure. However, my finding supports the earlier contentions of Cerbioni & 
Parbonetti (2007), who reported that the existence and independence of a remuneration 
committee are significantly negatively associated with the level of voluntary disclosure on 
intellectual capital in European biotechnology firms. This result is also consistent with 
Allegrini & Greco, (2013), who confirmed that the existence of a compensation committee in 
the board and its independence are insignificantly associated with the amount of information 
voluntarily disclosed. However, this result is in contrast to the earlier arguments of Aburaya 
(2012), who found a positive but not significant relationship between remuneration 
committee independence and voluntary environmental disclosure in the UK. The findings are 
inconsistent with O’Sullivan et al. (2008), who provided evidence of a positive association 
between the presence and independence of a compensation committee and voluntary 
disclosure of forward-looking information. This was not consistent with Laksmana (2008), 
who reported a positive relationship between the independence of a compensation committee 
and the voluntary disclosure of executive compensation practices. In sum, the empirical result 
failed to find support for hypothesis H2.6, which predicted a positive association.  
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As for the independence of a nomination committee, the results of the regression model show 
that the coefficient of nomination committee independence has a positive but insignificant 
relationship to the extensiveness of carbon disclosure, with a coefficient estimate of 0.307 
and a p-value of 0.80, which is inconsistent with my expectations.  The results indicate that a 
nomination committee composed of a majority of independent directors is less likely to 
disclose more of their GHG emissions information.  The possible explanation for this could 
be that when independent directors are involved in the inner dynamics of boards, they may 
limit the information disclosed. To the best of my knowledge, there is no known Australian 
study that has examined the association between nomination committee independence and the 
extensiveness of carbon disclosure. However, on a more general level, my result is 
inconsistent with the earlier findings of Aburaya (2012), who found evidence that nomination 
committee independence is significantly and negatively associated with environmental 
disclosure in the UK. My results are also inconsistent with Allegrini & Greco (2013), who 
documented that the existence and independence of a nomination committee are not 
significantly negatively associated with the amount of information voluntarily disclosed. 
Therefore, based on the results of the regression model, hypothesis H2.7 is not supported.  
With reference to an environmental committee, the results of this study find that the existence 
of an environmental committee has a positive but not significant relationship with the 
extensiveness of carbon disclosure, which does not support hypothesis H2.8. This result is in 
contrast to my arguments that firms with an environmental committee are more likely to 
disclose their emissions information. This result highlights the complexity of the role an 
environmental committee plays for carbon transparency. Prior literature documents mixed 
findings. For example,  while Aburaya (2012), Liao et al. (2014) and Peters & Romi (2011; 
2013) documented that corporate environmental responsibility (CER) has a strong significant 
positive relationship to voluntary environmental/GHG disclosure, Rupley et al. (2012) and 
Rankin et al. (2011) were unable to find a significant association between CER and 
environmental disclosures. The result of the current study suggests that mere presence of the 
environmental committee in itself does not guarantee adequate voluntary GHG disclosures. 
Instead, environmental committee characteristics are also important. These characteristics 
include, e.g. committee size, number of committee meetings, expertise of committee 
members, etc., (Berthelot and Robert, 2012; Peters & Romi, 2013). Particularly, if a 
committee that has a lack of female directors or/and independent directors perhaps is unable 
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to have significant influence, and this committee may be just symbolic (Berrone and Gomez- 
Mejia 2009). 
Regarding the two aspects of ownership structure, the analysis results of the regression model 
indicate that managerial ownership has a significant positive association with the 
extensiveness of carbon disclosure at the 1% level (β= 0.984, p < 0.01, two-tailed), which is 
consistent with my prediction indicated in hypothesis H2.9.  The results seem to imply that 
owner managers may tend to disclose more information about carbon activity. It is possible 
that the increase in the percentage of shares owned by all directors can reduce the agency 
problem (Leung & Horwitz, 2004) and drive environmental transparency (Liao et al. 2014). 
There is no existing study that has investigated the relationship between managerial 
ownership and the extensiveness of carbon disclosure.This result can be deemed consistent 
with Liao et al. (2014), who found a positive association between the percentage of ordinary 
shares owned by all non-executive directors and GHG disclosure in the context of the UK. 
On a more general level, the result is also in line with the argument of Leung & Horwitz, 
(2004), who reported that managerial ownership is positively related to voluntary disclosure 
in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, the results of my analysis are inconsistent with previous studies 
(Eng & Mak, 2003; Baek et al. 2009; Ghazali, 2007; Chau & Gray, 2010; Oh et al. 2011; 
Khan et al. 2013), which provided a negative association. Thus, hypothesis H2.9 is supported 
which indicates that managerial ownership is positively associated with the extensiveness of 
carbon disclosure.  
According to the results of the regression described in table 5.4, ownership concentration is 
not significantly related to the extensiveness of carbon disclosure, with a coefficient estimate 
of 0.146 and a p-value of 0.37; this result is also opposite to my expectation presented in 
H2.10.  This result suggests that firms with a high concentrated ownership disclose less 
voluntary information about their carbon emission disclosures. One possible explanation for 
this unexpected relationship could be that because lowering monitoring costs (Demsetz, 
1983) incur the cost of carbon activities (Liao et al. 2014). This result is in keeping with 
Hollindale (2012), who provided evidence that ownership concentration does not have a 
statistically significant association with voluntary GHG disclosure. In the general level of 
voluntary disclosure, the result is also in line with the results of Eng and Mak, (2003), who 
did not find a relationship between ownership concentration and voluntary corporate 
disclosure.  However, the result contradicts earlier evidence presented by Liao et al. (2014), 
who confirmed that ownership concentration is negatively associated with the voluntary 
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disclosure of GHG emissions. Similarly, in the context of environmental disclosure, a 
negative relationship between ownership concentration and environmental disclosure has 
been recorded by Cormier et al. (2005); Brammer & Pavelin, (2006) & Aburaya (2012). On a 
more general level, the results of my regression model are also inconsistent with the evidence 
of Hossain et al. (1994); Barako et al. (2006) and García-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta (2010), 
who found a negative association between ownership concentration and voluntary disclosure.  
With respect to control variables, firm size measured by the natural logarithm of total assets 
is statistically significantly positively associated with the extensiveness of carbon disclosure 
in the full model at the 1% level (β= 1.424, p < 0.01, two-tailed), indicating that large 
companies tend to disclose more of their GHG emissions information. The results of my 
analysis regarding firm size are consistent with prior studies (Deegan & Gordon 1996; Neu et 
al., 1998; Eng & Mak, 2003; Cormier et al., 2005; Brammer & Pavelin, 2006, 2008; Clarkson 
et al. 2007; Stanny & Ely, 2008; Prado-Lorenzo et al. 2009; Jiang & Habib, 2009; Cormier et 
al. 2011; Peters & Romi, 2011;   Rupley et al. 2012; Luo et al., 2013; Wegener et al. 2013; 
Liao et al. 2014; Shan & Taylor, 2014; Peng et al. 2015). However, profitability (ROA) has 
no significant relationship with the extensiveness of carbon disclosure. This implies that 
profitability may not influence voluntary GHG disclosures. This result is congruent with the 
work of Rankin et al. (2011), who found that return of assets (ROA) is not significantly 
related to GHG emissions disclosure in Australian firms. The results are also in line with 
previous studies (Patten, 1991; Eng & Mak, 2003; Freedman & Jaggi, 2005; Stanny & Ely, 
2008; Prado-Lorenzo et al. 2009; Cotter & Najah, 2011; Peters & Romi, 2011; Wegener et al. 
2013), which showed an insignificant association between profitability and environmental 
disclosure. Similarly, leverage has a positive but not significant relation to the extensiveness 
of carbon disclosure, showing that leverage does not play a significant role in GHG emissions 
disclosure. This result is consistent with the earlier evidence of Freedman & Jaggi, (2005); 
Stanny & Ely, 2008; Rankin et al. (2011) &Luo et al, (2012), who found that leverage is an 
insignificant predictor of GHG emissions disclosure. On a more general level, the result is 
also in line with Craswell & Taylor (1992) & Raffournier (1995), who documented an 
insignificant association with voluntary disclosure decisions. The results also show that the 
coefficient of Tobin’s Q does not show a significant association with the extensiveness of 
carbon disclosure. This result indicates that this variable does not play a notable role in the 
extensiveness of carbon disclosure. This result is consistent with prior studies by Stanny & 
Ely, (2008); Luo et al. (2012); He et al. (2013) & Wegener et al. (2013), who confirmed that 
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Tobin’s Q does not show a significant association with carbon disclosure. My results from 
the regression analysis further indicate that capital intensity is statistically not significantly 
associated with the extensiveness of carbon disclosure. This result is also consistent with 
prior studies (e.g. Stanny & Ely, 2008), which were unable to find any association between 
capital intensity and carbon disclosure. Finally, my results show that Intensive Sectors is not 
significant with the extensiveness of carbon disclosure. 
5.7 Sensitivity and Robustness Checks 
 
The current chapter has also conducted several robustness tests to assess the reliability of the 
regression model described in Table 5.4, namely, board size measured using a cut-off basis, 
audit committee independence measured using a cut-off basis, and an alternative measure for 
firm size. 
5.7.1 Board Size measured using a cut-off basis 
 
Following Jensen (1993), who suggested that more than eight members on a board are less 
likely to function effectively, I have employed eight board members as the cut-off basis for 
an alternative measure of board size. Therefore, the current chapter has used the same 
technique to measure board size, where board size was measured as a dummy variable by 
taking the value of 1 if board size is equal to or more than eight members, and 0 otherwise. 
The results of my analysis (which are un-tabulated) show that the coefficient on board size 
has become insignificant, while the coefficient of NIDAC was marginally significant at the 
10% level. However, this result does not appear to have a significant effect on the rest of the 
initial results reported in Table 5.4. 
 
 
5.7.2 Audit committee independence measured using a cut-off basis 
 
As previously discussed, this chapter has also used a 100% threshold as the cut-off point 
following published literature and governance reports, e.g., Menon and Williams, 1994; 
BRC, 1999, ASX, 2003, Davidson et al. 2005, who suggested that the audit committee should 
consist exclusively of non-executive or independent directors. In addition, previous studies 
such as Klein, (2002a); Bedard, Chtourou, & Courteau (2004), Davidson et al. (2005) and 
 163 
 
Baxter and Cotter (2009), examined the sensitivity of audit committee independence to 
specific cut-offs.  This chapter has conducted the same technique to measure the 
independence of an audit committee measured as a dummy variable by taking the value of 1 
if the audit committee is composed solely of independent directors and 0 otherwise. The 
results of my analysis (which are un-tabulated) are the same to those described in Table 5.4, 
with the coefficient for board size and board diversity significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels. 
5.7.3 Alternative measure for company size 
 
Previous studies such as Stanwick & Stanwick (2001) and Berrone et al. (2010) have 
employed the logarithm of the firm’s total sales as a proxy for firm size. Thus, the present 
section employed this measure as an alternative measure for firm size. The results of my 
analysis (which are un-tabulated) are the same to those reported in Table 5.4, with the 
coefficient for firm size and board diversity are significant at the 0.1 and 0.01 levels. Another 
alternative measure of firm size were performed, which was the total market capitalisation 
and the results (which are not reported) are consistent with the main findings. 
 
5.7.4 Alternative Measures of independent variable 
 
I have re-run my results with alternative definitions of board independence, board diversity, 
audit committee independence, compensation committee independence and nomination 
committee independence by using the proportion proxy instead of using the actual numbers 
of these variables, for example, NIDB to NDB as board independence, NFBD to NDB as 
female percentage, NIDAC to NAC as the proportion of independent directors on the audit 
committee, NIDCC to NCC as the proportion of independent directors on the compensation 
committee  and NIDNC to NNC as the proportion of independent directors on the nomination 
committee . I find that the results (which not tabulated) do not alter my main findings. 
5.7.5 Endogeneity Test 
 
I test the regression model for the endogeneity problem that could potentially affect the 
results of my analysis. Following previous studies (e.g. Lim et al., 2007 and Gisbert & 
Navallas, 2013). I, first, conducted the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test to determine whether or 
not endogeniety exists between C_DIS and LOG_MANAG_OWN in our paper. By using this 
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technique, the results of Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (which not tabulated) indicate that the 
coefficient of managerial ownership was significant in the model, implying that my main 
findings were affected by the endogeneity issue. To address endogeneity problem properly, I 
resort to a two-stage least methodology. In the first equation, I regressed the endogenous 
variable (LOG_MANAG_OWN) with all exogenous variables to obtain the fitted value of 
LOG_MANAG_OWN. In the second stage analysis, I estimate the fitted values of 
LOG_MANAG_OWN derived from the first stage and re-run the main model again.  The 
findings (which not tabulated) of the two-stage least squares remained the same, but the 
effect of managerial ownership on C_DIS becomes insignificant. Therefore, I can continue 
with OLS regression analysis as the main results. 
5.8 Concluding Comments 
 
This chapter has reviewed the empirical results with regard to the second part of this thesis 
which examined the association between corporate governance mechanisms and the 
extensiveness of carbon disclosure in the largest Australian companies over a four year 
period (2009 to 2012). This chapter began by testing the validity of the regression model. In 
this section I described the fundamental assumptions that can determine the validity of the 
underlying regression model. After I applied the multiple regression technique to assess the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and carbon disclosure, I provided 
descriptive statistics for all variables: dependent, independent, and control variables that 
performed in the empirical model. In this chapter, I further conducted the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) and correlation coefficient to test the existence of multicollinearity in this model. 
The results show that there is no issue of multicollineraity between the independent and 
control variables.   In addition, an OLS regression model was adopted in order to explain the 
impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the extensiveness of carbon disclosure. 
Based on the overall results, it can be concluded that the coefficient of board independence 
(NIDB), board diversity (NFDB), and managerial ownership (LOG_MANAG_OWN) are 
significantly positively associated with the extensiveness of carbon disclosure (C_DIS); 
however, compensation committee independence (NIDCC) is negatively related to the 
extensiveness of carbon disclosure and board size (NDB) is marginally significant with 
carbon disclosure (C_DIS). In respect to other variables of corporate governance 
mechanisms; board meetings (NBM), audit committee independence (NIDAC), nomination 
committee independence (NIDNC), the existence of environmental committee (EC_D), and 
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ownership concentration (LOG_OWN_CONC) are not significantly associated with the 
extensiveness of carbon disclosure. Among the control variables, the results also indicate that 
only firm size (FSIZE) has a positive association with the extensiveness of carbon disclosure. 
Finally, this chapter has carried out a number of additional tests to check the robustness of the 
main regression model. 
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CHAPTER SIX:  CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND 
FURTHER RESEARCH AVENUES 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Carbon emissions have sharply grown since the Industrial Revolution began roughly 250 
years ago. So modern day companies have been encouraged by their stakeholders to reduce 
their carbon emissions and disclose carbon information (Peng et al. 2015). Although 
Australian companies and industry are considered to be one of the major contributors of GHG 
emissions, little public policy has been published to guide large companies to address climate 
change (Pearse, 2009).  Thus, the Australian Governments has introduced programs, 
initiatives and legislation designed to reduce carbon emissions as evidenced by the Australian 
National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting (NGER) Act, 2007 and Australian Government 
Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, 2010 which laid down GHG 
measurement requirements and GHG emissions reporting. 
Consequently, this thesis set out to achieve three main objectives. The first was to examine 
the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on carbon performance. My second 
objective was to investigate whether the corporate governance indicators are linked with the 
extensiveness of carbon disclosure. The third objective was to explore whether existing 
conceptual framework can explain the association between corporate governance and carbon 
performance and carbon disclosure. It used sample from the largest Australian companies 
which participated in the CDP over the 2009 - 2012 period. Therefore, the main research 
question to be answered was: To what extent is good corporate governance related to 
relatively better carbon performance and/or carbon disclosures? In order to answer the 
research question, the current study has developed a number of hypotheses based on the 
previous studies and theoretical background. These hypotheses have been examined in the 
empirical sections by using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) multiple regression analysis. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 briefly concludes the overview of 
main results of this thesis; section 6.3 discusses the fundamental research contributions that 
can contribute to the empirical literature followed by section 6.4 which covers the potential 
implications of research results that can provide for policy makers, managers and researchers; 
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section 6.5 provides several limitations of this study; while section 6.6 highlights 
recommendations for future research; section 6.7 summarises this chapter.   
6.2 Overview of the Main Results 
 
The purpose of this empirical study was to consider the impact of corporate governance on 
carbon performance and the extensiveness of carbon disclosure. It was based on the largest 
Australian companies which participated in the CDP over the period of 2009 - 2012.  This 
section will summarise the research results of the previous. Specifically, subsection 6.2.1 will 
summarise the research result based on the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and carbon performance. Subsection 6.2.2 will present a summary of the 
research results based on the association between governance mechanisms and carbon 
disclosure. 
6.2.1 Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Carbon performance 
 
The results of the first empirical work indicated that most of the corporate government 
strength is not significantly related to carbon performance (except for environmental 
committee). More specifically, consistent with hypothesis H1.1, that there is no significant 
association between board size and carbon performance. The results suggest that board size is 
not significantly related to carbon performance. Furthermore, the results of analysis found 
strong support that the presence of an environmental committee was positively associated 
with carbon performance, which is in line with hypothesis H1.6. In addition, the results of my 
analysis indicate that the two aspects of compensation structure (CEO stock option, CEO 
long term bonus), were insignificantly associated with carbon performance, which is 
consistent with my hypotheses H1.7, H1.8. The findings also indicate that managerial 
ownership and ownership concentration are not statistically significant with carbon 
performance, which is keeping with my hypotheses H1.9, H1.10. Among to the control 
variables, the results also indicate carbon performance is sensitive to some financial 
indicators such as leverage, Tobin’s Q, and capital intensity. The results are summarised in 
Table 6.1. These results were consistent with several robustness checks.  
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Table 6.1: Overview of the Results 
Hypotheses findings 
H1.1: There is no significant association between the number of directors 
in the board and carbon performance. 
Supported 
H1.2: There is significant association between board independence and 
carbon performance. 
Not supported 
H1.3: There is a positive association between corporate board diversity and 
carbon performance. 
Not supported 
H1.4: There is a positive association between the number of board 
meetings and carbon performance. 
Not supported 
H1.5: There is a positive association between the independence of an audit 
committee and carbon performance. 
Not supported 
H1.6: There is a positive association between the presence of 
environmental committee and carbon performance. 
Supported  
H1.7: There is no significant association between CEO stock options and 
carbon performance. 
Supported 
H1.8: There is no significant association between the CEO long term 
bonus and carbon performance. 
Supported 
H1.9: There is no significant association between ownership concentration 
and carbon performance. 
Supported 
H1.10: There is no significant association between managerial ownership 
and carbon performance. 
Supported 
  
 
6.2.2 Corporate Governance Mechanisms and the extensiveness of Carbon Disclosure 
 
The results of the second phase of this research showed that four variables of corporate 
governance were associated with the extensiveness of carbon disclosure; three positively and 
one negatively. More specifically, the results revealed that board independence were 
significantly and positively associated with the extensiveness of carbon disclosure, 
supporting hypothesis H2.2. In addition, the statistical results indicate a positive relationship 
between board diversity and the extensiveness of carbon disclosure, which is also consistent 
with my hypothesis H2.3. Moreover, hypothesis H2.10 assumes that managerial ownership 
will be positively associated with the extensiveness of carbon disclosure. As expected, a 
positive relationship between managerial ownership and the extensiveness of carbon 
disclosure is found. On the other hand, the result of testing H2.1 indicates that board size was 
significantly and negatively associated with the extensiveness of carbon disclosure, however, 
the result was only significant at the 10% level.  With respect to control variables, only firm 
size was significantly positively associated with the extensiveness of carbon disclosure. 
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Whereas, other control variables (leverage, profitability, Tobin’s Q, Capital intensity and 
Intensive Sector) are not related to the extensiveness of carbon disclosure. The results are 
summarised in Table 6.2.  
Table 6.2: Overview of the Results 
Hypotheses findings 
H2.1: There is a positive association between the number of directors in 
the board and the extensiveness of carbon emissions disclosure.   
Not supported 
H2.2: There is a positive association between the independent boards of 
directors and the extensiveness of carbon disclosure. 
Supported 
H2.3: There is a positive association between the number of female on 
the board and the extensiveness of carbon emissions disclosure. 
Supported  
H2.4: There is a positive association between that the number of board 
meetings and the extensiveness of carbon emissions disclosure. 
Not supported 
H2.5: There is a positive association between the independence of an 
audit committee and the extensiveness of carbon emissions 
disclosure. 
Not supported 
H2.6: There is a positive association between the independence of 
compensation committee and the extensiveness of carbon 
emissions disclosure 
Not supported  
H2.7: There is a positive association between the independence of 
nomination committee and the extensiveness of carbon emissions 
disclosure. 
Not supported 
H2.8: There is a positive association between the presence of an 
environmental committee and the extensiveness of carbon 
emissions disclosure. 
Not supported 
H2.9: There is a positive association between ownership concentration 
and the extensiveness of carbon emissions disclosure. 
Not supported 
H2.10: There is a positive association between managerial ownership 
and the extensiveness of carbon emissions disclosure. 
Supported 
 
6.3 Research Contributions 
 
There are few studies that have predominantly investigated the relationship between 
corporate governance and environmental disclosure. And even fewer studies specifically 
address carbon performance and disclosure in Australia. In this respect, the current study 
contributes to two different branches of accounting research. First, this study contributes to 
the corporate governance literature by analysing whether corporate governance mechanisms 
serve to monitor, guide and reward carbon actions. Whilst previous work has investigated the 
relationship between corporate governance and environmental performance (Kassinis & 
Vafeas, 2002; de Villiers et al. 2011; Walls et al. 2012), few studies have examined the link 
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between individual corporate governance mechanisms and environmental and social 
reporting (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Rankin et al. 2011; Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012; 
Kathyayini et al, 2012) The study’s results also contribute to the recent literature (e.g. Rankin 
et al. 2011; de Villiers et al. 2011,2013; Ben-Amar & McIlkenny,2014 & Liao et al. 2014) by 
examining a comprehensive set of corporate governance mechanisms and their impacts on 
carbon performance and disclosure. Second, this study adds to the environmental research by 
providing archival evidence of the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on carbon 
performance and disclosure. This study focuses on carbon emissions performance and 
disclosure, while much of previous studies, for example, Kassinis & Vafeas, (2002); Haniffa 
& Cooke, (2005); de Villiers et al. (2011); Walls et al. (2012); Michelon & Parbonetti, (2012) 
& Kathyayini et al. (2012) focused on general sustainability (social and environmental) 
performance and disclosures. The present study also provides evidence of corporate 
governance mechanisms and a number of company-specific characteristics as control 
variables on carbon performance and disclosures in Australia, where there is a lack of 
empirical evidence specifically focused on this association. Currently the literature is limited 
to the issues related to water and toxic chemical pollution rather than carbon pollution. 
Moreover, the current study will fill the gap and to my knowledge this is the first study to 
examine the issue in Australia by using comprehensive corporate governance indicators.  The 
study chooses Australian firms because Australia is one of the highest per capita carbon 
emitters in the world and Australia will be significantly and negatively affected by global 
warming (Lue & Tang, 2014). Additionally the Australian government has introduced a 
series of GHG legislation which signal a new era of transition toward a carbon constrained 
economy. For the majority of Australian firms, the exposure to carbon liability has much 
more financial implication than general environmental exposure. This is due to the fact that 
these firms do not have water or toxic chemical air pollution problem, but any carbon 
emission is subject to carbon tax existed in Australia recently and it was repealed in 2014. 
Therefore, the results of my study contribute to a growing literature on corporate governance, 
in association with climate change and presents new evidence of how carbon performance 
and disclosure are impacted by corporate governance. 
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6.4 Research Implications 
 
In addition, the results of this study provide a valuable insight to policy makers/ regulators, 
corporate governance standard setters, investors and academics who may be interested in 
global climate change and GHG emissions and corporate governance practice. A brief 
discussion of each of these implications follows. 
The results of this study should provide a useful insight for policy makers in Australian 
companies to pinpoint the aspects of corporate governance that could affect the firm's carbon 
performance and disclosures. More specifically, the policy makers should recognise the vital 
role played by the presence of an environmental committee on the board as one of corporate 
governance’s characteristics in driving carbon performance of companies. One potential 
explanation for the inclusion of environmental committees on boars is that environmental 
committees are much more expedient in responding to institutional pressures to reduce 
carbon emissions (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009a). They also can use my results to 
emphasise governance mechanisms that may enhance carbon activities in their company. In 
addition, in respect of regulators, they also play an important role in helping companies to 
better manage carbon activities and reduce their emissions. Thus, it is expected that 
regulators in government can use this result to identify good elements of corporate 
governance that may deserve further regulatory focus in order to achieve the carbon policy 
objectives. Regulators can be using these results to consider the potential aspects of corporate 
governance that could impact on the carbon legislation. Furthermore, the findings also should 
provide a useful guide to corporate governance standard setters, especially in Australia, about 
the importance of sound corporate governance in understanding the determinants of GHG 
emissions disclosure. Thus, can use my results as empirical support to evaluate the role of 
corporate governance in improving the carbon performance and carbon disclosure. Moreover, 
investors are becoming more concerned about GHG emissions and corporate responses to it. 
Therefore, it is expected that investors urge companies to analyse and disclose more 
information relating to the firm’s GHG emissions. My results are of interest to investors as 
they provide a useful basis for understanding the impact of corporate governance on carbon 
performance and disclosure that may inform investors on how to foster reliable carbon 
information, so that they can make better decisions in their investment. Finally, my results 
can extend academic research attempting to enhance my understanding of the impact of 
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corporate governance in their different aspects on carbon performance and the extensiveness 
of carbon disclosure. 
6.5 Research Limitations 
 
As with other studies, the results of this thesis have some limitations that should be 
acknowledged and could help future researches. The first limitation of this study is that the 
sample size is relatively small and restricted to those firms that completed the CDP 2009 -
2012 questionnaire in Australia. Therefore, the result may suffer from the self- selection bias 
due to the limited availability of firm-level carbon data. Further, the sample of this research is 
limited to largest Australian companies this can also lead to some self-selection bias and 
consequently the results may not extend to small- and medium-sized firms and cannot be 
generalised to other types of firms. In addition the issue of unbalanced panel data could be 
biased to my results. At the same time, this study only ran for four years, which appears a 
relatively short period and therefore the result may not be generalised to longer periods of 
time. The second limitation of the study pertains to the fact that since my analysis is restricted 
to carbon performance and carbon disclosures, the results cannot extrapolate to social 
/environmental performance and disclosures more broadly. The third limitation is that my 
study only looks at the carbon emission that related to carbon performance and relies on the 
total Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions divided by the total sales at the end of fiscal year to 
measure this variable. Scope 3 carbon emissions were not considered for this thesis because it 
is still not well-defined; thus, a lot of companies do not disclose this information (He et al. 
2013). Regarding the carbon disclosure, this study focuses on CDP reports in my analysis, 
therefore my results to information disclosed cannot be generalised via other media such as a 
company’s website or a press release. Another possible limitation in my study is that the 
sample of the current study includes only internal governance mechanisms, although other 
external governance mechanisms may influence a company’s carbon activities. In addition, 
this study has been concentrated only on the individual aspects of corporate governance but 
did not consider the interaction effects that can occur among independent variables.  
6.6 Future Research Avenues  
 
This thesis raises a number of new potential avenues that could be rectified in future research. 
One possible avenue for future research is that the data collection could be extended to 
include companies in non-Australian contexts or to small- and medium-sized companies that 
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could yield some interesting comparative results. A second possible avenue of study could be 
to extend the analysis to a longer period of time to examine whether an improvement of 
corporate governance would lead to improved carbon performance and disclosures. Another 
possible avenue for future study is examining the alternative measures of a firm’s carbon 
performance that might be more likely to draw more attention than others. For example, the 
valuation relevance of a firm’s carbon emissions which have been examined by Krishnan 
(2003), cited in Luo and Tang, (2014b). Also, (He et al. 2013) recommended using the impact 
of carbon activities on share price for carbon performance. A further potential avenue for 
future research is testing the integrated effect of internal and external corporate governance 
mechanisms that may influence a company’s carbon activities. Moreover, future research 
may consider the combined effect of any interaction among corporate governance that could 
provide further useful insights as to whether corporate governance mechanisms have any role 
to play in GHG emissions disclosures Although the endogeneity problems typically occur in 
much of the corporate governance variables and disclosure quality, future studies can 
replicate this study with other more sophisticated methodologies (e.g. two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) approach) to address this issue that may produce other meaningful results.  
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